Powers v. Csx Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.99-0326-RV-S.,CIV.A.99-0326-RV-S. |
| Citation | 188 F.Supp.2d 857 |
| Parties | Oreatha POWERS, etc., Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Charles R. Godwin, Timothy J. Godwin, Atmore, AL, for Plaintiff.
Brian P. McCarthy, Jerry A. McDowell, Todd Preston Resavage, McDowell Knight Roedder & Sledge, L.L.C., Lawrence M. Wettermark, Thomas O. Gaillard, III, Galloway, Smith, Wettermark & Everest, LLP, Mobile, AL, Jim R. Ippolito, Jr., Gilda Branch Williams, T. Dudley Perry, Jr., Robert M. Alton, III, Department of Transportation State of Alabama Legal Division, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on several defense motions for summary judgment: that of CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"), G.A. Owens and C.M. Cooper (collectively, "the CSX defendants"), (Doc. 138); that of the City of Atmore ("the City"), (Doc. 141); and that of the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ADOT") and Dykes Rushing. (Doc. 133). The parties have filed briefs and evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions, (Docs. 134-35, 137-39, 142-43, 149-50, 155, 158, 165), and the defendants' motions are now ripe for resolution.1 After careful consideration of the parties' briefs and of those portions of their evidentiary submissions specifically cited in their briefs,2 the Court concludes that ADOT's and Rushing's motion for summary judgment is due to be granted in its entirety and that the motions for summary judgment filed by the other defendants are due to be granted as to the plaintiffs federal claims. The Court further concludes that the plaintiffs supplemental state law claims are due to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).3
Terrence Terrell Rogers died early on November 13, 1997, several hours after the vehicle he was driving was struck by a train owned and operated by CSX. Rogers was struck as he attempted to traverse the CSX track at the Martin Luther King, Jr. crossing (the "MLK crossing") in Atmore, Alabama. The plaintiffs second amended complaint contains eight counts, as follows:
• Count One: Negligence
• Count Two: Wantonness
• Count Three: Substantive Due Process
• Count Four: Equal Protection
• Count Five: 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI)
• Count Six: Thirteenth Amendment
• Count Seven: 42 U.S.C. § 1982
• Count Eight: 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(Doc. 41). CSX and the City are named as defendants under all eight counts. ADOT and Rushing are named as defendants only under Counts Three through Eight, while Owens and Cooper are named as defendants only under Counts One and Two. Rushing is sued in both his official and individual capacities. (Id.).
The Court has subject matter over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). Once the moving party has satisfied her responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "If the nonmoving party fails to make `a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)) (footnote omitted). Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994 999 (11th Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
I. Federal Claims.
Count Three of the second amended complaint alleges that, despite actual or imputed knowledge of the dangerousness of the MLK crossing, the defendants "consciously refused to prevent the automobile/train collision which killed Plaintiffs decedent by refusing to install crossing gates and flashing light signals at the MLK crossing prior to said collision" and thereby "affirmatively placed members of a suspect class, including Plaintiffs decedent, in a dangerous position which they would not otherwise have faced." The complaint continues that the defendants installed active warning devices in the City "in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner displaying callous and deliberate indifference toward the City of Atmore's black community in which Plaintiff and her son resided." The complaint concludes that the defendants' "conscious and intentional decision to omit installation of crossing arms and flashing light signals at the MLK crossing when they had an affirmative duty to do so deprived Plaintiffs decedent of his constitutionally protected life interest" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process. (Doc. 41 at 20-22).
The CSX defendants and the City have moved for summary judgment as to Count Three and properly supported their motions. (Doc. 138 at 47-49; Doc. 142 at 15-29).4 The plaintiff, who has failed to respond in any meaningful way to the defendants' motions, has effectively abandoned her claim for violation of the substantive due process clause.5 At any rate, and as explained below, the plaintiff has no such claim.
"As a general matter, then, we conclude that a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). That is, the Due Process Clause "forbids the State itself" to deprive individuals of life, liberty or property without due process of law, id. at 195, 109 S.Ct. 998, but it does not "ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other." Id. at 196, 109 S.Ct. 998.
Rogers was deprived of his life by a collision with a train owned and operated by CSX. While the plaintiff alleges that CSX was a state actor for purposes of installing active warning devices at the crossing, (Doc. 41 at 21), it is uncontroverted that CSX was purely a private actor with respect to its operation of its train on November 12, 1997. Rogers was thus deprived of his life by "private violence" which, under DeShaney, generally will not support a substantive due process claim. Neither of the two exceptions to the general rule applies here.
First, the Constitution may require the government affirmatively to protect an individual from private violence when the individual is in custody. 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998. Rogers, of course, was not in custody as he drove his vehicle across the track. Any theory that a "special relationship" short of custody could support an affirmative duty to protect individuals from private harm was laid to rest in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). See White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.1999)("After Collins, it appears the only relationships that automatically give rise to a governmental duty to protect individuals from harm by third parties under the substantive due process clause are custodial relationships ....").
Second, the DeShaney Court noted that an affirmative duty to protect individuals not in custody from private dangers could not arise where the government "played no part in their creation nor did ... anything to render [the individual] any more vulnerable to them." 489 U.S. at 201, 109 S.Ct. 998. Some courts have read this obscure dicta to suggest that the converse is also true, so that a government may take on an affirmative duty to protect a non-custodial individual when the government creates the danger or renders the individual more vulnerable to a danger created by others. The Eleventh Circuit initially concluded that this portion of DeShaney was consistent with the circuit's "special danger" analysis for identifying duties owed to individuals not in custody. Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 354-56 (11th Cir.1989). More recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the "special danger" analysis "has been supplanted"6 by Collins. White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d at 1258. "Under Collins, government officials violate the substantive due process rights of a person not in custody only by conduct `that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. at 128, 112 S.Ct. 1061); accord County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)(Collins held that the substantive due process clause "is violated by executive action only" when it is arbitrary or conscience shocking)(emphasis added)!
Thus, the plaintiff can pursue a substantive due process claim only if the defendants' conduct was "arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense." This standard is to be "narrowly interpreted and applied," White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d at 1258, and "only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be `arbitrary in the constitutional sense.'" County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708. Among other restrictions, conduct that is not undertaken with a deliberate intent to injure will seldom satisfy the...
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