Prasad v. George Wash. Univ.

Citation390 F.Supp.3d 1
Decision Date17 May 2019
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 15-1779 (ABJ)
Parties Ricca PRASAD, Plaintiff, v. The GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Daniel James Hornal, Talos Law, Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Andrew Charles Mendrala, Pro Hac Vice, Yael Bromberg, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

William David Nussbaum, Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, Washington, DC, Christina D. Riggs, Pro Hac Vice, Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

PUBLIC WITH REDACTIONS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge The case arises out of the unhealthy and abusive relationship between plaintiff Ricca Prasad and "VT," who met when both were undergraduate students at George Washington University ("the University" or "GW").1 Plaintiff has sued the University under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), for how it responded to her complaints about VT's physical and emotional abuse, and she also has brought claims alleging breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent retention.2 Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of defendant.

The pleadings in this case chronicle a disturbing saga of a dangerous attraction between a young woman with a prior history of emotional problems and a very troubled, possessive, and ultimately abusive young man. Plaintiff maintains that the school fell short of its statutory obligation as an educational institution to protect her from sexual harassment, and she submits that GW was negligent in performing the duties it owed her as a student when it dealt with her reports about VT. But she has proven neither, and there is no cause of action available to her based on a contract theory.

With respect to Count One, the Title IX count, the Court finds that at certain points in the chronology, the school was on notice that VT's abuse of plaintiff was based on his hostility towards her as a woman and therefore, the statutory obligations were triggered. But GW was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's plight when it responded to the information with which it was provided, and it did not violate the statute.

With respect to Count Two, the breach of contract claim, the Court finds that even if the contract between VT and GW was intended to benefit the plaintiff, plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary cannot sue the University for breach since it was the promisee, and not the promisor, in the agreement.

As for negligence, plaintiff's claims fail in the absence of any expert testimony to define the nature of the duty GW owed plaintiff as its student and what the reasonable exercise of professional judgment would have called for under the complicated set of circumstances here. Plaintiff, who suffered from serious mental health problems before she arrived on campus, has also failed to provide any expert testimony on the issue of causation, and there is no evidence tying the emotional consequences she has suffered to GW's conduct, as opposed to the abuse perpetrated by VT or other contributing factors.

Finally, plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary predicates for a negligent supervision claim: a duty on the part of GW, the employer, that arises from a source other than a statute, and a showing that the employee himself engaged in tortious behavior.

As the hearing in the case made clear, plaintiff simply cannot place her finger on the specifics of when and how GW dropped the ball in her case. Notwithstanding the evidence of their apparent immaturity and mental health issues, plaintiff and VT were legally adults when they stepped under the University's umbrella, and given overlapping statutory obligations and privacy requirements that constrain educational institutions, the school could not do more at various critical junctures without plaintiff's consent. Also, the school owed certain duties to VT, and there were points where it may have been bound to take his rights as an accused into account.

More important, at the end of the day, the University's conduct can only be measured against what it knew at any given time. Thus, one cannot ignore the fact that GW's ability to carry out its obligations in this case was complicated by the many occasions in which plaintiff misrepresented or failed to disclose critical information about her ongoing contacts with VT. Indeed, it appears that GW's efforts were often undermined by plaintiff's unfortunate and repeated decisions to welcome VT back into her life – both online and in person. Counsel for plaintiff posited at oral argument that a more vigorous approach by the school under the specific auspices of Title IX could have made a difference, since skilled counseling might have enabled plaintiff to separate herself from the cycle of attraction, manipulation, and abuse sooner. It may very well be that the contacts plaintiff reinitiated were more of a symptom than a cause of the abuse she suffered, but there is no question that throughout this period, the University repeatedly offered to provide her with the counseling she sorely needed, and it offered her access to additional resources and tools to enforce a separation from VT, but she declined to accept that assistance.

The Court is not suggesting in any way that this survivor is to blame for her own ordeal. But the case is here for decision because plaintiff has taken on the burden of proving that the University was responsible for the emotional distress she suffered in the wake of this relationship. The school is to be judged based on the known circumstances, and when one considers the circumstances known to the school at the time of plaintiff's reports, it is apparent that the situation was never cut and dried, and it did not then and does not now lend itself to easy solutions. The Court is not empowered – and it lacks the expertise in any event – to decide whether as a matter of sound educational policy or mental health practice, the school could or should have taken a different step, or adopted a preferable course of action, at any particular time. The Court is required to apply the applicable legal standards, which establish a very high bar for plaintiff to satisfy in order to obtain the monetary damages she seeks. A review of the entire record – which necessarily will be set out in great detail below – makes it clear that plaintiff has not met that burden.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the autumn of 2010, Ricca Prasad entered George Washington University as an undergraduate student. See Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [Dkt. # 81] ("Pl.'s SOF") ¶ 1; Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [Dkt. # 60-5] ("Def.'s SOF") ¶ 1. The evidence shows that plaintiff struggled with emotional and psychological issues in her adolescence and received treatment for them before she ever arrived on campus. See Dep. of Ricca Prasad, Pl.'s Ex. 38 ("Prasad Dep.") at 242:8–243:1, 250:1–251:2; [redacted]; see also Email of Nov. 20, 2012 from Pl. to VT, Def.'s Ex. 18, at AA0004288 [redacted]3 Nonetheless, her freshman year began on a positive footing. She did well in her classes and participated in the life of the university, succeeding in academic competitions and taking an active role in various campus groups. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 27; see also Def.'s SOF ¶ 1 (describing plaintiff's successful academic undergraduate record).

I. Plaintiff Met VT During Her Freshman Year

In early 2011, during the spring of her freshman year, plaintiff met VT, and a romantic relationship developed. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 28. Plaintiff ended the relationship at the end of the semester, but the two resumed contact in August of 2011. Id. ¶¶ 28–29. In September, VT stayed in plaintiff's dorm room for three weeks before he left to study abroad in London for the 2011–12 academic year. Id. ¶ 29.

In his absence, plaintiff dated other students, and this did not sit well with VT in London. He began sending harassing and threatening emails, Facebook messages, and other communications to plaintiff, her friends, and the other students she dated. See, e.g. , Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 30–32; Facebook Messages, Pl.'s Ex. 6, at AA0000601–624 (messages dated Oct. 30, 2011 to Jan. 18, 2012). VT used coarse, violent, and explicitly sexual language when he threatened both plaintiff and her friends. See id. at AA0000602 (referring to plaintiff as a "stupid cunt whore" whom he "fuck[ed] every day"); id. at AA0000620 ("i wish i could kill u and get away with it"); id. at AA0000621 (referring to plaintiff as a "dirty whore"); id. at AA0000623 (threatening that "one day i will FIND you wherever you are and fuck you mercilessly"). According to a timeline that plaintiff appears to have prepared for this litigation, she began having panic attacks in November of 2011. Pl.'s Timeline, Pl.'s Ex. 29, at RFP 000940.

II. The University Imposed the First No Contact Order

On January 17, 2012, plaintiff first brought the threatening nature of VT's messages to the GW Police Department ("GWPD"). Incident Report of Jan. 17, 2012, Pl.'s Ex. 6, at AA0000600.4 GWPD advised her to change her email address5 and gave her a "resource card" if she needed to speak to a counselor. Id. On January 23, 2012, she reported the messages to GW's Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities ("OSRR"). OSRR Investigative Report, Pl.'s Ex. 6, at AA0000625. The next day, plaintiff emailed VT stating that would be the last time she contacted him while also apologizing "for the trouble that going to [University Police Department] will have caused." Email of Jan. 24, 2012 from Pl. to VT, Pl.'s Ex. 131, at AA0004895. And on January 25, the University issued No Contact Orders ("NCOs"). NCO of Jan. 25, 2012, Pl.'s Ex. 6, at AA0000598 (NCO directing VT not to contact plaintiff and another unidentified individual); NCO of Jan. 25, 2012, Pl.'s Ex. 6, at AA0000597 (directing plaintiff not to contact VT); ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Stafford v. The George Wash. Univ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • January 4, 2022
    ...take any action to stem the tide of” misconduct plausibly satisfied deliberate indifference element at motion to dismiss stage); Prasad, 390 F.Supp.3d at 31 (describing cases where schools “ignored plight” of a victim or “made no effort whatsoever” to remedy violation). b. Sophomore Year Th......
  • Doe v. Dordt Univ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • July 20, 2022
    ...[21] Plaintiff also argues the OCR's 2017 Q&A provides parameters for a respondent's procedural protections in sexual misconduct proceedings. (Id.). Defendants, however, argue any from the 2017 Q&A guidance are irrelevant to Doe's claims. (Doc. 51, at 15-16 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Inde......
  • Byers v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • January 31, 2022
    ... ... Atl. Masonry Co. , ... 693 A.2d 1117, 1122 (D.C. 1997); Prasad v. George ... Washington Univ. , 390 F.Supp.3d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2019); ... ...
  • Woodland Drive LLC v. Courtovich
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • September 30, 2021
    ...breach of contract so long as the third party counts as an intended beneficiary to the arrangement. Prasad v. George Washington Univ., 390 F.Supp.3d 1, 34 (D.D.C. 2019). An intended beneficiary need not be named in the contract, rather the intent to involve a third-party beneficiary can be ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT