Pratt v. City of Greenville, No. 2000-CA-01028-SCT.

Decision Date11 October 2001
Docket NumberNo. 2000-CA-01028-SCT.
Citation804 So.2d 972
PartiesTony PRATT v. CITY OF GREENVILLE.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Martin A. Kilpatrick, Greenville, for Appellant.

G. Kenner Ellis, Jr., Greenville for Appellee.

Before PITTMAN, C.J., DIAZ and EASLEY, JJ.

EASLEY, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Tony Pratt ("Pratt") filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Washington County, against the City of Greenville ("City") on January 6, 1998, for alleged employment termination without hearing or reasonable cause.1 The City of Greenville filed its answer and defenses on February 4, 1998. The City took Pratt's deposition on or about September 30, 1998, and excerpts were filed with the circuit court on December 4, 1998. On October 14, 1998, the City filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. At the hearing on this matter, October 26, 1999, (a year after the motion was filed), Pratt was directed by the trial court to submit a supplemental response to the City's assertions of immunity. On November 10, 1999, Pratt filed a Plaintiff's Motion For Leave to File Amendment to Complaint. On June 8, 2000, the judgment for the Circuit Court of Washington County was filed. The Judgment granted the City's Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative Summary Judgment and denied Pratt's Motion for Leave to File Amendment to Complaint. On June 27, 2000, Pratt filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

FACTS

¶ 2. Pratt filed a complaint on January 6, 1998. The complaint alleged that Pratt was terminated from his position as a fire fighter with the City of Greenville on or about the summer months of 1997, without a hearing or reasonable cause, on the basis of his arrest for an alleged conspiracy to report false fire alarms. The complaint further stated that as a consequence of the criminal charge, which was initiated by the City, Pratt had to employ counsel for his defense. The City failed and refused to compensate Pratt during the pendency of the alleged criminal action notwithstanding that the Grand Jury failed to indict him for the charge. Pratt further complained that as a direct and proximate cause of the City's actions, he suffered loss of reputation, seniority and income, and suffered great pain of body and mind.

¶ 3. The City filed a its answer and defenses on February 4, 1998. The defenses cited, included but were not limited to: failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to § 11-51-75, Miss. Code Ann. (1972); immunity pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 to -23 (Supp. 2001); and generally the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity.

¶ 4. On June 18, 1998, a Motion to Extend Discovery and Motion Deadline was filed. On June 29, 1998, an Agreed Order was filed. On October 14, 1998, the City filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12 and Rule 56 of the MRCP. During a hearing on this matter, on October 26, 1999, (a year after the motion was filed), Pratt was directed by the trial court to submit a supplemental response to the City's assertions of immunity. On November 10, 1999, Pratt filed a Plaintiff's Motion For Leave to File Amendment to Complaint. The motion contained a separate paragraph pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c). According to the judgment, dated June 6, 2000, Pratt's counsel made an oral motion to amend the complaint to include an additional theory of recovery stemming from the same transaction and series of events at the October 26, 1999, hearing. The trial court denied Pratt's Motion to Amend the Complaint on the basis that the timing of the motion was late and potentially prejudicial to the City for failure to exercise due diligence. Consequently, the trial court granted the City's Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative Summary Judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in denying the Plaintiffs, Tony Pratt, Motion to Amend Complaint?
2. Did the trial court err in granting Summary Judgment Motion for the Defendant, City of Greenville?

LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. Did the trial court err in denying the Plaintiffs, Tony Pratt, Motion to Amend Complaint?

¶ 5. On appeal Pratt lists two issues for review by this Court: whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to amend the complaint and whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the City of Greenville. Prior to addressing the issue of the complaint amendment, a discussion of the City's contentions which are in essence their affirmative defenses are necessary to place the issue in context.

¶ 6. The City asserts that Pratt did not exhaust administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit in circuit court. Specifically, Pratt failed to follow the grievance procedure outlined by the City in the employee handbook; failed to comply with the statutory requirements for appeals of employment grievances pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (1972)2; failed to comply with requirements of the Immunity from Liability Tort Claims Act3 ("TCA"); and the City is exempt from liability as a governmental entity under the TCA.4

¶ 7. The proper procedure to request an "explanation" for a grievance is through the ascending chain of command, that being an immediate supervisor, department head or personnel director, Mayor's office, and City Council by agenda request. In his deposition, Pratt stated he received a copy of the City handbook and read it. Pratt stated that he spoke to Chief Nelson, his immediate supervisor and the department head, at the station and spoke to a City council member. Pratt never spoke to the personnel director, other council members or the Mayor. Pratt stated that he did not go to City Hall to request to be on the agenda to be heard by the City Council. Exhibit 5, which is a letter from Pratt's attorney to the Mayor, was offered as a notice of claim to the City by Pratt. Pratt, also, stated that he never went before the City Council to ask for a decision, and consequently, there was no appeal of the Council decision to the circuit court. The City asserts that had Pratt followed the grievance procedure, then he could have appealed the municipality's decision to the circuit court as provided by Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75. In addition, the City asserts the statutory requirements of the TCA and the exceptions contained therein for a governmental entity as affirmative defenses.

¶ 8. The summary judgment issue is contingent upon a finding that the amendment to the complaint was properly denied by the trial court. Other than the premise that the amendment to the complaint should have been granted, Pratt cites no further support for the summary judgment argument. Therefore, the pivotal issue before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to amend the complaint. Whether the grant of summary judgment was proper is only appropriate for review by this Court if there is a finding that the trial court correctly denied Pratt leave to amend the complaint in light of the facts of this case.

Standard of Review

¶ 9. The standard of review for determining whether to allow a motion to leave to amend a complaint is abuse of discretion. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 730 So.2d 574, 579 (Miss.1998). This Court is without authority to reverse a determination unless convinced that the trial judge abused his discretion. Id.; Par Indus., Inc. v. Target Container Co., 708 So.2d 44, 51 (Miss.1998). The trial court has the discretion to allow an amendment and should freely allow an amendment, unless the defendant would be prejudiced. Id.

¶ 10. Pratt contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow an amendment to the complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Pratt further contends that, without the amendment, he did not have an opportunity to dispute the City's claim of governmental immunity.

¶ 11. Rule 15(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Amendments. A party may amend his pleading as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within thirty days after it is served. On sustaining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), thirty days leave to amend shall be granted, provided matters outside the pleadings are not presented at the hearing on the motion. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or upon written consent of the adverse party; leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within ten days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be longer, unless the court otherwise orders.

(emphasis added).

¶ 12. The trial court cited both Par Indus., Inc. v. Target Container Co., 708 So.2d 44, 51 (Miss.1998) and Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So.2d 614 (Miss.1991) in its findings. In Par Indus., this Court held that while leave to amend should be freely granted there are also limits. Par Indus., 708 So.2d at 52.

Since prejudice to the opposing party is the key factor in governing the court's discretion in granting leave to amend a pleading, the court will ordinarily refuse to grant such permission where the motion comes so late and in such circumstances that the right of the adverse party will necessarily be prejudicially affected.

Id. (citing McCarty v. Kellum, 667 So.2d 1277,1284-85 (Miss.1995)). The trial court cited Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So.2d at 617, for this Court's holding that a...

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    • United States
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