Poyner v. State

• Decision Date: 14 May 1921
• Citation: 88 So. 762,81 Fla. 726
• Parties: POYNER v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

88 So. 762

81 Fla. 726

POYNER v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

May 14, 1921

Rehearing Denied June 17, 1921.

Error to Circuit Court, Jackson County; C. L. Wilson, Judge.

Pratt Poyner was convicted of larceny, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Overruling motion to quash count of indictment not harmful after general verdict of guilty as charged and arrest of judgment upon such count. An order overruling a motion to quash a count of an indictment containing more than one count is not harmful although such count may be defective, where, after a general verdict of guilty as charged, judgment was arrested as to such count, and sentence may be legally imposed upon a good count contained in the indictment.

Conviction not reversed for technical errors if supported by evidence. A judgment of conviction will not be reversed, even if technical errors were committed in rulings on the admissibility of evidence or in charges given or refused where the evidence of guilt is ample, and no fundamental rights of the defendant are infringed.

Sentence may be imposed under count supported by evidence. The indictment returned against plaintiff in error contained three counts, the first and third of which charged robbery and the second charged larceny. Upon a trial a general verdict of guilty as charged was returned. The court arrested judgment as to the first count, declined to impose sentence under the third count, and imposed sentence upon the count charging larceny. Held, that the evidence does not prove the charge of larceny, but does make out a case of robbery as charged in the third count, and that sentence may be imposed under this count charging robbery.

Where error confined to sentence imposed, judgment may be reversed and cause remanded, with directions. Where error is confined to the sentence imposed, the judgment may be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a proper judgment.

COUNSEL

Thomas E. Walker and Amos E. Lewis, both of Marianna, for plaintiff in error.

Rivers H. Buford, Atty. Gen., and Worth W. Trammell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the state.

OPINION

WEST J.

By an indictment containing three counts plaintiff in error was charged with the crime of robbery and larceny. The first and third counts charge robbery, and the second charges larceny. There was a motion to quash the indictment, which motion was overruled. Upon a trial of the case a general verdict of guilty as charged was returned. After verdict motion for a new trial was made and overruled. In overruling this motion the trial judge recited that he did so after arresting the judgment on the first count and declining to impose sentence under the third count. At the same time an order was made arresting the judgment upon the first count because this count appeared to the court to be defective, and reciting that plaintiff in error would not be sentenced upon the third count. Sentence was imposed under the second count whereby plaintiff in error was charged with larceny. From the judgment imposing sentence writ of error was taken. There are a great number of assignments of error, but no benefit would result from a discussion of them.

Since the judgment was arrested as to the first count, there was no harmful error in overruling the motion to quash this count, even though it may be defective. Bueno v. State, 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862; Jordan v. State, 22 Fla. 528; Cribb v. State, 9 Fla. 409.

Numerous rulings on objections to evidence and upon questions of the admissibility of proffered evidence were made during the progress of the trial, and a great number of assignments of error are predicated upon such rulings. There was no such error in any of the rulings complained of as to require a reversal of the judgment. In many cases the court has held, in effect, that a judgment of conviction will not be reversed even if technical errors were committed in rulings on the admissibility of evidence or in charges given or refused where the evidence of guilt is ample and no fundamental rights of the defendant are infringed. Riggins v. State, 78 Fla. 459, 83 So. 267; Dixon v. State, 77 Fla. 143, 83 So. 741; Barker v. State, 76 Fla. 164, 79 So. 436; Settles v. State, 75 Fla. 296, 78 So. 287; Milligan v. State, 75 Fla. 815, 78 So. 535; Smith v. State, 74 Fla. 44, 76 So. 334.

As we have said, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty as charged, whereupon sentence was imposed under the second count of the indictment; the court having previously stated that plaintif...