Prentice v. Classen

Decision Date23 May 1984
Docket NumberNo. 14369,14369
Citation355 N.W.2d 352
PartiesLowell PRENTICE and Mary Prentice, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Charles L. CLASSEN, Defendant, and Opal H. Classen, Defendant and Appellant. . Considered on Briefs
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Scott N. Heidepriem of Heidepriem & Widmayer, Miller, for plaintiffs and appellees.

Douglas G. Fosheim of Wehde, Fosheim & Haberstick, Huron, for defendant and appellant.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by Opal Classen from a judgment decreeing that she was in default on a contract for deed. We affirm.

On May 1, 1980, Lowell and Mary Prentice agreed to sell Opal and Charles Classen some fifty-six acres of pasture land, together with the house, garage, and outbuildings situated on the land. The contract for deed entered into by the parties fixed the purchase price at $45,000.00 and provided that the Classens would pay $4,500.00 at or before the execution of the contract, $6,174.00 on November 1, 1980, and $3,321.15 on November 1, 1981, and a like sum each November 1 for the next nineteen years. The interest rate was set at seven percent. The contract also provided that:

If there is any default or breach of this contract by buyer, then in such case, this agreement, at the option of the seller, may be cancelled by the seller giving the buyer thirty days written notice of such cancellation, and this contract shall be terminated unless within such thirty days period buyer shall pay the entire balance under the contract in default of which buyer shall have no right or claim thereto or right of action to recover the premises herein described and all payments and improvements made by buyer shall be retained by seller as liquidated damages, it being expressly understood and agreed that time is of the essence of this contract.

The Classens were dairy farmers. They lived with their children in the farm home and added a bulk tank, dairy equipment, and cement floors to the outbuildings in order to operate a Grade "B" dairy.

During the summer of 1982 the Classens began experiencing marital difficulties, which resulted in their being divorced in May of 1983. Charles left the marital home in the fall of 1982. He advised Opal that he had made the November 1, 1982, contract payment. When Opal learned that Charles had not made the payment, she attempted to make arrangements for payment but was unsuccessful in doing so.

On November 9, 1982, the Prentices notified the Classens of their default and gave them thirty days to pay the entire balance due. The Prentices started this action to foreclose the contract in January 1983.

The trial court found, in part:

9. The Plaintiffs [Prentices] are ready, willing and able to perform their obligations under the terms and provisions of the Contract for Deed and have made this offer of performance known to the Defendants.

10. The Defendants [Classens] have failed to make the November 1, 1982 payment but are still in possession and are making use of the real property in question.

11. The contract contained a valid acceleration clause.

12. The contract contained a provision requiring all payments and improvements made by the Defendants to be retained by the sellers as liquidated damages upon default by the Defendants.

13. The damages to the Plaintiffs due to the breach of the Defendants were incapable of accurate estimation. The parties made a reasonable endeavor to fix fair compensation by way of vigorous negotiations. The amount paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs ($13,955.00) bears a reasonable relation to the amount of damage caused to the Plaintiffs.

The trial court concluded:

5. That pursuant to SDCL 21-50-1 through 21-50-3 the Defendants are in default according to the terms of the Contract for Deed and the time within which the Defendants must comply with the terms of the contract on their part shall be thirty (30) days from the rendition of judgment.

6. That the contract contained a valid acceleration clause which, therefore, requires the Defendants to pay the balance due on the Contract for Deed within thirty (30) days as stated.

7. That unless the Defendants fully comply within the time specified, the Plaintiffs shall have judgment against the Defendants and shall be able to retain all of the moneys already paid to them and the real estate, and any improvements made, shall be returned to them.

8. That unless the Defendants fully comply within the time specified, such judgment shall be and becomes final without further Order of the Court and all rights asserted under the contract by the Defendants, Opal H. Classen or Charles H. Classen, shall thereupon be forever barred and foreclosed.

9. The liquidation damage clause contained in the contract is valid and does not constitute a penalty pursuant to SDCL 53-9-5.

10. The damages to Plaintiffs due to the breach of the Defendants were incapable of accurate estimation. The parties made a reasonable endeavor to fix fair compensation by way of vigorous negotiations. The amount paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs ($13,955.00) bears a reasonable relation to the amount of damage caused to the Plaintiffs.

In her proposed findings, Mrs. Classen asked for ninety days in which to pay the November 1, 1982, payment. She proposed that the court adjust the equities of the parties and...

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11 cases
  • United States, for the United Statese & Benefit of Ash Equip. Co. v. Morris, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
    • August 8, 2017
    ...to the amount of any damage reasonably contemplated at the time of contracting so as to be oppressive. Id. In Prentice v. Classen, 355 N.W.2d 352 (S.D. 1984), the court distilled the modern take on liquidated damages clauses:The modern tendency, reflected in public contract cases, is not to......
  • Wandler v. Lewis
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 20, 1997
    ...the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors." 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Prentice v. Classen, 355 N.W.2d 352-55 (S.D.1984) (citing Walter Motor Truck Co. v. State, etc., 292 N.W.2d 321, 323-24 (S.D.1980))); see also Safari, Inc. v. Verdoorn, 446......
  • In re Direct Transit, Inc., BAP No. 98-6039NI.
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, Eighth Circuit
    • October 26, 1998
    ...any damages reasonably to be anticipated. Safari, Inc. v. Verdoorn, 446 N.W.2d 44, 46 (S.D. 1989) (citations omitted); Prentice v. Classen, 355 N.W.2d 352, 355 (S.D.1984); Walter Motor Truck Co. v. State, 292 N.W.2d 321, 323 (S.D.1980) (citation omitted); Dave Gustafson & Co. v. State, 83 S......
  • Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Miller, 3:16-CV-03004-RAL
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
    • June 29, 2017
    ...there was an attempt to settle the compensation, and the amount is a reasonable estimate of the actual damages); Prentice v. Classen, 355 N.W.2d 352, 355 (S.D. 1984) ("Whether a stipulated sum is an unenforceable penalty or an enforceable liquidated damages provision is a question of law fo......
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