Pratt v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:21-CV-84-DWC |
| Citation | 538 F.Supp.3d 1163 |
| Parties | Christopher PRATT, Plaintiff, v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Damien N. Villarreal, Damien Villarreal LLC, Seattle, WA, Gregory M. Skidmore, Vera Fomina, Skidmore & Fomina, PLLC, Bellevue, WA, for Plaintiff.
Danielle Marie Kays, Pro Hac Vice, Seyfarth Shaw, Chicago, IL, Molly Gabel, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant.
ORDER REMANDING TO STATE COURT
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand this case to state court. Dkt. 19. Defendant objects. Dkt. 24. For the reasons discussed below the Court grants Plaintiff's motion.
Plaintiff, Christopher Pratt (Plaintiff), is a former employee of Defendant Alaska Airlines (Defendant). Plaintiff is a resident of California, and Defendant is a resident of both Washington and Alaska. Dkt. 1-1; Dkt. 2 at 2.
On January 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the King County Superior Court in Seattle alleging two state-law claims: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and, (2) retaliation in violation of RCW 49.60. Dkt. 1-1. The case was assigned case number 21-2-00905-7 SEA. Dkt. 10. Two days later, on January 22, 2021, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 128(b). Dkt. 1. At the time Defendant filed the notice of removal no service had occurred on Defendant, nor had Defendant waived service and voluntarily appeared in the state court action. Dkt. 2 at 1.
On February 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand. Dkt. 19. On March 22, 2021, Defendant filed a response in opposition. Dkt. 24. On March 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a reply. Dkt. 26.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger , 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). Accordingly, there is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA , 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). Under the removal statute, a defendant may remove any civil action over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Once a defendant receives "a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it can determine that the case is removable," the defendant has thirty days to file a notice of removal. Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2) ).
A plaintiff can challenge removal with a motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). When removal is based on diversity jurisdiction, the removing defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is complete diversity and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The court will resolve all ambiguities in favor of remand. Hunter , 582 F.3d at 1042.
Under the Forum Defendant Rule a diversity case cannot be removed if "any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the [s]tate in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)1 ; see also Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc. , 456 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2006). Plus, "all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
The issue presented by this case is whether "snap removal," where a defendant removes a case to federal court before any defendant has been properly served, contravenes the Forum Defendant Rule, which confines removal on the basis of diversity jurisdiction2 to instances where no defendant is a citizen of the forum state.
Plaintiff urges the view that a defendant who is a citizen of the forum state (such as here, where Defendant is a citizen of Washington) should be prohibited from removing on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, before service is perfected, just as that defendant is prohibited from removing post-service. Dkt. 19 at 3, 5. According to Plaintiff, "snap removal" frustrates the removal statute's purpose "of preserving a plaintiff's choice of a state court forum when suing a proper forum defendant." Id. at 5-6.
Defendant does not dispute the relevance of the Forum Defendant Rule, but maintains it does not apply in this case because no defendant has been "properly joined and served." Dkt. 24 at 4. Defendant argues the rule's only function pre-service is to prevent a plaintiff from fraudulently joining a resident defendant in order to defeat diversity. Dkt 24 at 4, 6-7. Defendant urges this court to apply a purely textual treatment to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), and leave it to Congress to make changes should it so choose. Dkt. 24 at 7.
Though there is no binding precedent from the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit, this Court is far from the first to consider this issue, as The Honorable James L. Robart recently noted. See Breuer v. Weyerhaeuser NR Company , NO. 20-0479-JLR, 2020 WL 4260948 (W.D. Wash. July 24, 2020). In Breuer , Plaintiff filed suit against Weyerhaeuser—a Washington corporation—in King County Superior Court, alleging violations of the Washington Products Liability Act, RCW 7.72 et seq. Id. at *1. Plaintiffs’ counsel then emailed Weyerhaeuser's counsel asking if it would accept service (and enclosing a copy of the complaint and summons). Id. Instead of accepting service, Weyerhaeuser's counsel filed a notice of removal the next day. Id. Plaintiff moved to remand, but quickly withdrew that motion and filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case with the intent to refile in state court. Id. As Plaintiff notes, the case at bar trekked a similar procedural path. Dkt. 26 at 5.
Although Judge Robart did not enter an order on the motion for remand, he had occasion to consider the practice of "snap removal" because Weyerhaeuser argued Plaintiff's pivot to a motion to dismiss was an attempt to "avoid a near-certain adverse ruling" on its withdrawn motion to remand. Id. at *4.
Snap removal is a controversial procedure and its compliance with the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is questionable. See Schachmurove , supra, at 214. Moreover, Weyerhaeuser's position appears to be the minority view among the courts that have ruled on the matter. See id. at 207 (); see also Hawkins v. Cottrell, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (); but see Colo. Seasons, Inc. v. Friedenthal , No. LA CV 19-09050 JAK (FFMx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84645, *8 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2020) ( ). Thus, Weyerhaeuser's contention that "[g]ranting this motion will undermine the authority [it] cited in its opposition to the motion for remand" is unconvincing and, more importantly, fails to establish any plain legal prejudice.
Id. at *4 (footnote omitted).
Defendant argues that Judge Robart's "dicta" actually reflects an outdated analysis "based only on a law review article written before recent circuit courts of appeals decisions finding that ‘snap removal’ is proper under the removal statutes."3 In fact, this law review article—published in February 2019—provides a comprehensive collection and discussion of relevant case law, including at least one of the cases Defendant relies on. See Amir Schachmurove, Making Sense of the Resident Defendant Rule, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. Online 203 (2019). The article correctly states that Defendant's position is the minority view, with the majority of courts finding "snap removal" untenable. It explains, in part:
In accordance with the denotation likely to be found in any authoritative dictionary,4 the use of "any" in § 1441(b)(2) implies the existence of at least one defendant that is a party in interest and that has been properly joined and served;5 this adjective's predecessor — the pronoun "none" — insinuated the same. Logically, "[w]ithout this precondition for removal," the utilization of either "any" or "none" would be "superfluous."6 Textually, therefore, § 1441 suspends operation of the Home State Defendant Rule until appropriate joinder and service on at least one resident defendant has taken place by virtue of its reliance on the indefinite pronoun "any."7 Until that explicitly designated action's first consummation, however, § 1441(b) ’s unadorned text "allows removal by a non-forum defendant prior to service on a forum defendant,"8 and cannot proscribe "removal even by a forum defendant prior to service."9 Accordingly, so long as no defendant has been served at the time of removal, the Resident Defendant Rule is irrelevant — or so some within the majority asseverate.10
Id. at 218-19 (footnotes re-numbered); see also Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Fid. Nat'l Title Group , Case No. 2:20-CV-2220 JCM, 2021 WL 493410, at *3 (D. Nev. February 10, 2021) (); U.S. Bank Trustee National Assoc. v. Fid. Nat'l Title Group , Case No. 2:20-CV-2068 JCM, 2021 WL 223384, at *3 (D. Nev. January 22, 2021) (same).
This approach is consistent with Supreme Court guidance on statutory interpretation, generally, which cautions against interpreting statutory text in a "vacuum," in favor of a "holistic" approach that includes "context, along with purpose and history." Gundy v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019) (citing United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. , 484 U.S. 365,...
To continue reading
Request your trial