Powers v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 26 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-50983,18-50983 |
| Parties | Don POWERS; Karon Wernli, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. NORTHSIDE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; Brian T. Woods, Defendants - Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
951 F.3d 298
Don POWERS; Karon Wernli, Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
NORTHSIDE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; Brian T. Woods, Defendants - Appellees
No. 18-50983
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
FILED February 26, 2020
Mark W. Robinett, Attorney, Jefferson K. Brim, Esq., Brim, Arnett, Robinett, Conners & McCormick, P.C., Austin, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Donald Craig Wood, Attorney, Katie Elizabeth Payne, Walsh Gallegos Trevino Russo Kyle, San Antonio, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
KURT D. ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Don Powers and Karon Wernli filed suit against their former employer, Northside Independent School District (NISD) and its superintendent Brian Woods, asserting free speech and retaliation claims in violation of their First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Article 1, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution ; and the Texas Whistleblower Act. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge several of the district court’s rulings, as well as its final judgment in favor of Defendants. We AFFIRM.
I.
Powers and Wernli, formerly the principal and assistant principal, respectively, of Adams Hill Elementary School, were employed by NISD, pursuant to two-year term contracts that were set to expire at the end of the 2014–15 school year. During the 2012–13 school year, Plaintiffs, along with three other Adams Hill educators, served on a committee (the 504 committee) which was convened for the purpose of implementing regulations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1
Plaintiffs’ Section 504 Practices
In May 2013, the 504 committee met to conduct an evaluation of J.B., a student diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The 504 committee determined that J.B. had a reading disability and was therefore entitled to an oral administration accommodation for the upcoming STAAR test.2 However, on June 20, 2013, Anna Draker, who was NISD’s Section 504 program coordinator at the time, reviewed J.B.’s Section 504 documentation. After concluding that J.B. did not meet the criteria to qualify for oral administration on state tests, Draker notified Plaintiffs that J.B. would not be given the accommodation for the STAAR test.
Following this incident, NISD conducted an investigation of Adams Hill’s Section 504 files and 2013 STAAR testing procedures. In July 2013, Draker and the NISD investigative team met with Wernli and later with Powers to inform them of potential STAAR testing errors and Section 504 violations at Adams Hill. After his meeting with NISD, Powers called the Texas Education Agency (TEA)3 to validate that he and Wernli were "on the right approach for accommodations on the 504 for oral administration." The following day, Wernli also called the TEA because she "felt adamant to report ... that [NISD] had violated the law by taking J.B.’s rights away from him." Wernli and Powers both placed several subsequent calls to the TEA to validate their Section 504 procedures and to report NISD’s allegedly unlawful conduct.
Thereafter, on July 24 and July 30, 2013, respectively, NISD suspended Powers and Wernli pending the outcome of their investigation into Plaintiffs’ Section 504 and STAAR administrative practices. Upon the investigation’s conclusion, NISD filed an incident report with the TEA setting forth the investigative team’s findings that Plaintiffs intentionally authorized inappropriate student testing accommodations
based on a misapplication of Section 504 eligibility requirements.
Administrative Proceedings
In early September 2013, Plaintiffs filed grievances asserting that NISD imposed their suspensions in retaliation for Plaintiffs reporting NISD’s conduct to the TEA. After hearing Plaintiffs’ grievances, NISD’s superintendent, Brian Woods, denied their requested remedies. Woods then sent Plaintiffs follow-up letters informing them that he would be recommending their termination during an upcoming meeting of the NISD Board of Trustees (the Board).4 In advance of the upcoming termination proceeding, the Board held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ grievances, after which the Board too denied Plaintiffs’ requested remedies. On December 10, 2013, during the Board’s regular meeting, Woods recommended that Plaintiffs’ employment be terminated, and the Board voted in favor of termination.
The Board’s first vote to terminate entitled Plaintiffs to a hearing before an independent hearing examiner (IHE)5 appointed by the TEA. The hearing was held before the IHE on March 18, 19, 20, and 24, 2014. Over those four days, the parties presented witnesses, offered exhibits, and cross-examined opposing witnesses. On April 14, 2014, the IHE issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law and found that NISD was justified and met the standard of good cause in proposing termination of Plaintiffs’ employment contracts. At the following Board meeting on April 22, 2014, the Board adopted the IHE’s recommendation and unanimously voted to terminate Plaintiffs’ employment.6
District Court Proceedings
On May 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit against NISD in Texas state court, alleging NISD terminated their employment in violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act. Plaintiffs later amended their state court petition to name Woods as a defendant and to raise additional causes of action under the Texas and United States Constitutions, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Thereafter, Defendants timely filed a notice of removal. On August 4, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, raising the following claims against NISD: (1) violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act, TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002(a) ; (2) violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment free speech rights under § 1983 ; and (3) violation of Plaintiffs’ free speech rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also raised a § 1983 claim against Woods.
On October 29, 2015, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims against Woods on the basis of qualified immunity. On January 27, 2016, the district court granted in part and denied in part NISD’s motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ free speech claims under the First Amendment and the Texas Constitution.7 However, the district
court concluded that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Texas Whistleblower claims against NISD. Consequently, only Plaintiffs’ Texas Whistleblower Act claims against NISD survived for trial. On January 19, 2018, the district court also granted NISD’s motion for summary judgment on its affirmative defense of Plaintiffs’ failure to mitigate their economic damages under the Texas Whistleblower Act, finding that Plaintiffs had failed to identify competent evidence of their efforts to obtain substantially equivalent employment since their discharge.
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims under the Texas Whistleblower Act went to a jury trial. During the trial, the district court informed the jury that the IHE’s findings of fact from the administrative hearing have a preclusive effect, meaning the jury must accept those facts as true but was still tasked with determining whether retaliation was the reason for Plaintiffs’ terminations. The written jury charge likewise incorporated a preclusive effect instruction as to questions three and seven of the verdict form.
After the close of evidence, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of NISD, finding that Plaintiffs’ conversations with the TEA about NISD’s denial of a student’s test-taking accommodations were not reports of a violation of law made in good faith. Thereafter, the district court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of Defendants. On November 20, 2018, Plaintiffs timely filed their notice of appeal.
II.
Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by dismissing their claims against Defendant Woods based on qualified immunity. We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), applying the same standard as the district court. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. , 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). "The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the plaintiff must plead "specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations" to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Tuchman v. DSC Commc’ns Corp. , 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations need not be detailed, but they must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, assuming all the...
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