Premiere Automotive Group, Inc. v. Welch
Decision Date | 06 April 2001 |
Citation | 794 So.2d 1078 |
Parties | PREMIERE AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC., d/b/a Premiere Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Toyota; Charles Mitchell; and Joe Plexico v. Carl A. WELCH. AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Carl A. Welch. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John Martin Galese and David A. Norris of Galese & Ingram, P.C., Birmingham, for appellants Premiere Automotive Group, Inc., Charles Mitchell, and Joe Plexico.
C. William Gladden and James S. Witcher III of Gladden & Sinor, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant AmSouth Bank, N.A.
W. Scears Barnes, Jr., of Barnes & Radney, P.C., Alexander City; and John K. Johnson, Rockford, for appellee.
Carl A. Welch sued Premiere Automotive Group, Inc., doing business as Premiere Pontiac Buick GMC Toyota ("Premiere"); AmSouth Bank, N.A. ("AmSouth"); Charles Mitchell; and Joe Plexico, alleging suppression, misrepresentation, conspiracy, and a violation of Alabama's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 8-19-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. All claims related to the sale and financing of an automobile. At all pertinent times herein, Mitchell and Plexico were employees of Premiere. The defendants moved to compel arbitration of Welch's claims; the trial court denied their motions. The defendants appeal from the orders denying their motions to compel arbitration.1 We reverse and remand with instructions.
Welch's complaint alleges that his daughter, Amy Welch Andrews, had financed with AmSouth the purchase of a 1999 Toyota Camry automobile from Premiere. Welch alleges that his daughter signed his name to the sale documents without his permission, after he had expressly informed Mitchell and Plexico, as agents of Premiere, that he would not sign the documents if he was listed as the buyer. Welch further alleges that Mitchell later advised Andrews that he had talked to Welch and that her father had approved her signing his name to the sale documents.
Several weeks after the sale, according to the complaint, AmSouth mailed Welch a payment book. Welch says he then advised AmSouth that he did not know what he had supposedly purchased, and he says that AmSouth advised him that he had purchased a 1999 Toyota Camry. Welch says that he told AmSouth that he had not purchased the automobile. According to the complaint, AmSouth assured Welch that it would contact Premiere and AmSouth would call Welch back.
The complaint states that at a later date Plexico telephoned Welch and instructed him to return the automobile to the dealership by 1:00 p.m. that same day. Welch says that Plexico told him that if he failed to do so, Premiere would prosecute his daughter for "grand theft." At some time thereafter, according to the complaint, Welch applied for a loan for himself but was refused credit because of "excessive obligations in relation to income." Welch says that a few months later, AmSouth notified him that the account on the Camry was in arrears, and he says he again told AmSouth that he had not purchased the automobile. Welch's complaint demands an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages.
Premiere, Mitchell, and Plexico (hereafter referred to collectively as "the Premiere defendants") filed a motion to stay the action and to require Welch to submit his claim to binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ("FAA"). The motion was based upon a written agreement to arbitrate included in the documents allegedly executed by Welch. The Premiere defendants attached an affidavit given by Mitchell, who testified that Andrews presented the arbitration agreement to him bearing what was purported to be Welch's signature, and who further testified that Andrews represented to him at that time that she had obtained her father's signature on the arbitration agreement and on other documents in connection with the purchase of the Toyota. AmSouth filed a motion requesting enforcement of the arbitration agreement set forth in a retail installment contract that also bears the purported signature of "Carl A. Welch."
The terms of the applicable agreements are not material, because Welch has not challenged in this appeal the scope of the agreements to arbitrate. Welch unequivocally denies signing any of the documents that would have been necessary to purchase a vehicle from Premiere or to finance it with AmSouth.
Shortly after the motions to compel arbitration had been filed, Welch filed materials in opposition, attaching his and his daughter's affidavits. Four days later, the trial court summarily denied the motions to compel arbitration filed by the Premiere defendants and AmSouth. On the next day, the Premiere defendants moved the court for leave to conduct limited discovery as to matters relating to the enforceability of the arbitration agreements at issue. A hearing on this motion was at that time set for approximately one month later, but, on the next day, a representative of the trial court contacted the Premiere defendants' counsel and advised that the hearing on their motion for leave to conduct discovery would have to be rescheduled. Welch thereafter responded to the motion by contending that the trial court's order denying arbitration rendered the motion moot. Premiere and AmSouth thereafter filed timely notices of appeal.2
All parties agree that there must be a trial on the issue of the making of the agreements to arbitrate. The only issues before us are the timing of the trial and, if the trial is to take place before any trial of the underlying issues in the action, whether discovery limited to the issue of execution of the agreements is appropriate.
Under the provisions of § 4 of the FAA, "[i]f the making of the arbitration agreement ... be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof." If a jury has been demanded, the trial court "shall" refer the issues to a jury. "If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made ..., the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration...." Id.
Our caselaw has analogized the practice on motions to compel arbitration to motions for summary judgment. In Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Harcus, 754 So.2d 622, 625-26 (Ala.1999), Justice See wrote:
Because the facts before us in Harcus were similar to the facts presented in these appeals, the result we reached in Harcus is instructive for our resolution of the questions raised in these appeals. In Harcus, we stated:
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