Poythress v. J. P. Stevens and Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 8110IC222,8110IC222 |
| Citation | 283 S.E.2d 573,54 N.C.App. 376 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Lucille B. POYTHRESS, Employee v. J. P. STEVENS AND COMPANY, INC., Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier. |
Hassell & Hudson by Robin E. Hudson, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellant.
Maupin, Taylor & Ellis by Richard M. Lewis and David V. Brooks, Raleigh, for defendants-appellees.
In reviewing an award of the Industrial Commission, this Court is limited to two questions: (1) whether the Commission's findings are supported by any competent evidence in the record; and (2) whether the Commission's findings justify its legal conclusions. Inscoe v. DeRose Industries, 292 N.C. 210, 232 S.E.2d 449 (1979); Walston v. Burlington Industries, 49 N.C.App. 301, 271 S.E.2d 516 (1980). However, as plaintiff contends that defendants waived the defense of N.C.G.S. 97-58(c) by failing to raise it until after all evidentiary hearings had been concluded, we first deal with this important procedural question.
Assuming that the two-year limit for filing claims under N.C.G.S. 97-58(c) is in the nature of a statute of limitations to be pleaded and proved by defendants, plaintiff's contention finds doubtful support in the law. Because the case involves an administrative proceeding instituted by an application for workers' compensation benefits rather than formal pleadings, the rights of the parties are to be determined by the facts. See In re Gibbs, 205 N.C. 312, 171 S.E. 55 (1933). The facts in this case point to only one conclusion--the plaintiff did not comply with the applicable time limit for filing claims in order to determine her right to compensation for occupational disease. Moreover, it has been stated that:
The Administrative Procedure Act provides very clearly what constitutes a final agency decision. By its very nature a decision that is not final is subject to change. This is as it should be. Administrative agencies should be encouraged to continue cases under active deliberation until rendition of a final decision to assure that that decision is the product of adequate, sound deliberation. See Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 833, 892 (1975).... [A]n agency retains jurisdiction to continue its deliberations after an initial vote and until such time as a final agency decision is rendered ....
In re Savings & Loan Assoc., 53 N.C.App. 326, ---, 280 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1981).
Defendants would have us construe N.C.G.S. 97-58(c) not in the nature of a statute of limitations, but as a condition precedent. Under this construction, plaintiff's failure to comply with the condition would create a jurisdictional bar to her claim. Her waiver argument fails as lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be taken advantage of at any stage of the proceedings, even after judgment. Clark v. Ice Cream Co., 261 N.C. 234, 134 S.E.2d 354 (1964); McCrater v. Engineering Corp., 248 N.C. 707, 104 S.E.2d 858 (1958).
We find no North Carolina case in which this question has been presented for resolution. Our Courts have held that N.C.G.S. 97-24, which deals with injury by accident as opposed to occupational disease, constitutes a condition precedent to the right to compensation. Subsection (a) of that statute reads:
"The right to compensation under this Article shall be forever barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within two years after the accident."
Subsection (c) of N.C.G.S. 97-58 reads:
"The right to compensation for occupational disease shall be barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within two years after death, disability, or disablement as the case may be."
We find that the two subsections are substantially similar in language and intent 1 and a like construction should be applied to both.
In McCrater, a case that was decided under N.C.G.S. 97-24(a), the Court discussed the distinction between statutes of limitation and conditions precedent as follows:
248 N.C. at 709, 104 S.E.2d at 860.
It has also been stated that:
The North Carolina Industrial Commission has a special or limited jurisdiction created by statute, and confined to its terms. Viewed as a court, it is one of limited jurisdiction, and it is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction over subject matter of which it would otherwise not have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in this sense cannot be obtained by consent of the parties, waiver, or estoppel.
Hart v. Motors, 244 N.C. 84, 88, 92 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1956). See also Clodfelter v. Furniture Co., 38 N.C.App. 45, 247 S.E.2d 263 (1978); Barham v. Hosiery Co., 15 N.C.App. 519, 190 S.E.2d 306 (1972).
Applying this law to the present case, we hold that the two-year time limit for filing claims under N.C.G.S. 97-58(c) is a condition precedent with which claimants must comply in order to confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Commission to hear the claim. In the absence of facts suggesting that defendant-employer engaged in false representations or in the concealment of material facts reasonably calculated to mislead plaintiff, we do not decide whether a claimant might invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to attack jurisdiction. See Clodfelter, supra; Barham, supra.
As the burden was on the plaintiff to establish that her claim was timely filed, we turn now to her contention that she was precluded from doing so during the hearing because objections to her questions were sustained on grounds of relevancy. The testimony on redirect examination reads as follows:
I do not recall telling anyone at the mill my reason for quitting besides Mr. Barnes and Mr. Person. None of them told me anything I should do. I did not receive any compensation benefits from the mill.
The purpose of redirect is to clarify the subject matter of the direct examination and new matter elicited on cross-examination. 1 Stansbury's N.C. Evidence § 36 (Brandis rev. 1973). Plaintiff had testified on direct examination that a period of approximately twelve and one-half years had elapsed from when she last worked in defendant-employer's mill to when she filed her claim for compensation. On cross-examination, defendants did little more than elicit that same information. Plaintiff's effort to justify her failure to file within the statutory period was not a proper subject for redirect. This was new evidence relating to an issue not yet raised by either party. Moreover, we find no prejudice with respect to the deputy commissioner's rulings in light of the overwhelming evidence that plaintiff was informed of the occupational nature of her illness as early as 1963.
Plaintiff further objects to the fact that the Commission's opinion and award was limited to only those findings and conclusions which the deputy commissioner deemed sufficient to support his denial of plaintiff's claim on grounds of N.C.G.S. 97-58(c). We note initially that the Commission's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and that the findings justify the legal conclusions. By filing her claim in 1977, plaintiff has at once the benefit of twelve years of medical understanding and legal clarification of her disease. She is also bound by the recent case law respecting her rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. In Taylor v. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 102, 265 S.E.2d 144, 149 (1980), Justice Carlton wrote that "with reference to occupational diseases the time within which an employee must give notice or file claim begins to run when the employee is first informed by competent medical authority of the nature and work-related cause of the disease." Such was the law in 1963. Duncan v. Carpenter, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1...
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