Prantl v. State

• Decision Date: 09 October 1984
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 230
• Parties: Charles E. PRANTL v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 781

462 So.2d 781

Charles E. PRANTL v. STATE.

7 Div. 230.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Oct. 9, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 13, 1984.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 1, 1985

Alabama Supreme Court 84-226.

William R. Justice of Harrison, Conwill, Harrison & Justice, Columbiana, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Phillip Luke Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HARRIS, Judge.

Charles Prantl was indicted on a charge of burglary in the third degree. At the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of burglary in the third degree, and appellant was sentenced under the Habitual Felony Offenders Act to thirty (30) years' imprisonment in the penitentiary.

On Saturday afternoon, November 28, 1981, Shelby County Deputy Sheriff Lloyd Anderson received a call to investigate a burglar alarm. He proceeded to Robert Robinson's cabin on Lay Lake in Shelby County, Alabama. He drove five to ten minutes until he reached Robinson's private road, which was blocked by a locked gate. Deputy Anderson then had to walk down the road through a wooded area to reach the cabin. Upon reaching the cabin he saw two people standing on a landing outside the door on the back side of the cabin. He also saw another person in a boat tied up to a dock 100 to 150 feet away in front of the cabin.

The man and woman outside the cabin went inside as Deputy Anderson watched from the woods. Anderson then went toward the door, drew his gun, and the woman, Karen Prantl, saw him. He instructed her to come down from the landing, and she "hollered" back into the cabin, "Sam, there's a damn deputy out here." The male suspect, Sam Boackle, then came out the door and Anderson arrested both of them. After arresting these two suspects, the third suspect, who had been sitting in the boat, walked up to the area and was arrested too. Appellant was the third suspect.

An examination of the residence revealed that the burglar alarm wires outside the house had been cut and a window facing away from the lake had been broken, with the screen torn away. Inside, several drawers had been opened, and burglar alarm wires had been ripped off the wall. Some kitchen items had been taken into another room. Nothing was missing from the residence. The audible burglar alarm was sounding through an outside speaker throughout this time.

Before appellant walked up from the boat, Boackle and Karen Prantl told Anderson that they had been on the lake in the boat and had heard the burglar alarm going off, so they went to the cabin to see what was going on. They said when they pulled up to the dock they saw two people run into the woods. When appellant approached Anderson afterwards, he gave the same explanation for being present at the cabin.

Appellant alleges that the evidence presented at trial only shows that he was present at or near the scene, and the facts were insufficient to establish appellant as an accomplice, or to support a conviction, except on mere conjecture, suspicion, or guesswork. An examination of the record reveals that the State proved appellant was present at the cabin when Anderson arrived and when Boackle and Karen Prantl entered the cabin, that the audible burglar alarm was sounding outside the cabin, that a window was broken, and that the contents of the cabin had been rummaged through. Additionally, someone had damaged the burglar alarm wires inside and outside the cabin, and all three suspects gave the same explanation for their presence at the scene.

There was no evidence that anyone had taken any item from the cabin, and no evidence that any of the three had touched anything inside or outside the cabin. There was no evidence of flight or attempted flight by any of the parties. In fact, it is clear that appellant voluntarily, without any prompting by Anderson or any call for aid from his alleged co-conspirators, walked up to the cabin and spoke with Anderson. The only possible incriminating evidence that could be tied to any of the parties was Karen Prantl's statement when she saw Anderson with his gun drawn, "Sam, there's a damn deputy out here."

The applicable test for complicity is whether a defendant, with intent to promote or assist in the perpetration of an offense did aid or abet such other person in committing the offense. § 13A-2-23, Ala.Code (1975). The thrust is to place liability on one who has the more positive mental state of promoting or actively assisting in the perpetration of an offense. Besides the mere presence of appellant at the scene, the State must show some evidence that appellant either recruited, helped, or counseled in preparing the crime, or undertook some part in its commission. Pugh v. State, 42 Ala.App. 499, 169 So.2d 27 (1964). Aiding and abetting comprehends all assistance rendered by acts, or words of encouragement, or support or presence, actual or constructive, to render assistance should it become necessary, and no particular acts are necessary. Watkins v. State, 357 So.2d 156 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), cert. denied, 357 So.2d 161 (Ala.1978); White v. State, 42 Ala.App. 249, 160 So.2d 496 (1964); Fuller v. State, 43 Ala.App. 632, 198 So.2d 625 (1966).

In appellee's brief, the State asserts that "Even though Appellant may not have actually entered the house, or broken the window, he was present to render assistance to his wife during the burglary, if it became necessary." There was no evidence that Karen Prantl was appellant's wife or ex-wife, other than an assumption by...