Prentzel v. State, Dept. of Public Safety

Decision Date14 September 2007
Docket NumberNo. S-12031.,S-12031.
Citation169 P.3d 573
PartiesH. Thompson PRENTZEL, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Trooper Daniel Scott, Trooper Dane Gilmore, Sergeant John Papasodora, Captain Warren Tanner, and Colonel Glenn Godfrey, Appellees.
CourtAlaska Supreme Court

H. Thompson Prentzel, III, pro se, Fairbanks.

Venable Vermont, Jr., Anchorage, and Mary Ann Lundquist, Fairbanks, Assistant Attorneys General, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellees.

Before: FABE, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, BRYNER, and CARPENETI, Justices.

OPINION

BRYNER, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1998 Alaska State Troopers arrested H. Thompson Prentzel, III, without a warrant, for violating conditions of release imposed under a DWI charge. The troopers relied on the Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN) and records from the Fairbanks Correctional Center (FCC) in determining that he was subject to conditions. There were two problems with this arrest. First, it was not authorized by the warrantless arrest statute, AS 12.25.030, which allowed arrests for violations of conditions of release for some charges, but not a charge of DWI. In addition, violation of conditions of release was not yet specifically defined as a criminal offense; the legislature first made it a crime when AS 11.56.757 went into effect in 2000. Second, Prentzel was not even subject to conditions of release at the time of the arrest — he had pled no contest four days earlier. These APSIN and FCC records had not been promptly updated with Prentzel's judgment. Prentzel sued the State of Alaska, the arresting troopers, and supervising Alaska State Troopers, asserting state-law tort claims and violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In January 2005, Superior Court Judge Mark I. Wood granted summary judgment to the state. Prentzel appeals. We affirm in all respects but one, reversing a portion of the attorney's fees awarded against Prentzel.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts

Many of the relevant facts have previously been set forth in Prentzel v. State, Department of Public Safety (Prentzel I).1 In October 1998 Alaska State Troopers Daniel Scott and Dane Gilmore were dispatched to the Blue Marlin Bar in Fairbanks in response to a reported disturbance. Near the bar the troopers saw Prentzel with a bottle of liquor; Prentzel appeared to have been drinking. The troopers learned Prentzel's identity and called their dispatcher, who informed them that Prentzel was currently on bail release conditions for a recent charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and that his conditions precluded him from possessing alcohol. The dispatcher's information came from the computerized records in the Alaska Public Safety Information Network (APSIN).

Troopers Scott and Gilmore asked the dispatcher to confirm this information by checking with the Fairbanks Correctional Center (FCC). FCC confirmed the bail release conditions of no consumption and no possession of alcohol. The troopers then asked the dispatcher for a consultation with Alaska State Trooper Sergeant John Papasodora. Sergeant Papasodora reviewed the APSIN records, noted the FCC's confirmation of those records, and directed them to arrest Prentzel for violating conditions of release.

As it turned out, Prentzel was no longer under conditions of release because four days before the arrest he had pled no contest to the DWI charge. The judgment was not distributed by the court until six days after his arrest by Troopers Scott and Gilmore.

In October 1999 Prentzel filed a civil action against the Alaska Department of Public Safety, Troopers Scott and Gilmore, Captain Warren Tanner, and Colonel Glenn Godfrey2 alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, conversion, and negligence.3 The state defendants denied the allegations and the state filed an Alaska Civil Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Prentzel moved to amend his complaint to claim civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and civil rights violations under the Alaska Constitution. Prentzel later moved for permission to file a second amended complaint to add claims against an unknown Sergeant John Doe, and to allege that the defendants' actions were willful and malicious. Soon after, the superior court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint and ruled that the second amended complaint would not change the outcome of its ruling.

Prentzel appealed. We reversed the dismissal of Prentzel's negligence claims against the state defendants and his § 1983 claim against Troopers Scott and Gilmore, Captain Tanner, and Colonel Godfrey.4 We ruled that Prentzel's claims against Troopers Gilmore and Scott were improperly dismissed on the ground of official immunity because the troopers would only be entitled to qualified immunity.5 We noted that Prentzel had responded to the qualified immunity defense by alleging that the troopers acted with malice — a factual question not suitable for disposition on the pleadings. We also held that Prentzel's negligence claims against the troopers and Captain Tanner and Colonel Godfrey were improperly dismissed because the pleadings did not rule out the possibility of actionable claims for negligent training and supervision.6 We further held that any defect in Prentzel's pleadings did not require dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the individually named officers and troopers.7 Last, we affirmed the dismissal of Prentzel's claim based on alleged violations of the Alaska Constitution because the issue was inadequately briefed.8

B. Proceedings After Remand

Following remand, trial was scheduled for the week of December 1, 2003. In a pretrial order dated November 25, 2002, the superior court ordered that motions to amend the pleadings were due by February 24, 2003 and dispositive motions were due by August 1, 2003. In November 2003 Prentzel moved for a continuance of trial because he did not have sufficient funds to conduct discovery. The superior court granted the motion and continued the trial to the week of September 13, 2004. On November 25, 2003, the superior court informed Prentzel on the record that no further amendments to the pleadings were authorized and dispositive motions were due by July 2, 2004; a pretrial order dated December 16, 2003, confirmed these deadlines.

In spite of the court's pretrial order, Prentzel moved to amend his complaint in June 2004. He sought to name Sergeant John Papasodora in place of Sergeant John Doe and attempted to clarify that he was suing the troopers in their individual capacities for money damages. In addition, Prentzel proposed to add a claim that the "Alaska State Troopers are deliberately indifferent to the inevitable false arrest of persons whose bail has been exonerated for violation of bail conditions of release." The court granted Prentzel's motion, and the state answered the third amended complaint on August 19, 2004.

Meanwhile, the state had filed a motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2004, the deadline for filing dispositive motions. On August 5 Prentzel indicated that he was not prepared for trial and requested another continuance. The superior court granted the request and set the trial for the week of January 17, 2005.

The court further specified that amendments to the pleadings were due by September 20, 2004, and dispositive motions were due by October 4, 2004. The court also gave Prentzel until September 24, 2004, to file his opposition to the state's summary judgment motion.

Prentzel failed to respond to the summary judgment motion and filed no other pleadings by these newly extended deadlines. He also failed to appear on November 9, 2004, for oral argument on the summary judgment motion.

The next day, the superior court issued a notice of intent to grant the troopers' motion for summary judgment unless Prentzel filed a "responsive pleading" by November 24, 2004. On November 23, 2004, Prentzel filed a motion for summary judgment; a motion for extensions of time to oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment and to file his own motion for summary judgment; a motion for a permanent injunction; and a motion to file a fourth amended complaint to include a contingent cause of action based on an alleged violation of the Alaska Constitution that he could pursue if his other causes of action were dismissed.

The state moved to dismiss Prentzel's complaint and to strike his November 23 motions. It argued that Prentzel's pleadings contained "nothing that amounts to a response or opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment." It further contended that many of Prentzel's requests were simply untimely and without good cause. Prentzel opposed the state's motion, countering that his motions were "`responsive pleadings' within the intention, if not the letter, of the [c]ourt's November 12, 2004 Order."

C. The Superior Court's Orders
1. Order granting summary judgment to the state defendants

The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants. The court first determined that the state, Troopers Scott and Gilmore, Captain Tanner, and Colonel Godfrey were immune in their official capacities from false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims. The court relied on AS 09.50.250(1) in determining that the individually named defendants were "statutorily immune in their official capacities from claims based on the exercise or performance of a discretionary function or duty, regardless of whether they abused their discretion."9

The court also ruled that Troopers Scott and Gilmore were immune from suit even though they admittedly misunderstood the law by failing to recognize that AS 12.25.030 did not authorize warrantless arrests for violations of misdemeanor DWI bail conditions. It reasoned that Troopers Scott and Gilmore were "entitled to...

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