Pratt v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital

• Decision Date: 21 December 1898
• Citation: 42 A. 51,88 Md. 610
• Parties: PRATT et al. v. TRUSTEES OF SHEPPARD AND ENOCH PRATT HOSPITAL et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

42 A. 51

88 Md. 610

PRATT et al. v. TRUSTEES OF SHEPPARD AND ENOCH PRATT HOSPITAL et al.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 21, 1898

Appeals from circuit court of Baltimore city; George M. Sharp, Judge.

Suit by Isaac Pratt, Jr., and another, against the Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital and others for the construction of a will. From a decree in favor of the hospital trustees, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before MCSHERRY, C.J., and BRYAN, BRISCOE, PEARCE, PAGE BOYD, and FOWLER, JJ.

W Irvine Cross, for appellants. William Pinkney Whyte, Willis & Homer, and Barton & Wilmer, for appellees.

MCSHERRY C.J.

In these proceedings the validity of the twelfth or the residuary clause of the will of the late Enoch Pratt is assailed by his heirs at law and next of kin, and by his alternative residuary legatees and devisees. There are four cases, which have been consolidated; but it is not necessary to set forth the pleadings, or any part of the pleadings therein, as the disposition of the questions presented for decision depends largely on the terms of the will. The cases have been argued with marked zeal and ability on both sides and we have been greatly aided by the discussion at the bar in our examination of the matters in controversy. The clause in dispute is in these words: "Having in my lifetime liberally provided for my niece and nephews hereunder named, I do now hereby give, devise, and bequeath all the rest and residue and remainder of my estate, of every kind and description, whether real, personal, or mixed, and wherever the same may be situate, of which I may die possessed, or be in any way entitled to at the time of my death, after the payment of all debts justly due by me, and after satisfying all the devises and bequests hereinbefore set forth, to the Trustees of the Sheppard Asylum, a corporation duly incorporated by the general assembly of the state of Maryland by said name, style, and title, and its successors, forever; it being my intention and meaning to make said corporation, the Trustees of the Sheppard Asylum, the residuary legatee and devisee under this, my last will and testament. And I direct my executors to set over, transfer, and convey, by proper deeds, assignments, and transfers, the said residuary of my estate to the said corporation, upon and subject, however, to the following condition and bargain, namely: That the said trustees shall adopt as the name and style of said corporation the title of the 'Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital,' and shall obtain at the first session of the general assembly of Maryland after by death an amendment to their charter authorizing the said change of title, and adopting the said name of the 'Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital' as the future title of said corporation. While I do not wish to alter the operations and management in the working of the said asylum as now existing and being carried on, it is my wish and will that the income from my said residuary estate shall be used to complete the present buildings and grounds, and for the erection of such other buildings or building as will accommodate not less than two hundred additional inmates, and after that the income from my aforegoing donation shall be devoted mainly to the care of the indigent insane in the most advisable manner, at very low charges, or absolutely free, as the trustees of said corporation, in the exercise of their best judgment as to the rate to be charged, may deem best and wisest to promote the object of this donation: provided, however, and it is expressly my will, that in case the said Trustees of the Sheppard Asylum fail to obtain from the general assembly of Maryland at its first session after my death the amendment to the charter of said institution hereinbefore stipulated and provided for, and fail to adopt the name for said corporation of the 'Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital,' then and in that case it is my will, and I then give, devise, and bequeath, in lieu of the aforegoing provision, the said residue of my estate to my niece, Ellen J. O'Phinney, and to my nephews Gerard C. Tobey, Horace P. Tobey,

J. Lowell Pratt, David G. Pratt, Edmund T. Pratt, and Moreland L. Pratt, to be in that case set apart for and equally divided among them and the issue, per stirpes, of any of them who may be dead at the time of my decease; such issue to take the share to which its or their parent would, if living, have been entitled. I direct my executors, until it shall have been decided, as above provided, whether the said condition of my aforegoing devise and bequest of said residue will be performed (that is to say, whether the said corporation will obtain authority as aforesaid to change its title, and will in fact adopt the title above designated), to keep all buildings and improvements on my property insured, and in good order and condition, and pay all charges and taxes thereon, and to collect the rents and income of said residue of my estate, and to invest the said net income in Baltimore city stock; the same to be added to, and constitute a part of, the said residuary estate."

Mr. Pratt died in September, 1896. At the January session, 1898, of the general assembly of this state, a statute was enacted changing the corporate name of the "Trustees of the Sheppard Asylum" to the "Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital," and this change was agreed to by the body corporate. The condition, and the sole condition, prescribed in the twelfth clause of the will, having been complied with, it is now insisted: First, that the residuary clause creates a trust, which is void, because so vague and uncertain as to the objects to be benefited that it cannot be enforced, and that, therefore, the next of kin and heirs at law--a brother and a sister of the testator--are entitled to the property constituting the residuum; secondly, that the residuary clause creates a perpetuity, and is, therefore, void; thirdly, that Act 1898, c. 17, changing the name of the "Sheppard Asylum" to the "Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital," is unconstitutional and void, and that, therefore, the residuary estate passed to the alternative residuary legatees and devisees,--a niece and six nephews. The last position will be considered in the next succeeding case. As the second proposition is dependent entirely upon the disposition which may be made of the first one, we now proceed to examine and consider the first contention.

It is safe to say that thousands of cases have been decided where the same or synonymous words in different wills have, in view of the unlike circumstances attending their use, and the contrariety of the contexts where they are found, received different, and often widely different, interpretations; and it has, in consequence, frequently been observed that the effect given or the meaning ascribed to a particular word in the construction of one will is by no means a sure guide for its application, or a reliable definition of its meaning, when used in an apparently similar clause of some other individual's will. And this, of necessity, must be true when we take into account the diversity of the subject dealt with, the inequality in the capacity of the testators to clearly express their intentions, the flexible character of almost every word in a living and a constantly changing language, and the numerous and dissimilar designs and motives revealed in testamentary dispositions. If, without first finding from the four corners of the instrument what the testator's purpose or intention really was, we turn for its ascertainment to the multitude of adjudged cases wherein the words he has used have been given a meaning in other wills, his design may be easily frustrated, and, though perfectly plain in itself, might, and most probably would, be so shrouded in obscurity as to be hopelessly unintelligible. It is not meant by what has just been said to intimate that there are no established or recognized rules or canons of construction to which resort may be had, in cases of doubt or difficulty, to solve a seeming uncertainty. These rules or canons are invoked, not to defeat, but to give effect, when possible, to, the expressed intention. To avoid misunderstanding, it may not be amiss to remark that we distinguish between rules of construction, which are appealed to with a view of upholding an intention, and rules of policy or of property, which cannot be disregarded, even though they defeat the most clearly stated purpose.

If we lay out of view for the moment all canons of construction and critically read the words of the clause in controversy (for the simplest and most obvious method of discovering the intention of a testator is to read the language he has employed to give expression to that intention), his purpose is clearly manifested; and if that purpose, thus declared, does not invade some rule of property, or is not repugnant to some settled policy of the law, it ought to, and certainly will, prevail. What, then, has he said? He starts with the assertion that he had in his lifetime liberally provided for his niece and nephews, who are the alternative residuary legatees and devisees. That he did do this is abundantly clear from the evidence. To each of the six nephews and to the niece, and to another nephew, who was not named as an alternative legatee, he gave in 1892 $200,000, or $1,600,000 in the aggregate. He, therefore, did not intend that they, or the appellants in this case, who are not mentioned in the will, should receive any part of the estate disposed of by the residuary clause, unless, as respects the alternative residuary legatees and devisees, the condition on which the gift to the Sheppard Asylum was made to depend should...