Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 09 August 1991 |
| Citation | 589 So.2d 165 |
| Parties | PREFERRED RISK MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Vivian G. RYAN. 1900067. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
W. Michael Atchison and Jeffrey E. Friedman of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for appellant.
Harry M. Renfroe, Jr., Mountain & Mountain, Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company ("Preferred Risk") appeals from a judgment rendered on a jury verdict against it and codefendant Arthur Lee Blackman in an action by Preferred Risk's insured, Vivian J. Ryan, to recover uninsured motorist insurance benefits. The question presented is whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of the limits of Ryan's uninsured motorist insurance policy.
Ryan and Blackman had a collision on a dirt road in rural Tuscaloosa County. As a result of the accident, Ryan suffered an injury to her larynx. She filed a complaint against Blackman, alleging both negligence and wantonness. She later withdrew her wantonness claim. Because Blackman was uninsured, Ryan also named her uninsured motorist insurance carrier, Preferred Risk, as a defendant, pursuant to the procedure set out by this Court in Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1988). Preferred Risk opted to participate in the trial and filed a cross-claim against Blackman.
During the trial, the judge allowed Ryan to admit, over Preferred Risk's objection, evidence of the policy limits of her uninsured motorist coverage. Under that policy, Ryan's recovery was limited to $20,000. At the close of the evidence, Preferred Risk moved for a mistrial. It argued, inter alia, that the trial court's admission of the policy limits evidence was reversible error. That motion was denied. The jury then returned a verdict for Ryan and assessed damages at $20,000, and prejudgment interest in the amount of $1,900. The jury also returned a verdict for the same amount in Preferred Risk's favor on its cross-claim against Blackman. Preferred Risk's subsequent motion for j.n.o.v. or a new trial was denied by operation of law, pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala.R.Civ.P., and it appeals. 1
Preferred Risk contends that the trial court's judgment is due to be reversed because: (1) evidence of insurance policy limits is, it argues, inadmissible as a matter of law; (2) there was no legal justification, it says, for admitting such evidence in this case; and (3) the admission of that evidence, it says, unduly influenced the jury's decision on the amount of damages to award. Therefore, it contends that it is entitled to a new trial.
Generally, rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Ryan v. Acuff, 435 So.2d 1244 (Ala.1983). Notwithstanding that broad discretion, this Court has held that evidence of insurance coverage, or of the limits of a policy of insurance, is usually not relevant in tort cases, and, thus, that admission of such evidence is error. See Harvey v. Mitchell, 522 So.2d 771 (Ala.1988); Otwell v. Bryant, 497 So.2d 111 (Ala.1986); and Keown v. Monks, 491 So.2d 914 (Ala.1986). The rationale underlying the general prohibition against such evidence is based on the possibility that injecting evidence of insurance coverage would unduly influence the jury's determination regarding liability and its assessment of damages. Robins Engineering, Inc. v. Cockrell, 354 So.2d 1 (Ala.1977).
The trial judge's decision to admit the policy limits evidence in this case appears to have been based on the unusual nature of actions by insureds against their insurers for uninsured motorist benefits. Such actions, though based on contractual agreements, have their underpinnings in tort law. In order to recover, the insured must show (1) that he is covered under an uninsured motorist policy; (2) that an uninsured motorist was at fault; and (3) that he suffered damage. Harvey v. Mitchell, supra. The uncertainty caused by the dual nature of this type of action is evidenced by the fact that the trial judge initially held that the policy limits evidence was not admissible, then subsequently allowed it. The court stated:
Because of our disposition of this appeal, it is not necessary for this Court to determine whether the conclusions contained in the trial judge's statement are correct statements of the law. However, we do point out that this Court has refrained from classifying actions for uninsured motorist benefits either as actions sounding in contract or as actions sounding in tort. Instead, we have recognized that such actions are unique and contain elements from both categories of actions. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cahoon, 287 Ala. 462, 468, 252 So.2d 619, 624 (1971). 2
It is the policy of this State to uphold verdicts returned by juries. Warner v. Elliot, 573 So.2d 275 (Ala.1990). Therefore, this Court will not reverse a judgment rendered on a jury verdict, even in the face of an erroneous ruling by the trial court, unless the appellant demonstrates that he was substantially prejudiced by the error. Costarides v. Miller, 374 So.2d 1335 (Ala.1979); Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P. This Court will not presume that an error was prejudicial. Bryson v. State, 264 Ala. 111, 84 So.2d 785 (1955). Nor have we held that the erroneous injection of evidence regarding insurance is, in every instance, prejudicial error requiring reversal. Thompson-Weinman & Co. v. Robinson, 386 So.2d 409, 411 (Ala.1980). The burden of establishing that an erroneous ruling was prejudicial is on the appellant. Dinmark v. Farrier, 510 So.2d 819 (Ala.1987).
In the instant case, Preferred Risk contends that a prejudicial effect is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the jury's verdict, not counting the award of prejudgment interest, was for $20,000, the amount of Ryan's policy limits. Despite its argument that the policy limits evidence unduly influenced the jury's assessment of damages, Preferred Risk does not argue that Ryan did not sustain, or failed to prove, damage in the amount of $20,000. In response, Ryan points out that $20,000 was the amount of damages requested by her lawyer during his closing argument. Although the parties' closing arguments are not in the record, Preferred Risk concedes this fact in its brief.
In addition, Ryan submitted the affidavit of the jury foreman in opposition to Preferred Risk's post-judgment motion. That affidavit tends to support Ryan's contention that the jury's assessment of damages was based on the amount of damages proved and requested by her lawyer, and contains the following relevant statements:
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