Pratali v. Gates

• Decision Date: 13 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. B058745,B058745
• Citation: 4 Cal.App.4th 632,5 Cal.Rptr.2d 733
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Wayne A. PRATALI, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Elgin T. GATES, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 733

5 Cal.Rptr.2d 733

4 Cal.App.4th 632

Wayne A. PRATALI, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Elgin T. GATES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B058745.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

March 13, 1992.

Law Offices of Patrick Talbot Hall and Patrick Talbot Hall, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Law Offices of Robert E. Guilford and Robert E. Guilford, Santa Monica, for plaintiff and respondent.

JOHNSON, Associate Justice.

Appellant, Elgin T. Gates, by and through his special representative, Dollie Gates, appeals from an adverse judgment entered in an action on a prior judgment in favor of respondent, Wayne A. Pratali. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The underlying action in the case at bar was submitted to the trial court on trial briefs and an agreed statement of stipulated facts. The agreed facts, in essence, are as follows:

In 1967, appellant executed a promissory note in the principal sum of $16,500 in Las Vegas, Nevada, payable to respondent in San Francisco, California. When the note was not paid on the due date, respondent filed an action on the note.

On November 16, 1976, respondent received a judgment against appellant in the amount of $23,417.44 which included the principal amount of the note, attorneys' fees, costs and interest. ¹

After entry of judgment, but prior to 1980, appellant moved his domicile to Idaho where he resided until his death in 1988.

In 1980 respondent sent appellant a notice of recording of a sister state judgment in Idaho. In 1986, counsel for respondent wrote appellant a letter demanding payment on the judgment.

In 1987, respondent filed an application to renew the San Francisco judgment. This application was denied as untimely. Respondent filed a motion for relief from default alleging the slight delay was due to a calendaring error of counsel. Respondent's motion was denied on the basis the statutory period for renewal of judgments ran after ten years. The statute providing for renewal of judgments is strictly construed and expressly rejects any extension of time because of tolling or equitable relief. The decision to deny relief was upheld by the First Appellate District in an unpublished opinion.

In September 1988, respondent filed a separate action on the judgment of 1976.

In November 1988, Elgin T. Gates died. Appellant was appointed special administratrix of the estate of Elgin T. Gates and substituted in the present action as party defendant.

Appellant attempted to unilaterally include additional facts in her trial brief. Counsel stated appellant's son told him Gates used the money respondent lent him in 1976 to build residential units in Utah. The trial court sustained respondent's objection to appellant's attempt to augment the agreed statement of facts.

The trial court entered judgment for respondent. Appellant moved for new trial based on errors of law. The motion was denied and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING ENFORCEMENT OF A JUDGMENT ARE INAPPLICABLE TO SEPARATE ACTIONS ON A PRIOR JUDGMENT.

The Enforcement of Judgments Law, enacted in 1982 (Code Civ.Proc., § 680.010 et [p] Unlike former Section 681, the 10-year period provided by Section 683.020 is not extended because enforcement of the judgment has been stayed or enjoined by court order or by operation of law. Nor is the 10-year period tolled for any reason.... The judgment creditor may also be able to bring an action on the judgment after the 10-year enforcement period of this section has expired if the statute of limitations provided by Section 337.5 [10 years] has not yet run." (16 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep. (1982) p. 1207.)

                seq.) provides the enforcement of a judgment may be extended by renewal of the judgment "at any time before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability...." 2  (§§ 683.130, 683.020.)   The Law Revision Commission Comment to section 683.020, which defines the period of enforceability, states: 3  "Unless the judgment is renewed [by an action on the judgment or by extension of a renewed judgment] a judgment is [4 Cal.App.4th 637] enforceable only for 10 years;  at the end of this period, enforcement of the judgment is barred and any liens created by the enforcement process are extinguished.  No further action, including levy, sale, collection, or delivery pursuant to the judgment, or pursuant to a writ or order issued to enforce the judgment, may take place
                

Based on this section and others, appellant contends the action on the judgment was barred because: 1) respondent failed to renew the 1976 judgment within the prescribed 10-year period; 2) the 10-year period within which to renew the 1976 judgment cannot be tolled for any reason under the statute; 3) the tolling provision in section 351 applicable when defendants are outside the state is inapplicable to renewal of judgments as the statute expressly prohibits any tolling of the statute of limitations; and, 4) respondent failed to file an action on the judgment within the 10-year period prescribed by section 337.5 for actions on judgments.

Each of appellant's contentions is correct. However, they are misdirected as they ignore the true factual circumstances of this case. In this action, respondent did not attempt to renew the 1976 judgment. He previously tried to renew the judgment after the 10-year period for renewal of judgments expired and his application was rejected as untimely. Rather, respondent brought a separate, independent action on the 1976 judgment. The treatment of an action on a judgment is distinguishable from the treatment of an application to renew the prior judgment.

A separate action on the judgment is expressly authorized in section 683.050 which states: "Nothing in this chapter limits any right the judgment creditor may have to bring an action on a judgment, but any such action shall be commenced within the period prescribed by Section 337.5." Thus, this section expresses the legislative determination in enacting the Enforcement of Judgments Law. The lawmakers did not intend the provisions to renew a judgment every 10 years to replace the then sole existing method of bringing an action on a judgment to retain the enforceability of a judgment. According to the Legislative Council's Digest, the Enforcement of Judgments Law "would provide for multiple renewals of the 10-year period by filing an application therefor, as specified, as an alternative to extending the 10-year period by bringing an action upon the judgment." (Legis.Counsel's Dig., Assem.Bill No. 707, 6 Stats.1982 (Reg.Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 490.)

Thus, this alternate method to extend the life of a judgment was expressly Appellant correctly points out more than 10 years elapsed between the time the 1976 judgment became final and the time respondent filed this action on the 1976 judgment. She thus contends this action is barred by the 10-year statute of limitations in section 337.5. Respondent counters by arguing the 10-year limitations period was tolled during the time appellant was out of state. (§ 351.) ⁴

authorized by statute and is proper in this case if the action on the judgment was filed within the 10-year period of limitations prescribed in section 337.5.

A review of the pertinent statutory provisions and explanatory comments of the Law Revision Commission reveals respondent is correct and appellant's position cannot be sustained.

The Law Revision Commission Comment to section 683.050, authorizing separate actions on judgments, states this section "makes clear that the 10-year period of enforcement prescribed by Section 683.020 and the renewal procedure ... do not affect the right to bring an action on a judgment. The limitation period for commencing the action is prescribed by Section 337.5. The 10-year period provided by Section 683.020 and the 10-year statute of limitations provided by Section 337.5 are not coterminous. The period prescribed in Section 683.020 commences on the date of entry and is not tolled for any reason. The statute of limitations commences to run when the judgment is final [citation] and may be tolled such as by the debtor's absence from the state (see Section 351)...." (16 Cal.Law Revision Com.Rep. (1982) p. 1210); italics added.)

In the case at bar, the judgment sued upon was rendered in 1976. The action on this judgment--as distinct from an application to renew the judgment--was filed in 1988, approximately two years beyond the 10-year period of limitations. However, the 10-year statute of limitations was tolled under section 351 sometime before 1980 when appellant left California. Because appellant never returned to California, the period of limitations remained tolled up to the time of the filing of this action on the 1976 judgment.

As a consequence, this action was not barred by either the Enforcement of Judgments Law (§§ 680.010 et seq.) nor by the 10-year statute of limitations for actions on judgments (§ 337.5).

II. SECTION 351 DOES NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, AS APPLIED IN THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE OR OTHERWISE.

Appellant contends the tolling provision in section 351 penalizes her for exercising the right to travel and relocate to another state. Appellant thus asserts the statute must be tested by the "strict scrutiny" standard. She contends the statute must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest to withstand constitutional attack because the right to travel is a fundamental right under the federal constitution. (See generally, Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974) 415 U.S. 250, 254, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1080, 39 L.Ed.2d 306.) Appellant further contends under this standard the statute is unconstitutional as applied because the asserted purpose of alleviating the difficulties of finding and serving an absent defendant outside the state's borders...