Powers v. City Of Richmond

• Decision Date: 24 January 1918
• Citation: 122 Va. 328,94 S.E. 803
• Parties: POWERS et al. v. CITY OF RICHMOND.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

94 S.E. 803

(122 Va. 328)

POWERS et al.

v.CITY OF RICHMOND.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 24, 1918.

Appeal from Chancery Court of Richmond.

Petition by the City of Richmond against Jefferson C. Powers and others. Decree for the City, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Robert H. Talley, of Richmond, for appellants.

H. R. Pollard, of Richmond, for appellee.

PRENTIS, J. The city of Richmond filed its petition in the pending cause of Powers v. Powers, alleging that certain) property known as No. 3116 East Broad street, Richmond, Va., had been purchased by direction of the court in that cause for the use of Annie I. Tallay (who was the widow of Jefferson Powers, deceased) during her life, with remainder to the appellants, his children, and asserting the claim of the city to a lien for $774.61 and interest, alleged to be due for taxes thereon from 1905 to 1915, inclusive. These taxes had accrued during the time the property was held and occupied by Mrs. Powers, the life tenant. The appellants filed an answer to that petition, denying the existence of the lien for taxes against their interests as remaindermen, and denying that the taxes claimed had been legally or properly assessed upon the-property, as well as the authority of the city to levy therefor, insisting that the taxes were a lien upon the life estate only, and that the provisions of the charter of the city under which the claim for taxes is based are violative of both the federal and state Constitutions.

The property having been sold under decree of court, a sufficient sum was retained to satisfy the claim of the city. The trial court determined that the city was entitled to the amount of the taxes claimed, entered its decree to this effect, and from that decree this appeal was taken.

The claim of the city is based upon an act approved March 6, 1900 (Acts 1899-1900, p 944), entitled:

"An act to amend and re-enact sections 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, and 83 of the act approved May 24, 1870, providing a charter for the city of Richmond and the acts amendatory thereof, relating to the lien of the city for taxes assessed on real estate, and to the sale thereof for nonpayment of taxes."

These amendments to the charter of the city were passed at the session of the Legislature immediately succeeding the decision of the case of Tabb v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 47, 34 S. E. 946, 51 L R. A. 283, whichheld that neither state nor city taxes assessed on real estate held by a life tenant constituted a lien upon the interest of the remaindermen in property so assessed. The avowed purpose of securing these amendments to the charter was to secure to the city a lien on such interests, and to this end section 75 provides that there shall be a lien on all real estate and on each and every interest therein for city taxes assessed thereon from the commencement of the year for which they are assessed; section 79, that any person having an interest in such real estate, by way of reversion, remainder, or otherwise, may redeem the same, if the land has been sold for such taxes; section 82, that nothing in that section shall be construed to affect or impair the lien of the city on said real estate, and on each and every interest therein, or to afreet, limit, or impair the right of the city when it becomes a purchaser of such real estate at a delinquent tax sale; and section 83, that the city may, at any time, elect to enforce its lien for such taxes in a court of equity. There can be no doubt whatever that this act, if valid, fully sustains the decree of the trial court.

1. It is claimed by the appellants, among other things, that this act was invalid at the time of its adoption, because section 16 of article 10 of the Constitution of 1869 provides that:

"Every law which imposes, continues or revives a tax, shall distinctly state the tax, and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object, "

—as well as under section 50 of the present Constitution (Code 1904, p. ccxx), which provides that:

"Every law imposing, continuing or reviving a tax shall specifically state such tax and no law shall be construed as so stating such tax, which requires a reference to any other law or any other tax."

These sections are substantially similar, so that it may be said that if invalid under that section of the present Constitution, it was invalid under the former Constitution. We cannot, however, accept the suggestion that either of these sections is in conflict with the act referred to. The act simply relates to the lien of the city for taxes. It neither imposes, continues, nor revives a tax, and so the constitutional provisions referred to do not affect the question. While we think the language of the two Constitutions is sufficient thus to settle this question, it is nevertheless not difficult to find authority to sustain that construction.

In 37 Cyc. at page 228, this is said: "The Constitutions of several states provide that every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same, to which only it shall be applied. It is held, however, that this applies only to the ordinary and general taxes for state purposes, and such as are imposed generally on all the taxable property in the state, and not to local taxes for local purposes, or to special taxes on peculiar kinds of property, or such as are in the nature of license or occupation fees; nor does the provision apply to laws which merely provide or regulate the machinery for assessing and collecting the tax."

The notes to the text refer to many authorities which sustain it.

To uphold the position of counsel for the appellants would be to disrupt a system of taxation which has always been in force in Virginia, and as we believe in most of the states of the Union. From the earliest date, the local authorities in the counties and cities of the commonwealth have by the General Assembly been authorized to impose local taxes and fix the rates thereof.

In Gilkeson v. Frederick Justices, 13 Grat. (54 Va.) 583, this is said:

"The power of the General Assembly to confer authority on county courts, city councils, corporations, and other organized bodies to impose local taxes for local purposes had been exercised from the adoption of the first Constitution down to the formation of the last. The rates and subjects of taxation were different in many instances, if not in all; the powers conferred were not always the same, but were varied to meet the exigencies of particular circumstances, and frequently were left to the discretion of the body on which they were conferred. All this was known to the convention; yet no explicit provision was inserted in the Constitution changing this power of the General Assembly. Surely if a change in the whole scheme of local taxation was intended, the convention would have expressed the intention in plain terms, and not have left us to arrive at it by a forced construction."

In Henrico County v. City of Richmond, 106 Va. at page 296, 55 S. E. at page 688 (117 Am. St. Rep. 1001), this is said:

"If there is any sovereign power universally recognized as legislative in its character, it is the power to levy taxes; and yet this court has held that the General Assembly had power to confer upon the county courts authority to levy taxes for local purposes"—citing In re County Levy, 5 Call, 139; Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Grat. (44 Va.) 247; Gilkeson v. Frederick Justices, 13 Grat. (54 Va.) 583.

The-inconvenience of any other construction is perfectly apparent. The Legislature would be driven to the necessity of making such local rates uniform in the various counties and cities of the commonwealth, for it would be without the information to enable it to pass laws providing for the various rates of taxation necessary in order to meet the varying local needs.

There have been several cases in Virginia holding that municipalities with charters like that of the city of Richmond have general powers of taxation, with power to tax all subjects within their jurisdiction, even though the state does not levy a tax upon such subjects. City of Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark, 95 Va. 564, 28 S. E. 959; Newport News, etc., Co. v. Newport News, 100 Va. 157, 40 S. E. 645; Woodall v. Lynchburg, 100 Va. 318, 40 S. E. 915; Myers, Receiver, v. Richmond, 110 Va. 605, 66 S. E. 826.

There can be no doubt, then, that the sections of the Constitution above referred to donot restrain the Legislature to the extent asserted, and that that legislation is not invalid under these sections of either the! old or the new Constitution. This statute simply extends a lien, and does not relate to the imposing, continuing, or reviving of taxes.

2. It is also claimed that in order for the lien to attach there must have been a valid assessment, and this of course is true; and that because the property was assessed for taxation in the name of the life tenant; therefore, it could not affect the interest of the remaindermen. It must be remembered, however, that it is an assessment of the property itself which is involved.

Section 465 of the Code provides:

"In the table of tracts of land the commissioner shall enter each tract separately, and set forth in as many columns as may be necessary the name of the person who by himself or his tenant has the freehold in possession, his place of residence, the nature of his estate, whether in fee or for life, the number of acres in the tract, " etc.

It is the value of land that is assessed, and under the statute must be assessed, in the name of the person who by himself or his tenant has the freehold in possession. He it is who under the Virginia statutes is assessed with the property, and it is well settled that if the person so assessed has an estate for life, it is his duty to pay the taxes.

In Cooley on Taxation, vol. 1, pp. 731, 732, this is said:

"By the owner of property for purposes of taxation is meant the legal and not the...