Premo v. U.S.A

• Decision Date: 30 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-1427.,No. 09-1426,09-1426,09-1427.
• Parties: Joelle PREMO, PlaintiffAppellant/CrossAppellee, v. UNITED STATES of America; United States Postal Service; John Doe, an unidentified Postal Service truck driver, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

599 F.3d 540

Joelle PREMO, PlaintiffAppellant/CrossAppellee, v. UNITED STATES of America; United States Postal Service; John Doe, an unidentified Postal Service truck driver, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

No. 09-1426

No. 09-1427.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 5, 2010.

Decided: March 30, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED: Lawrence T. Garcia, Allen Brothers, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Sushma Soni, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Lawrence T Garcia, Allen Brothers, PLLC, Detroit Michigan, for Appellant. Sushma Soni Thomas M. Bondy, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Before: CLAY and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; POLSTER, District Judge.^*

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Joelle Premo appeals the district court's determination that pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A § 2671, et seq., Michigan state law, which in this case is the Michigan No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 500.3101, et seq., applies to Premo's claim for personal injury benefits against the government. Plaintiff also appeals the district court's denial of her request for interest and attorneys' fees. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court's decision.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Factual Background

On August 7, 2006, Joelle Premo, then 19 years old, was riding her bicycle in Royal Oak, Michigan. While riding through a cross walk, Premo was struck by a United States Postal Service ("USPS") postal truck and injured. She suffered multiple leg, ankle, and foot fractures that required surgery.

Premo does not own an automobile and thus, does not have automobile insurance. Consequently, Premo was unable to claim insurance benefits from her own insurance company. On September 6, 2006, Premo's counsel contacted the USPS to file a claim for insurance benefits, pursuant to the Michigan No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act ("No-Fault Act"), Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. ("M.C.L.A.") § 500.3101, et seq., under the postal service's insurance plan. The USPS declined Premo's request for benefits in a letter dated September 15, 2006. The letter stated, inter alia, the following:

The United States Postal Service is selfinsured and does not carry insurance on its motor vehicles because it is exempt from the requirements of state vehicle insurance statutes. In the most general of terms, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution does not al-low a state to regulate the actions of any arm of the federal government, unless, of course, the federal government agrees to allow that regulation. No such allowance has been provided in this instance.

There is one relevant exception to the United States' sovereign immunity from claims of any kind. The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. 2671-80, provides the exclusive means of pursuing a claim against the federal government based on the negligence of one of its agencies or their employees. 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1). Therefore, Michigan No-Fault does not apply to the United States Postal Service. Accordingly, the Postal Service declines Ms. Premo's request for benefits from the Postal Service.

If it is your intent to present an administrative tort claim with the United States Postal Service under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the claim must conform in all respects with Title 28, United States Code, § 1346, 2671-2680 and Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 14. Accordingly, each claim should state, with specificity, sufficient facts to allow the government to investigate its liability and a "sum certain" amount for injuries or losses alleged to have occurred by reason of the incident. Please note that "sum certain" is the term used to identify the amount of damages the claimant seeks to resolve the dispute. Further, it should be accompanied by supportive documentation, and exhibit an original ink signature.

Plaintiff filed an FTCA administrative claim with the USPS, seeking $197,569.80 for personal injury and the property damage to her bicycle. The agency denied Premo's claim on May 18, 2007, stating: "an investigation into [the accident] failed to establish a negligent act or omission on the part of the U.S. Postal Service or its employees. While we regret any injury that may have occurred, we cannot accept legal liability for these alleged damages. Accordingly, this claim is denied." Plaintiff did not subsequently apply for insurance benefits under Michigan's assigned claims plan.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed suit in U.S. district court against the United States, the USPS, and "John Doe" ¹ on July 31, 2007 pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 2671, et seq., seeking economic and noneconomic damages resulting from the driver's alleged negligence. After discovery concluded, the government moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the Michigan No-Fault Act was applicable and therefore, Plaintiff could not recover economic damages; and (2) Plaintiff had not demonstrated that she met the threshold to receive non-economic damages under Michigan law.

On October 2, 2008, the district court granted in part and denied in part the government's motion for summary judgment. The district court determined that: (1) Michigan's No-Fault Act applied, (2) the government was not estopped from arguing that the No-Fault Act applied, (3) Plaintiff failed to meet the standard necessary to recover non-economic damages, and (4) the case would go forward as to the government's liability and Premo would be entitled to economic damages if such liability were established.

On October 14, 2008, Premo moved for summary judgment on her claim for $34,018.62 in economic damages, which included $33,768.62 in medical expenses and $250 in property damage, and requested $8,654.33 in interest and $50,000 in attorneys' fees. On February 3, 2009, the district court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs motion, finding that Plaintiff was entitled to the $34,768.62 in economic damages but denying her request for interest and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. Plaintiff appeals the district court's: (1) application of Michigan's NoFault Act to her claim and (2) denial of her request for interest and attorneys' fees.²The government appeals the district court's award of economic damages to Plaintiff.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews de novo a district court's grant or denial of summary judgment. Seaway Food Town, Inc. v. Med Mut. of Ohio, 347 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court reviews the issue of sovereign immunity and whether the government can be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act de novo. See Young v. United States, 71 F.3d 1238, 1241 (6th Cir.1995) ("Whether the United States can be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for basic reparation benefits... under the Kentucky no-fault statute is a question of law that we review de novo."); see also Bowling Green v. Martin Land Dev. Co., 561 F.3d 556, 558 (6th Cir.2009) ("Because the district court's decision turned on its interpretation of a federal statute,... this Court reviews that question of law de novo.").

B. Requirements under the Federal Tort Claims Act

Sovereign immunity prevents suit against the United States without its consent. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") waives sovereign immunity for certain actions in tort by giving district courts exclusive jurisdiction over those types of civil actions. Under the FTCA the government may be liable

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,... if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. A. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA "was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like circumstances." Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). The FTCA "neither creates causes of action against the United States nor provides a means of enforcing federal statutory duties. Rather, it 'constitutes consent to suit and is fundamentally limited to cases in which a private individual [would be liable] under like circumstances.'" United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 217 (6th Cir.2009) (alteration in original). Although the United States government may be liable "in the same manner and to the same extentas a private individual under like circumstances, " the government is not liable for pre-judgment interest or for punitive damages. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674.

Claims under the FTCA involve a two-step analysis. "First the district court applies local law to determine liability and to assess damages. Second, federal law is invoked to bar proscribed recoveries, such as punitive damages." Palmer v United States, 146 F.3d 361, 366 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Kirchgessner v. United States, 958 F.2d 158, 159 (6th Cir.1992)); see Richards, 369 U.S. at 10, 82 S.Ct. 585 ("We conclude that Congress has, in the Tort Claims Act, enacted a rule which requires federal courts... to look in the first instance to the law of the place where the acts of negligence took place."). Thus, liability under the FTCA is usually determined by referencing state law. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305, 112 S.Ct. 711, 116 L.Ed.2d 731 (1992). Because the alleged...