Presbyterian University Hosp. v. Wilson

Decision Date01 September 1994
Docket NumberNo. 42,42
Citation654 A.2d 1324,337 Md. 541
Parties, 63 USLW 2581, 99 Ed. Law Rep. 481 PRESBYTERIAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL v. Joyce WILSON et al. ,
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Larry A. Silverman (Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, George M. Church, F. Ford Loker, Church & Houff, P.A., Baltimore), all on brief, for petitioner.

Daniel F. Goldstein (Brown, Goldstein & Levy, John S. Singleton, Gendler, Berg & Singleton, all on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued Before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.

CHASANOW, Judge.

In the present case, we must determine whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a Maryland court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania hospital that provided services to a Maryland resident in Pennsylvania. We find under the circumstances of the instant case that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant hospital does not violate due process.

I.

This case arises out of the tragic death of Hugh Eric Wilson. In January of 1985, Mr. Wilson was diagnosed by Dr. Martin B. Cooper, a Maryland gastroenterologist, with non-alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver. Mr. Wilson and his wife were informed that this condition would be fatal without a liver transplant. Mrs. Wilson then contacted Chesapeake Health Plan, Inc. (Chesapeake), a health maintenance organization (HMO) providing coverage for both herself and Mr. Wilson, to inquire about coverage for a liver transplant. She was informed by Chesapeake that it would not cover a liver transplant for Mr. Wilson. Mrs. Wilson then inquired about coverage with the Maryland Medical Assistance Program (MA), which provides coverage for indigent persons. MA informed Mrs. Wilson that it would cover a liver transplant if Mr. Wilson qualified.

On August 23, 1985, Dr. Cooper contacted Dr. Thomas Starzl, who was the head of the transplant service at Presbyterian University Hospital (PUH) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to discuss Mr. Wilson's condition and his need for a transplant. Despite Mr. Wilson's lack of insurance coverage, Dr. Starzl agreed to admit Mr. Wilson and told Dr. Cooper to have Mr. Wilson come to PUH the following Monday. As Dr. Starzl testified:

"My honest assessment at the time was ... that Dr. Cooper was laboring under a dictate, a decision by the governance group of this HMO that they would not allow transplantation coverage.

And that Dr. Cooper took it upon himself to say to the system, I am not going to go with this, I am going to try to sneak the patient out. That was my impression.

And that, on the other end, I told him, Dr. Cooper, I am going to take the patient, and carry on the battle."

As a result of this conversation, Donna Rinaldo, a PUH social worker, spoke with Mrs. Wilson by phone to arrange travel and accommodations for the Wilsons. The Wilsons arrived in Pittsburgh on August 25, 1985.

Upon arrival, Mr. Wilson was refused admittance to PUH because Mr. Edward Berkowitz, PUH's credit administrator, had informed the admitting office that coverage for Mr. Wilson's liver transplant had not been confirmed. After being refused admittance, the Wilsons were provided accommodations at a hostel connected with PUH. As Mrs. Wilson testified, while staying at the hostel, Dr. Starzl visited the Wilsons and spoke to them regarding his desire to perform the transplant on Mr. Wilson:

"A: He said that he wanted to transplant him. He said that he would try and get us coverage. He called a reporter.

Q: Did he say why he was calling a reporter?

A: Because he wanted to get him admitted. He figured, with pressure, that my husband would be admitted."

Additionally, the doctors at PUH told Mrs. Wilson to remain in Pittsburgh and they would mount a media campaign on Mr. Wilson's behalf. During this time, Mr. Berkowitz participated in protracted discussions with Chesapeake and Mr. Wilson's union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers' (IBEW), to discuss the possibility of providing coverage for Mr. Wilson's liver transplant.

Due to deteriorating health, Mr. Wilson was admitted to the emergency room at PUH under his IBEW insurance on August 28, 1985. On Friday, August 30, 1985, Dr. Starzl wrote to Larry Payne, director of Maryland MA, regarding Mr. Wilson's condition and lack of insurance. Dr. Starzl, with Mrs. Wilson present, also telephoned Maryland MA on that day to have Mrs. Wilson discuss coverage with them and Dr. Starzl then directed Mrs. Wilson to return to Baltimore to obtain Maryland MA coverage. Mr. Wilson died on September 6, 1985, before Mrs. Wilson could obtain Maryland MA coverage and despite the fact that two suitable livers had become available to PUH for transplant during the time Mr. Wilson was in Pittsburgh.

Mrs. Wilson, individually, on behalf of her two minor daughters, and as the personal representative of Mr. Wilson's estate, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against PUH and several others. 1 Mrs. Wilson alleged several counts, including negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death. PUH filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction which was denied after limited discovery and oral argument on the issue. PUH then filed a motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction offering in affidavits and exhibits that: 1) PUH is a non-profit organization providing services to patients in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 2) PUH owns no property in Maryland and doesn't maintain an office or place of business there; 3) PUH is not and never has been licensed or authorized to do business in Maryland; 4) PUH has no agent for service of process in Maryland; 5) PUH sells no products and provides no services in Maryland; 6) PUH has no telephone listing in Maryland and derives no income from services provided in Maryland; and 7) PUH does not advertise in Maryland. In response, Mrs. Wilson alleged that jurisdiction was proper based on PUH's registration as a Maryland MA provider and its designation as a Maryland Transplant Referral Center. Mrs. Wilson asserted that PUH voluntarily solicited patients in Maryland through its Maryland MA registration and its designation as the only adult referral center for liver transplants. Mrs. Wilson also alleged that PUH "reached out to solicit Hugh Wilson, individually" and that PUH's personnel, by arranging for Mr. Wilson to come to PUH and by participating in discussions with Maryland insurers to seek coverage for Mr. Wilson, became subject to jurisdiction in Maryland. PUH's motion for summary judgment was denied after a hearing. Following the denial of PUH's motion for summary judgment, the suit proceeded to trial and a jury verdict was rendered against PUH. PUH appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over PUH. See Presbyterian Hospital v. Wilson, 99 Md.App. 305, 637 A.2d 486 (1994). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that PUH had sufficient contacts with the State of Maryland to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Wilson, 99 Md.App. at 332, 637 A.2d at 500. PUH petitioned for a writ of certiorari which we granted to address whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over PUH violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II.

In affirming the trial court, the intermediate appellate court first considered a motion to dismiss PUH's appeal filed by the Wilsons who, relying on our opinion in Metropolitan Mtg. Fd. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 415 A.2d 582 (1980), argued that the denial of PUH's motion for summary judgment is not reviewable after final judgment is entered. Wilson, 99 Md.App. at 311, 637 A.2d at 489. In Basiliko, Metropolitan Mortgage Fund filed suit against the Basilikos, alleging breach of certain written payment guarantee agreements. 288 Md. at 26, 415 A.2d at 583. Metropolitan submitted a motion for summary judgment which was denied. Basiliko, 288 Md. at 27, 415 A.2d at 583. Subsequent to the denial of summary judgment, the Basilikos filed a plea denying that they executed the note payment agreements. Id. The case subsequently went to trial and the trial judge entered judgment in favor of the Basilikos which was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals on appeal. Id. On appeal to this Court, based solely on a review of the denial of summary judgment, we noted that summary judgment should be entered only where there is "no dispute as to any material fact." Basiliko, 288 Md. at 28, 415 A.2d at 584. We further held that "an appellate court should be loath indeed to overturn, on a very narrow procedural ground, a final judgment on the merits entered in favor of the party resisting the summary judgment motion." Basiliko, 288 Md at 29, 415 A.2d at 584. We therefore held that:

"a denial ... of a summary judgment motion, as well as foregoing the ruling on such a motion either temporarily until later in the proceedings or for resolution by trial of the general issue, involves not only pure legal questions but also an exercise of discretion as to whether the decision should be postponed until it can be supported by a complete factual record; and we further hold that on appeal, absent clear abuse ..., the manner in which this discretion is exercised will not be disturbed."

Id.

In assessing the applicability of Basiliko to the present case, the Court of Special Appeals found that Basiliko's holding was limited "to those cases in which there are factual controversies--in which the ultimate results would be determined by resolution of facts." Wilson, 99 Md.App. at 313, 637 A.2d at 490. The court further held:

"Where ... a motion for summary judgment is based upon a pure issue of law that could not properly be submitted to a trier of fact, as such, to resolve, the conclusion in Basiliko that the...

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