Prather v. Process Systems
| Citation | 867 So.2d 479 |
| Decision Date | 13 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D01-4925.,1D01-4925. |
| Parties | Elsie PRATHER, Appellant, v. PROCESS SYSTEMS, Wal-Mart Amstaff/Greers, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
T. Rhett Smith, Esq. and Teresa E. Liles, Esq., Pensacola, for Appellant.
Frank C. Bozeman, III, Esq. and Colleen Cleary Ortiz, Esq. of Bozeman, Jenkins & Matthews, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellees.
Claimant, Elsie Prather, appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims ("JCC"), which denied her petition for disability and medical benefits. In denying claimant's petition for benefits, the JCC determined that "[b]ased on all the testimony presented, the petitioner's testimony lacks candor and is not reliable." The issue presented is whether the order denying claimant's petition for benefits is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Concluding that the JCC properly and thoroughly performed his obligation as the finder of fact, we affirm.
In workers' compensation cases, the JCC's findings must be sustained if supported by any view of the evidence and its permissible inferences. Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Dep't, 625 So.2d 868, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (citing Orange City Water Co. v. Barkley, 432 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). "The [JCC], as the trier of fact, has the right to determine the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant." Id. at 874 (citing Irving v. City of Daytona Beach, 472 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)). It is also within the province of the JCC to determine whether the claimant's medical history is credible or not, and the JCC may give greater weight to lay testimony than to scientific opinions of experts. GTE v. Miller, 642 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (citing Ullman, 625 So.2d at 873; Jeffers v. Pan Am. Envelope Co., 172 So.2d 577 (Fla.1965)).
In denying claimant's petition for benefits, the JCC also rejected the expert medical advisor's recommendation in favor of claimant. Regardless of whether or not the JCC erred in rejecting the expert medical advisor's opinion, the JCC set forth a second ground for denying claimant's application for benefits. The order stated that, based on all the testimony, the JCC was denying the claim as the result of claimant's lack of candor and reliability. See GTE, 642 So.2d at 1189
( ) (citing Tampa Bay Moving Sys., Inc. v. Frederick, 433 So.2d 628, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); other citation omitted); Ullman, 625 So.2d at 874. Thus, because the JCC can give greater weight to lay testimony than to the scientific testimony of experts, and because his finding regarding claimant's lack of credibility is supported by competent, substantial evidence, including claimant's failure to inform numerous doctors, including Dr. Szmurlo, Dr. Doheny, and Dr. Sellers, about her previous psychiatric medical history, the JCC did not err in rejecting the claimant's petition for benefits. The JCC based his finding regarding claimant's credibility on her testimony and the testimony of the doctors as a whole, which he had a right to do. See Chavarria v. Selugal Clothing, Inc., 840 So.2d 1071, 1076 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) () (quoting U.S. Cas. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741, 745 (Fla.1951)); GTE, 642 So.2d at 1189; Ullman, 625 So.2d at 874.
AFFIRMED.
The issue before the judge of compensation claims (JCC) was whether claimant's compensable, workplace injury was the major contributing cause (MCC) of her major depression. The majority affirms the JCC's rejection of the opinion of the expert medical advisor (EMA) for the reason that, based on the totality of the evidence, including the testimony of claimant, the order is supported by competent, substantial evidence. The majority's deference to the JCC's decision appears at odds with the legislature's clearly expressed preference that opinions of EMAs be generally accepted. I cannot agree that after the passage of the EMA procedure, codified in section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), a judge now retains the nearly unfettered power to disapprove an EMA's opinion in circumstances, such as those at bar, in which the advisor fully took into consideration all inconsistencies in the medical history given him by the claimant and still concluded that her workplace injury was the MCC of her mental condition.
What has occurred in the present case is that after considering virtually the same evidence the EMA reviewed, the JCC found, contrary to the EMA, that claimant's reports of pain were unbelievable, and for that reason rejected the opinion. In my judgment, this court's affirmance of the JCC's rejection effectually eviscerates the EMA process and ignores a body of case law this court has developed in defining the respective roles of EMAs and JCCs in resolving conflicting medical opinions. At this point, a brief recitation of the facts would be helpful to an understanding of the standard I espouse in reviewing an order that approves or rejects an EMA's opinion.
Claimant, Elsie Prather, suffered her workplace injury on May 10, 1995, resulting in carpal tunnel syndrome in her left hand. She continued to complain of left-hand pain after a surgical release. On April 11, 1997, claimant was involved in a non-compensable motor-vehicle accident and presented at a hospital emergency room complaining of resulting neck and back pain. Thereafter, continuing to complain of persistent pain and depression, she was given an independent medical examination (IME) in August by the psychiatrist of her choice, Dr. Steven Doheny, who diagnosed her with major depression and pain disorder stemming from her 1995 industrial injury. Following its receipt of Dr. Doheny's report, the employer arranged for a psychiatric evaluation of claimant with its IME psychiatrist, Dr. Scott Benson, who, while agreeing with Dr. Doheny that claimant suffered from major depression and pain disorder, disagreed that the workplace accident was the major contributing cause of the mental condition, but was rather only one of several contributing causes, including a combination of her wrist and non-compensable back injuries.
As a result of the conflict in medical opinions, an EMA was appointed, pursuant to the provisions of section 440.13(9)(c). Following his examination of claimant, the EMA, Dr. Peter Szmurlo, opined, as had Dr. Doheny, that claimant's industrial accident was the MCC of her depression and pain disorder. Dr. Szmurlo's opinion was based on an incomplete medical history given him by claimant, which omitted her treatment for depression before her employment injury, and, after the injury, her involvement in a motor-vehicle accident. When informed of these omissions, Dr. Szmurlo reviewed claimant's complete records, and subsequently persisted in the same opinion.
Despite the record's disclosure that the EMA's final opinion was not the product of his overlooking or ignoring evidence supporting a contrary view, the JCC rejected the opinion, essentially because, unlike Dr. Szmurlo, he disbelieved the claimant, concluding that she had greatly exaggerated her reports of pain and deliberately falsified her medical history; therefore, he considered the EMA's opinion had become "tainted." The JCC's order ignored the explanations by Drs. Doheny and Szmurlo that the claimant's mental condition made her a poor historian because it affected her memory and ability to recite historical facts.
The order also ignored this court's decisions construing the...
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