Pratt v. United States

• Decision Date: 20 February 1939
• Docket Number: No. 7176.,7176.
• Parties: PRATT v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

70 App. DC 7, 102 F.2d 275 (1939)

PRATT v. UNITED STATES.

No. 7176.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Decided February 20, 1939.

James J. Laughlin, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

David A. Pine, U. S. Atty., and Charles B. Murray, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and VINSON, Associate Justices.

VINSON, Associate Justice.

Appellant, Phillip John Pratt, brings this appeal from a judgment entered in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia on May 26, 1938, sentencing him to the penitentiary for a period of two to four years.

Appellant was indicted for the crime of robbery and entered a plea of guilty on March 17, 1937. Sentence was not then imposed. On April 1, 1938, appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment based upon the contention that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to impose sentence, which motion was granted; but, on the following day, the appellee's motion for rehearing on the motion in arrest of judgment was granted, and thereupon the court overruled the motion in arrest of judgment and sentenced appellant.

This appeal presents two questions for decision:

1. Did the District Court lose jurisdiction to impose sentence due to the long delay? 2. When the motion in arrest of judgment was granted was that a bar to further proceedings and does the doctrine of former jeopardy apply?

First. There is no merit in the contention that mere delay in imposing sentence during the term in which a conviction is had operates to defeat jurisdiction to sentence at a later term. In all criminal cases a sentence must be imposed to complete the steps of the prosecution. Until sentence is imposed there is no finality of judgment. The sentence is the judgment. Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U.S. 206, 210, 53 S.Ct. 325, 77 L.Ed. 702; Hill v. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 464, 56 S.Ct. 760, 80 L.Ed. 1283; Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204. There is an inherent power in courts to finish at a succeeding term business commenced at a previous term. Rachmil v. United States, 2 Cir., 288 F. 782, 785; Walker v. Moser, 8 Cir., 117 F. 230, 233. It is now settled that it is unnecessary for courts of general jurisdiction to impose sentence at the same term of court at which the verdict or plea of guilty was had, and that these courts have the power to continue the case to a subsequent term for sentence. Miller v. Aderhold, supra; Miner v. United States, 3 Cir., 244 F. 422, 3 A.L.R. 995; Musick v. United States, 3 Cir., 2 F.2d 711; Gillespie v. Walker, 4 Cir., 296 F. 330; 97 A.L.R. 806 note.

We are of the opinion that the case of Miller v. Aderhold, supra, completely controls in the disposition of the present case. In that case there was a plea of guilty, a suspended sentence and discharge from custody. About three and one-half years thereafter, another judge sentenced the defendant to four years imprisonment. The defendant contended that the order suspending the sentence was void and that with the expiration of the term, the trial court was without power to sentence him. The court stated that the greater number of cases supported the view of the defendant, but were of the opinion that the "weight of reason is the other way." It agreed that the suspension of sentence was void, but held emphatically that the trial court did not lose jurisdiction with the passing of the term, and stated:

"Moreover, since the suspension order is void, the accused is not bound to rest under the supposed hardship. He may at any time put an end to it by requesting the court to pronounce judgment, which the court no doubt would do unless good cause to the contrary were made to appear. In the absence of such request he must be held to have consented to the indefinite delay, and cannot complain. Cases.

"In a criminal case final judgment means sentence; and a void order purporting permanently to suspend sentence is neither a final nor a valid judgment. Cases. If the suspension be for a fixed time, the case undoubtedly remains on the docket of the court until disposed of by final judgment. There is no good reason, in our opinion, why a different rule should obtain where the order of suspension, though expressly made permanent, is void. Such an order is a mere nullity without force or effect, as though no order at all had been made; and the case necessarily remains pending until lawfully disposed of by sentence. Cases.

"The order here under review being ineffectual to confer immunity from punishment, the conclusion that such immunity existed must rest upon the bare fact that, without any saving provision, the term at which the accused was convicted but not sentenced had passed. But that foundation for the conclusion at once vanishes in the face of the rule that where judgment has not been pronounced upon a verdict during the term at which it was rendered, the cause continues on the docket and necessarily passes over to a succeeding term for final judgment or other appropriate action. Case. We conclude, in accordance with what we regard as the better view, that in a criminal case, where verdict has been duly returned, the jurisdiction of the trial court, under circumstances such as are here disclosed, is not exhausted until sentence is pronounced, either at the same or a succeeding term. Cases." 288 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 326.

In view of the fact that the suspended judgment in Miller v. Aderhold, supra, was a nullity, the case stood as if no order had been entered, as in the present case, and that case is, therefore, decisive of our question.

It is further urged that Rule 1 of the criminal rules promulgated by the Supreme Court vitiated the power of the court to impose sentence. It is:

"I. Sentence. — After a plea of guilty, or a verdict of guilt by a jury or finding of guilt by the trial court where a jury is waived, and except as provided in the Act of March 4, 1925, c. 521, 43 Stat. 1259 (as amended 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 724-727) sentence shall be imposed without delay unless (1) a motion for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty, or in arrest of judgment or for a new trial, is pending, or the trial court is of opinion that there is reasonable ground for such a motion; or (2) the condition or character of the defendant, or other pertinent matters, should be investigated in the interest of justice before sentence is imposed. * * *

"Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or continue or increase the amount of bail." Tit. 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723a.

We do not think that this rule changed, or was intended to change, the substantive law relative to jurisdiction. There is no penalty attached by the rule. The rule was adopted for the purpose of expediting criminal cases after verdict. It was suggested in Berkowitz v. United States, 8 Cir., 90 F.2d 881, that the rule is not for the benefit of a defendant, but for the benefit of the government. We think that it is equally important that the defendant have the benefit of the rule, and that upon his request, unless good cause to the contrary appears, the court should accommodate him by imposing sentence "without delay." Doubtless the Supreme Court in the promulgation of this procedural rule had the interest of the prisoner in mind, as well as the interest of society, but we think there was no purpose, intent, or power to change the substantive law relative to jurisdiction. Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 5 Cir., 98 F.2d 541, 543.

The record fails to disclose the reason actuating the district court in the delay in imposing sentence upon appellant. However, it is certain that the appellant had been convicted on another robbery charge, and that he was at the time of sentence in this case incarcerated for a period of 3 to 8 years by reason of the other conviction, the sentence in this case running concurrently with the former sentence. In the former case, an appeal was taken to this court. We affirmed the conviction¹ and denied rehearing, Tomlinson v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 106, 93 F. 2d 652, 114 A.L.R. 1315. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court,² and a subsequent motion to withhold the order denying the petition for writ of certiorari was also denied. Finally this court denied a motion to recall and stay our mandate on March 14, 1938. The motion in arrest of judgment in the present case was filed on April 1, 1938, and after due consideration, the district court imposed sentence on May 26, 1938.

The sufficiency of the indictment was challenged in the former appeal. It was substantially similar to the indictment in the present case. If held to be invalid, it certainly would affect the disposition of the present case. It may well be that the district court was of the opinion that it should await the outcome of the appeal in order that the prisoner would lose no rights and would not be compelled to protect his rights in an appeal of the second case. The issues decided by the appeal might have been considered by the court to be "pertinent matters which should be investigated in the interest of justice before sentence is imposed." As to this we express no opinion, for it is not necessary for us to consider, in any event, the probabilities for delay, "In fact, we must assume, in the absence of anything in the record to the contrary, that the postponements were made for a lawful...