Pratt v. Roseland Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 August 1892
• Citation: 50 N.J.E. 150,24 A. 1027
• Parties: PRATT v. ROSELAND RY. CO. et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

24 A. 1027

50 N.J.E. 150

PRATT

v. ROSELAND RY. CO. et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Aug. 19, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Bill for an injunction by Julius H. Pratt against the Roseland Railway Company and John J. Van Order, to restrain the construction of a railroad on certain land until compensation is made. Injunction granted.

John W. Taylor, for the motion.

Cortlandt Parker, opposed.

VAN FLEET, V. C. The complainant is the owner of a small tract of land, containing less than an acre, situate in the township of Caldwell, in the county of Essex. The land was sold for taxes in 1884, under the statute of 1879, and purchased by the defendant Van Order, for a term of 80 years. His term will not expire until 1914. The statute of 1879 makes taxes the first and paramount lien on the land against which they are assessed, (Supp. Revision, p. 990, § 50,) and also declares that a purchaser under a sale and conveyance made in enforcing such lien shall hold the land so acquired for his own use, benefit, and advantage against the owner and all persons claiming under him, and against all other estates therein and against all other liens thereon, as fully and completely as though there were no other estates therein or liens thereon, until the term for which he purchased is fully completed and ended, (Supp. Revision, p. 992, § 58.) The corporate defendant was organized under the general railroad law for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad from a point in the village of Caldwell, in the county of Essex, to a point in the neighborhood of Roseland, in the same county. It has located its road across the front of the complainant's lot, and in grading its roadbed it has made an excavation on the complainant's lot, varying in depth from two to three feet. Van Order gave it authority to use the land for the purposes of its road. Its acts, therefore, so far as he is concerned, are perfectly lawful. But it has acquired no right to the land as against the complainant. It appears, on the contrary, that it took possession of it against his remonstrance. The complainant charges, and the charge is not denied, that Van Order intends to use the rear of the lot in question for a coal yard, and, in order to make such use more profitable and convenient than it would otherwise be, he proposes to lay tracks connecting his yard with the defendant's railroad. On these facts the complainant insists that he is entitled to two measures of relief: First, that the corporate defendant be restrained from further constructing its railroad on the land in question until it has made compensation to him for his estate therein; and, second, that Van Order be enjoined from laying tracks thereon for the purpose of connecting his coal yard with the defendant's railroad.

It is clear that the relief sought against Van Order cannot be granted. He has a right, as against the complainant, to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the land until 1914, and may in the mean time appropriate it to any lawful use. He may construct a railroad on it for his own use, or erect a building on it, or use it for any other purpose to which a private owner may lawfully appropriate his land. That his dominion over the land, under his deed, was intended to embrace such uses, is manifest, in my judgment, from that provision of the statute which confers upon the purchaser of land sold for taxes the right to remove, at or before the expiration of his term, any building or material which he may have erected or placed thereon. Supp. Revision, p. 992, § 58. The use which Van Order intends to make of this land is, in my opinion, perfectly lawful, and one which the complainant has no right to challenge. As against him the order to show cause must therefore be discharged, with costs.

But the case against the corporate defendant stands on an entirely different foundation. The corporate defendant possesses no powers and has no rights except such as are conferred upon it and granted to it by the statute under which it was organized. That statute gives it power to take land for the purposes of its road, either by grant or the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but the power so granted is subject to this important limitation: that it shall not enter upon any land, for the purposes of building its road thereon, without the consent of the owner or owners, until it has first made compensation for the same. This limitation is found in the ninety-ninth section of the general railroad law, and the words in which it is expressed are: "Provided, always, that the payment or...