Prelich v. Med. Res., Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 August 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. ELH–10–3394.
• Citation: 813 F.Supp.2d 654
• Parties: Amanda PRELICH, Plaintiff, v. MEDICAL RESOURCES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

813 F.Supp.2d 654

Amanda PRELICH, Plaintiff,

v.MEDICAL RESOURCES, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. ELH–10–3394.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Aug. 19, 2011.

Eric E. McLauchlin, Tracey Dallahan McLauchlin, Shaffer Law Office LLC, Bel Air, MD, for Plaintiff.

Andrew Steven Cabana, Kara Marie Ariail, Jackson Lewis LLP, Reston, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLEN LIPTON HOLLANDER, District Judge.

Amanda Prelich, plaintiff, was employed as a “MR Technologist” at Colonnade Imaging Center, a medical imaging center operated by Medical Resources, Inc. (“MRI”), defendant.¹ (Proposed) First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (“Proposed Amended Complaint” or “Prop. Am. Compl.,” ECF 15–2) ¶ 12. During her employment, plaintiff learned that she was pregnant with quadruplets, and requested accommodations as to her schedule and information about benefits. Id. ¶ 29. Citing reduction-in-force measures, defendant subsequently terminated plaintiff. Id. ¶ 31. The circumstances of plaintiff's termination led to the instant suit, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.²

MRI has filed a Motion To Dismiss (“Motion,” ECF 11), which plaintiff opposes. See Plaintiff Amanda Prelich's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (“Opp'n” or “Opposition,” ECF 14). On the same date that plaintiff filed her Opposition, she also requested leave to amend her complaint to allege additional facts relevant to her Opposition. See Plaintiff Amanda Prelich's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (“Motion to Amend,” ECF 15). Defendant opposes plaintiff's Motion to Amend, arguing that the amendment would be futile. See ECF 16. The issues have been fully briefed and the Court now rules on both motions, pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being necessary.

Factual and Procedural Background ³

Plaintiff began her employment as a MR Technologist at defendant's Colonnade Imaging Center in Bel Air, Maryland on or about December 18, 2006. Prop. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. In July 2007, she informed both her “direct Supervisor” and the Area Center Manager (“Manager”) that “she was undergoing medical in vitro fertilization procedures for the purposes of becoming pregnant.” Id. ¶ 13. She also indicated that, were she to become pregnant, defendant “would need” to accommodate her pregnancy by, “ inter alia, allowing the Plaintiff periodic time off for appointments, and allowing the Plaintiff to avoid exposure to certain MRI equipment.” Id.

In August 2007, plaintiff learned that she “was pregnant with twins.” Id. ¶ 14. She “immediately” shared the news with her “employer.” Id. On or about September 12, 2007, plaintiff's physician advised her that “her pregnancy was a high-risk pregnancy; that she should at no time become overly tired; that she would need to attend regular, if not weekly, appointments; and that she would need to be on bed rest beginning on or about January 18, 2008.” Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff promptly informed her Supervisor of her physician's recommendations, and her Supervisor relayed that information to the Manager. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.

About two weeks later, on or about September 27, 2007, the Manager called plaintiff to a meeting to inform her, individually that defendant was “initiating a new work schedule.” Id. ¶ 18. In particular, plaintiff's “hours were being changed to include a new five-day, Monday through Friday work schedule,” ⁴ with alternating shifts each week. Id. The first week's shifts would “end as late as 10:30 p.m.,” and the second week's shifts would begin “as early as 7:00 a.m.” Id. Plaintiff was told that these scheduling changes, which were to go into effect the following day, “were being made because of the recommendations of an outside consulting group that MRI had hired to assess the efficiency of its operations.” Id. In response to the scheduling change, plaintiff informed her Manager that the “new schedule could create medical issues for her because of her at-risk pregnancy and her doctor's advice.” Id. ¶ 19. Therefore, “she asked that her medical needs be accommodated in the scheduling.” Id.

The following day, September 28, 2007, “after further reviewing the revised schedule,” plaintiff contacted her Manager “to note that the new schedule required the Plaintiff to work on Mondays,” the day on which she had pre-scheduled all of her weekly doctor's appointments (as Monday had previously been her regular day off). Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff subsequently spoke to her Supervisor, and “the two of them were able to work together to arrange a revised schedule” that satisfied defendant's staffing needs while also accommodating plaintiff's pre-scheduled doctor's appointments. Id. ¶ 21.

On October 2, 2007, plaintiff advised the Manager that she and her Supervisor had agreed on a revised schedule. Id. ¶ 22. The Manager did not respond, however. Id.

On October 4, 2007, the Manager “confronted” plaintiff and told her that she “needed to confirm that she would comply with the new schedule.” Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff reminded the Manager that, “because of her high-risk pregnancy, the physical limitations it required, and the advice of her physician, she would not be able to work swing shifts.” Id. ¶ 24. Nevertheless, the Manager “advised the Plaintiff that she had to either comply with the new schedule or resign from her employment.” Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff refused to resign. Id. ¶ 26. According to plaintiff, the Manager then “made no further attempt to understand what the Plaintiff's medical needs were or to accommodate them.” Id. ¶ 27.

On October 8, 2007, plaintiff's physician informed her that she was pregnant with quadruplets. Id. ¶ 28. Her physician advised her that she was to remain on bed rest, and that “she should not return to work because of the special nature of her high-risk pregnancy.” Id. In particular, she faced various complications associated with “multiple babies.” Id. That same day, plaintiff “presented the Defendant with a letter from her Perinatologist.” Id. ¶ 29. She informed her Supervisor and the Manager that she was pregnant with quadruplets, and that “she was unable to continue working,” because her physician had instructed her to remain on bed rest. Id. She requested information as to leave under the FMLA, as well as information on her available paid leave and disability benefits. Id.

Plaintiff did not receive the information she requested. Id. ¶ 30. Accordingly, on October 18, 2007, she sent an e-mail to defendant, “again requesting information and forms relating to short term disability benefits.” Id.

On or about November 5, 2007, by written correspondence, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment, stating that her position “was being eliminated due to a reduction in force.” Id. ¶ 31. In conjunction with the termination, defendant offered plaintiff a severance payment in exchange for her signature on a release (the “Release”), by which she would relinquish the right to institute “ ‘any action or complaint of any type in any administrative forum or court of law ...’ in order to receive the proposed severance.” Id. ¶ 32–33 (quoting Release). The Release also required plaintiff to “maintain the confidentiality of the fact and terms of the Release or risk repayment of the proposed severance.” Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff refused to sign the Release. Id. ¶ 34. However, “she subsequently qualified for and received short term disability benefits.” Id.

On December 12, 2007, plaintiff, through counsel, wrote to defendant (the “December 12 letter”). Id. ¶ 35. Her counsel expressed concerns that plaintiff's termination violated antidiscrimination laws, the FMLA, and the ADA. Id.

By letter dated March 26, 2008 (the “March 26 letter”), defendant's counsel responded, reiterating that plaintiff had been terminated because her position as MR Technician was eliminated on the advice of an outside consulting firm that had determined that “there was low MRI volume at the Colonnade Imaging Center.” Id. ¶ 36. Further, the March 26 letter averred that, “even if there had been no reduction in force, Ms. Prelich would have been terminated based on several articulated for-cause reasons.” Id. According to Prelich, the March 26 letter was the first time “for-cause reasons” were “presented as a basis for termination.” ⁵ Id.

According to plaintiff, “[w]ithin ten days, on April 6, 2008 and times surrounding, despite the suggestion that the position had been eliminated and there was no business need to fill it, the Defendant publicly advertised an available employment position for an MR Technologist” at the Colonnade Imaging Center.⁶ Id. ¶ 37. Further, plaintiff avers that defendant “knew or should have known that its failure to advise the Plaintiff of the reasons underlying her termination, its misrepresentations concerning the elimination of her position, and its issuance of the release in question would delay the Plaintiff's presentation of a discrimination claim.” Id. ¶ 38.

Three hundred and twenty-two days after plaintiff's termination, on September 22, 2008, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), “alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, and retaliation.” Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC almost two years later, on September 7, 2010. Id. ¶ 10.

This suit followed in December 2010. Plaintiff's complaint sets forth six counts, as follows: gender discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, in violation of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Count I); disability discrimination on the basis of defendant's failure to accommodate, in violation of the ADA (Count II); disability discrimination on the basis of defendant's termination of her employment, in violation of the ADA (Count III); retaliation in...