Prall v. City of Bos.
| Decision Date | 18 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10–10058–RWZ. |
| Citation | 985 F.Supp.2d 115 |
| Parties | Tormu E. PRALL v. CITY OF BOSTON, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Tormu E. Prall, Trenton, NJ, pro se.
Alix M. O'Connell, Lisa Skehill Maki, City of Boston Law Department, Boston, MA, for City of Boston, et al.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Allow Supplemental Briefing on the Privilege Against Self–Incrimination Claim (Docket # 148) is allowed.
Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Docket # 149) are overruled.
Upon consideration of the Report (Docket # 146) and plaintiff's objections thereto the court accepts it and adopts the Magistrate Judge's Recommendations. Accordingly,
It is ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (Docket # 121) is denied.
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment of the City of Boston (Docket # 128) is allowed.
3. The Motion for Summary Judgment of the individual defendants Jeffrey Lynch and Jeffrey Cahill (Docket # 127) is allowed.
4. Judgment may be entered for the City of Boston on Count 1 and for the individual defendants on Count 2 of the Amended Complaint.
5. Judgment may also be entered dismissing the claims against John Does 1–99 a/k/a Unknown Named Boston Police Officers and John Moe a/k/a Magistrate Judge.
Pro se plaintiff Tormu E. Prall (“Prall”) filed a nine-count complaint against defendants City of Boston (“the City”), John Does 1099, a/k/a, unknown named Boston police officers, John Moe, a/k/a, Magistrate Judge and Jane Doe, a/k/a, Commonwealth Judge on January 4, 2010. (# 1) Seven of those counts were dismissed in early 2011. See Prall v. City of Boston, 2011 WL 1344500 (D.Mass., Jan. 18, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted,2011 WL 1367041 (D.Mass., Mar. 4, 2011). On April 26, 2011, Prall's motion for leave to amend complaint (# 48) was allowed and Jeffrey Lynch (“Lynch”) and Jeffrey Cahill (“Cahill”), both Boston police officers, were added as parties-defendant.1 There are two claims at issue in the motions now before the Court: Count I against the City for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Count II against Officers Cahill and Lynch for violation of the Fourth Amendment for their roles in arresting Prall on May 17, 2008.(# 55)
On September 4, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (# 121) together with a memorandum of law (# 122) and a declaration. (# 123) On October 15, 2012, defendants Cahill and Lynch filed a motion for summary judgment (# 127), a memorandum of law (# 130), and a statement of facts with exhibits. (# 131) On even date, the City filed a motion for summary judgment (# 128), again with a memorandum of law (# 132) as well as a statement of facts with exhibits. (# 133) On October 25, 2012, Prall filed an opposition to both the City's and the individual defendants' disposition motions together with a declaration. (# 135) On November 15, 2012, the City, Cahill and Lynch filed an opposition to the plaintiff's summary judgment motion and a motion to strike 2 (# 136), a statement of disputed facts with supporting documents (# 137) and a Rule 56.1 statement of material facts with supporting documents (# 138). On December 3, 2012, Prall filed a reply to the defendants' opposition to his motion for summary judgment and to strike his declaration (# 140).
At this juncture the summary judgment record is complete, and the dispositive motions stand ready for decision.
For present purposes, the relevant facts may be summarized as follows: Boston police dispatch received a call around 4:00 a.m. on May 17, 2008 that two black males were holding a white female against her will in downtown Boston. (# 123 ¶ 15; # 131 ¶ 7) Officers Cahill and Lynch responded to the location described and saw two black men walking with a white woman matching the description from the 9–1–1 call and approached the group. (# 123 ¶ ¶ 14–15; # 131 ¶¶ 8–9) Upon inquiry, the woman confirmed that she was not held against her will. (# 123 ¶ 16; # 131 ¶ 9)
Officers Cahill and Lynch asked each person for his or her name. (# 123 ¶ 16; # 131 ¶ 11) The other two members of the group provided their names, which were checked by the officers for any outstanding warrants in the NOVA system, and returned clean.3 (# 123 ¶ 16; # 131 ¶ 11) Prall, however, provided the name “Denzil Willington” (sometimes spelled “Denzel”). (# 123 ¶ 16; # 131 ¶¶ 11–12) The officers could not locate any NOVA record for “Denzil Willington” and so asked Prall for his date of birth. (# 123 ¶ 16; # 131 ¶ 15) The plaintiff provided two different dates: January 1, 1973 and May 1, 1973. 4 (# 131 ¶ 15) Officers Cahill and Lynch asked Prall for his social security number and he provided the number “XXX–XX–XXXX'.” 5 (# 131 ¶ 17) The plaintiff further told the officers he was born in Boston, but could not recall where, and that he could not recall where he attended school. 6 (# 131 ¶ 19) Cahill and Lynch, noticing he was holding a red cup of liquid that smelled like alcohol—a fact that the plaintiff categorically disputes—placed Prall under arrest for public drinking. (# 123 ¶¶ 6(f) and (g), 21, 24; # 131 ¶ 20) Prall, although still refusing to provide his identification, was ultimately booked and fingerprinted after being ordered to do so by the state court judge as a condition of his release. (# 123 ¶ 31; # 131 ¶ 22) Following his release, it was discovered that Prall had an outstanding warrant in New Jersey.7 (# 131 ¶ 22)
The plaintiff's civil claims against both the City and officers Cahill and Lynch in their individual capacity are for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (# 55 ¶ 1) In their entirety, the claims as alleged in the amended complaint read:
COUNT I
Plaintiffs injuries occurred as a direct and immediate consequence of the unconstitutional custom of the Boston Police Department and the deprivations of plaintiff's rights were affirmatively linked to the City of Boston's Mayor and Police Chief having a policy of inadequate training, supervision and discipline of Boston police officers.
COUNT II
Defendants Lynch and Cahill violated the 4th Amendment rights by facilitating, participating in, condoning and executing plaintiffs false arrest.
Amended complaint # 55.
The plaintiff contends that the public drinking charge was fabricated to obtain his true identity. (# 122 at 2–3) He argues that officers Cahill and Lynch lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause, and therefore arrested him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (# 122 at 2–3) This violation, according to the plaintiff, resulted from the City's alleged failure properly to train its law enforcement officers on constitutional rights, and the City's purported knowing ignorance of the deficiency of its policy. (# 122 at 9–17)
The purpose of summary judgment is “to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Rojas–Ithier v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico, 394 F.3d 40, 42 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of asserting the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and “support[ing] that assertion by affidavits, admissions, or other materials of evidentiary quality.” Mulvihill v. Top–Flite Golf Co., 335 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2003) (citations omitted); Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano–Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2010).
Once the moving party alleges the absence of all meaningful factual disputes, the non-moving party must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. This showing requires more than the frenzied brandishing of a cardboard sword. The non-moving party must point to facts memorialized by materials of evidentiary quality and reasonable inferences therefrom to forestall the entry of summary judgment.
Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Stolberg, 680 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir.2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Fontánez–Núnez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 447 F.3d 50, 54–55 (1st Cir.2006).
In determining whether summary judgment is proper, “a court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir.2006); Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir.2012). Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “ ‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’ ” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)) (further internal quotation marks omitted).
In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to...
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