Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. Miller-Davis Co.
Decision Date | 16 September 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 68 C 407.,68 C 407. |
Citation | 292 F. Supp. 213 |
Parties | PREMIER ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. MILLER-DAVIS COMPANY and St. Arnaud Electric Company, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
A. Denison Weaver, Chicago, Ill., for Premier Electrical Construction Co.
Owen Rall and Peter M. Sfikas, Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, Chicago, Ill., for Miller-Davis Co.
Luther McKinney and John Berghoff, Chadwell, Keck, Kayser, Ruggles & McLaren, Chicago, Ill., for St. Arnaud Electric Co.
This is a civil antitrust action in which plaintiffs seek to recover treble damages for injuries resulting from an alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 15.
Plaintiff, Premier Electrical Construction Company and defendant St. Arnaud Electrical Company are direct corporate competitors engaged in the electrical construction business. Defendant Miller-Davis is in the general contracting business. On February 3, 1966, the Atomic Energy Commission sent invitations to various general contractors, including defendant Miller-Davis, to submit bids for an addition to the Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. The project was known as the Accelerator Improvement ZGS, FY-65 Meson Building Addition. In order to prepare their bids, the general contractors, including Miller-Davis, then sent invitations to various electrical sub-contractors, including Premier Electrical Construction Company, requesting bids on the electrical work to be performed on the Argonne project.
Plaintiff alleges that sometime between January 15, 1966, and March 3, 1966, a conspiracy arose between Miller-Davis and St. Arnaud such that Miller-Davis would induce St. Arnaud's competitors, including plaintiff, to submit inflated bids to the competitors of Miller-Davis, thereby insuring a successful bid by Miller-Davis and a sub-contract for St. Arnaud. Plaintiff claims that on March 3, 1966, it submitted its bid by telephone to Miller-Davis, was advised that it was the low bidder and, assuming that Miller-Davis was awarded the prime contract, that it, Premier, would be awarded the electrical sub-contract on the condition that it would "protect" Miller-Davis by submitting artificially inflated bids to other general contractors.
In its complaint (¶ 12), plaintiff acknowledges that it agreed to "protect" Miller-Davis if Miller-Davis would inform plaintiff of its receipt of a lower bid by a third party so that plaintiff could rebid to defendant's competitors. Miller-Davis did not advise plaintiff of any competitive bid on the electrical sub-contract. Plaintiff did submit high bids to general contractors other than Miller-Davis. The Atomic Energy Commission awarded the contract to Miller-Davis who then gave the sub-contract to defendant St. Arnaud.
On October 13, 1966, in another District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, plaintiff filed a suit against Miller-Davis entitled Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., Civil Action No. 66 C 1850. Plaintiff's amended complaint in that case set forth basically the same facts alleged in the present suit, save for the purported involvement of St. Arnaud. The language of the amended complaint in the first suit is virtually identical to that recited in the instant issue, especially in those paragraphs which relate to the agreement to "protect" Miller-Davis. The original action sought $40,000 for breach of contract. Trial ended on March 27, 1968, and the case was taken under advisement. A decision is expected to be rendered shortly.* In the present complaint, filed March 4, 1968, plaintiff claims deprivation of profits amounting to $65,000 as its damages and seeks an award of treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15.
Defendant Miller-Davis has moved to dismiss the present suit on the grounds of res judicata and in pari delicto. Defendant St. Arnaud seeks a judgment on the pleadings based on the doctrine of in pari delicto. Defendants admit plaintiff's factual allegations regarding the contract and sub-contract negotiations for the limited purpose of making their motions.
Because its first suit is based on contract while the present case stems from an alleged violation of the Sherman Act, plaintiff suggests that the respective causes of action are "totally separate and distinct in every respect." (Brief at 3). This argument is not well taken. It is the facts in each case, not the theories, which are crucial in determining the applicability of res judicata. Wolcott v. Hutchins, 245 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd 365 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1966). Both of plaintiff's suits arise out of the same operative facts and disputed transactions the end result of which was the failure of plaintiff to secure the electrical sub-contract from Miller-Davis. The mere addition of a new, federal theory will not support new litigation.
Plaintiff relies on Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1964) and Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927). In Engelhardt, however, a decision in an earlier suit under Missouri antitrust law was held to be res judicata in the later suit brought under federal antitrust statutes despite the incorporation of more specific allegations of interference in interstate commerce and a prayer for a different amount of damages. A plaintiff must plead his entire case on all theories at one time. Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 320, 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927); Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 33 (8th Cir. 1964). This plaintiff has not done. In fact, Premier filed the present suit within a few weeks prior to the trial of its original suit against Miller-Davis.
As to defendant Miller-Davis, res judicata would be a good defense if there were a final judgment in the first suit. While a decision is expected in a few days, such a final judgment has not yet been handed down. However, concurrent duplicate litigation is no less undesirable than successive duplicate litigation. In either situation, a second suit violates principles of comity between judges, creates administrative inefficiencies in the federal courts, and imposes an unfair burden on the defendant. Eastern States Petroleum & Chemical Corp. v. Walker, 177 F.Supp. 328, 333 (S.D.Tex.1959); Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Emerson Radio and Phonograph Co., 140 F.Supp. 588, 589 (D.N.J.1956). Thus, the public policies in favor of a single suit in a single controversy and against contentious litigation remain viable. Asbury v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 264 F.Supp. 437, 438 (D.Col.1967); Paluchowska v. United States Lines Co., 93 F.Supp. 751, 752 (S.D.N.Y.1950). The pendency of a prior action in the same jurisdiction, between the same parties, and arising out of the same transaction constitutes good grounds for abating the subsequent suit. Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1962). Consequently, the motion to dismiss of defendant Miller-Davis is granted.
Defendant St. Arnaud was not a party in the original action brought by Premier and may not now plead res judicata or take advantage of abatement. St. Arnaud's motion for judgment on the pleadings is based on the defense of illegality. Miller-Davis has adopted the arguments of St. Arnaud as additional support for its motion to dismiss. The Court is faced with two questions: whether plaintiff's agreement with Miller-Davis is illegal and, if illegal, whether plaintiff is barred from recovery of treble damages in a civil antitrust suit.
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Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. Miller-Davis Co.
...court did not reach Miller-Davis' statute of frauds and the damages defenses. 5 The district court's opinion is reported at 292 F.Supp. 213 (N.D.Ill.1968). 6 Paragraph 9 of the complaint 9. That sometime between January 15, 1966, and March 3, 1966, the defendants by and between themselves c......