Prentice v. Crane

• Decision Date: 05 June 1908
• Citation: 84 N.E. 916,234 Ill. 302
• Parties: PRENTICE et al. v. CRANE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

234 Ill. 302

84 N.E. 916

PRENTICE et al.

v.CRANE et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 23, 1908.

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1908.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; G. A. Carpenter, Judge.

Action by Allen T. Prentice and another against Richard T. Crane and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.

This is a bill for partition of a valuable residence property situated on Michigan avenue, in the city of Chicago, occupied by Richard T. Crane, who claims to be the owner thereof. The original bill was filed by Alonzo T. Prentice, by his conservator, Allen T. Prentice. Alonzo T. Prentice died after the suit was commenced, and Allen T. Prentice and Lizzie P. Crane, his children and only heirs at law, were substituted as complainants. It is stipulated that the value of the property sought to be partitioned is $125,000. The complainants claim an interest in said real estate estimated to be worth $14,000. On December 8, 1904, Alonzo T. Prentice executed a quitclaim deed to Richard T. Crane, conveying all title and interest he held to the property in controversy. The right of complainants to a partition depends upon the question whether this deed of their father is valid or invalid. If the deed is sustained, complainants have no interest in the property. If it is set aside as a cloud upon their title, then they have the interest which belonged to their father. Complainants seek to have this deed set aside on the alleged ground that their father was not competent to execute a deed and because its execution was procured by the alleged false and fraudulent representations of the grantee. Upon a hearing in the circuit court of Cook county, there was a finding against complainants, and a decree dismissing their bill for want of equity, from which this appeal is prosecuted.Kraus, Alschuler & Holden and James H. Barnard, for appellants.

Ashcraft & Ashcraft (E. M. Ashcraft, of counsel), for appellees.

Richard T. Crane bought the lot in controversy about the year 1889, for which he paid $51,450. By his direction the title was conveyed to his wife, Eliza A. P. Crane. Thereafter he built a residence upon the lot at a cost of over $100,000, which he occupied with his family until the death of his wife, which occurred in September, 1902. Alonzo T. Prentice was a brother of Eliza A. P. Crane. Crane had been married before he married his wife Eliza. His first wife, by whom he had several children, was also a sister of Alonzo T. Prentice. Eliza A. P. Crane left no children. She left Alonza T. and Leon Prentice, her brothers, Harriet Jane Fenn, a sister, Richard T. Crane, her husband, and Crane's children by his first marriage, as her only legal heirs. So far as the evidence in this record shows, Eliza A. P. Crane died intestate. Alonzo T. Prentice resided in Kalamazoo, Mich. He was about 80 years old at the time of his death in 1907. Early in 1902 he suffered a stroke of paralysis, and in the following year he had a second attack. In June, 1904, he was removed to a hospital, where he remained until his death. Lizzie P. Crane resided at Detroit, Mich. On December 7, 1904, Richard T. Crane wrote her the following letter: ‘December 7, 1904. Dear Lizzie-I have yours of 6th inst., and in reply would say that as I cannot very well get away from here so as to meet you in Kalamazoo, I am sending a gentleman from my office-Mr. Robert Stiles-who will hand you this letter and whom I have instructed to transact the business about which I wished to see you, which is as follows: When I bought the lot on which my residence stands I had the deed made to Aunt Ide, she in turn making a will, in which she willed everything to me. After her death, upon consulting a lawyer as to the necessity of filing the will, he said there was no occasion to do so under these circumstances. In the meantime I had forgotten all about the lot having been deeded to her, and about a week ago, upon finding the will among some of my papers and thinking there was no occasion to keep it, I destroyed it. Upon going through some other papers a few days later I found the deed, and upon examining it discovered the fact that, as before stated, the lot was deeded to her. Now, under the law, as I understand it, one-half of the real estate left by a man's deceased wife goes to him and the other half to her other heirs. Aunt Ide's other heirs, of course, were her two brothers, Tom and Leon, and her sister, Harriet. The destruction of this will being simply an oversight, it is only right that the heirs should give me a quit-claim deed to this property, and that is what Mr. Stiles goes to see you about. This letter you may show to your father, and I wish you to be sure he understands the facts. I would just add that the money (amounting to about $40,000) which I distributed among Aunt Ide's relatives was not provided for in the will. She simply left a memorandum in which she expressed a wish that this be done, and out of kindness and respect to the family I did it, there being no legal obligation whatever upon me to do so. Hoping there will be no delay in complying with my wishes in this matter, I remain yours very truly, R. T. Crane. To Mrs. Lizzie P. Crane.’

Robert Stiles went to Kalamazoo, and met appellant Lizzie Crane at a hotel. He there delivered to her the letter above set out. Before Stiles left for Kalamazoo, Crane had talked with him in regard to the importance of obtaining a deed from Alonzo T. Prentice. Upon meeting Lizzie Crane, Stiles explained to her that, if the deed was not signed by her father, it would put her uncle to the trouble of proving the will by witnesses, and he explained to her the method of establishing such wills by proceedings in court. After explaining this matter to her, Lizzie Crane promised that she would do all she could to get her father to sign the deed. the matter to Alonzo T. Prentice. On the matter to Alozo T. Prentice. On the way to the hospital Stiles stopped at the office of a notary public by the name of Burke, who at the request of Stiles accompanied them to the hospital. Upon arriving at the hospital Burke remained in an anteroom, while Stiles and Lizzie entered Prentice's room. Lizzie introduced Stiles to her father, and said: ‘Father, this is Mr. Stiles that Richard wrote you about.’ After a few words of conversation, Lizzie produced the letter to her from Crane and read it to her father. After the letter was read Prentice said: ‘What shall I do?’ This question was addressed to Lizzie, to which she replied: ‘I would rather you would say.’ Thereupon Prentice said he would sign the deed. Burke, the notary was then called from the anteroom, and Prentice, being mark, and, in reply to Burke's question mark, and, in reply to Burk's question whether he acknowledged the deed to be his free and voluntary act, he said ‘Yes.’ Stiles and Lizzie P. Crane, at Burke's request, signed the deed as witnesses. It is not pretended that any consideration whatever was paid for the deed. There is no proof that either Lizzie Crane or her father had any knowledge that Eliza A. P. Crane had died owning the property in controversy, and neither of them had any knowledge of the existence of the alleged will referred to in the letter of Crane.

The testimony as to the mental capacity of Prentice is conflicting. Burke and Stiles testified that they considered him competent to comprehend and understand the transaction, while 10 witnesses who were acquainted with Prentice and had had opportunities for becoming acquainted with his mental condition testified that in their opinion he was not competent to transact ordinary business. There is some other evidence bearing upon the mental capacity of Prentice, but the foregoing outline will be sufficient for the disposition of what we regard as the controlling question in this case. Other facts in evidence will be referred to and their bearing upon the issues pointed out in the opinion which is to follow.

VICKERS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

If it be conceded that the evidence in this record does not go to the extent of showing the absolute incapacity of Prentice to comprehend the nature and effect of executing the deed in question, it cannot be denied that it shows such debility of body and feebleness of mind as to render him an easy victim to fraud and imposition. The amended bill alleges that, in order to induce Prentice to execute the deed, it was wrongfully, falsely, and fraudulently represented to him, on behalf of Crane, that Prentice's sister (Mrs. Crane) had left a will devising all of her property to Crane and that such will had been inadvertently destroyed, and that such will so destroyed could be established by Crane in court, but would cause him considerable trouble. The bill alleges that this representation was false and known to be false by Crane, and that the same was made with the fraudulent purpose of inducing Prentice to execute a deed conveying to Crane property valued at $14,000, the true state of the title to which was known to Crane and not known to Prentice. These allegations are all denied by appellee Crane's answer.

As we understand appellee Crane's position in regard to the charge of fruad and misrepresentation, it is that the burden of proof is upon appellants to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the essential elements of the charge, one of which is the falsity of the representation, and that appellants must fail in this action because it is asserted that there is no proof that the statements in Crane's letter concerning the making and destruction of the will of Eliza A. P. Crane were untrue. A misrepresentation which will warrant a court of equity in rescinding a contract must contain the following elements: First, its form must be a statement of fact; second, it must be made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; third, it must be untrue; fourth, the party making the statement must know or...