Prescott v. Baker
| Decision Date | 06 May 1994 |
| Citation | 644 So.2d 877 |
| Parties | James C. PRESCOTT, M.D. v. Herchel BAKER, individually and as administrator of the Estate of Lucia C. Baker. 1921288. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Peter F. Burns and Max Cassady of Burns, Cunningham & Mackey, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.
Andrew T. Citrin, John T. Crowder, Jr. and David G. Wirtes, Jr. of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder & Brown, Mobile, for appellee.
The defendant, James C. Prescott, M.D., appeals from a $750,000 default judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Lucia C. Baker 1 and her husband Herchel Baker. The issue is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Dr. Prescott's Rule 55(c) Ala.R.Civ.P., motion to set aside the default judgment.
In August 1990, the Bakers brought this medical malpractice action against Dr. Prescott and numerous other named and fictitiously named defendants. In their complaint, the Bakers alleged that Dr. Prescott and the other defendants had breached the standard of care in performing an intubation to anesthetize Lucia Baker before a surgical operation on her gallbladder. The Bakers alleged further that, as a proximate result of the defendants' malpractice, she fell into a coma for several weeks, was unable to walk for 10 months, and suffered permanent physical injuries; physical pain; and mental anguish, and that she and Herchel Baker incurred sundry medical expenses and lost wages. Along with the other named defendants, Dr. Prescott filed an answer, denying that he had negligently intubated Lucia Baker or that any of his actions caused her injuries.
After many continuances, nearly all of which were granted at the request of the plaintiffs, the circuit court held a status conference or hearing on October 15, 1992, at which it set a trial date of January 13, 1993. Until the status conference, Dr. Prescott had represented himself; however, he hired an attorney to represent him at that conference.
In November 1992, Dr. Prescott entered into a contract with Kron Medical, a physician procurement company, to provide surgical care at a hospital in Kodiak Island, Alaska. According to the affidavits of Dr. Prescott and Kathy Gresham, the director of the medical facility in Kodiak, the term of the contract was to extend from December 21, 1992, until January 22, 1993. In his later testimony at the hearing on his motion to set aside the default judgment, however, Dr. Prescott testified that when he entered into the contract, he thought that the term of the contract would end in December.
On December 15, 1992, Dr. Prescott moved for a continuance, stating as grounds that before he received notice of the January 13, 1993, trial date, he had made a commitment to provide surgical services in Kodiak and that because he was going to be the only physician at the Kodiak facility practicing obstetrics, gynecology, and surgery and because a replacement was unavailable, he would be unable to leave Kodiak and attend the trial in Alabama. Dr. Prescott left for Kodiak before the circuit court ruled on his motion.
On January 5, 1993, the circuit court denied Dr. Prescott's December 15, 1992, motion for a continuance. On January 12, 1993, the day before the scheduled trial date, Dr. Prescott's secretary mailed a letter to the circuit judge, requesting that he continue the trial because of Dr. Prescott's commitment in Kodiak. Treating this letter as a motion for a continuance, the circuit court denied it on January 13, 1993. On the case action summary sheet, the circuit court stated: "The court specifically finds that the defendant Dr. Prescott had sufficient notice of the trial setting."
Dr. Prescott did not appear for trial on January 13, 1993. A default judgment was entered against him, and, after a brief hearing at which the Bakers testified and presented other evidence regarding the events forming the basis of their claims, their injuries, and their claimed damages, the circuit court entered a default judgment against Dr. Prescott. On February 4, 1993, Dr. Prescott moved to set aside the default judgment, supported by his own affidavit and the affidavit of Kathy Gresham. On March 19, 1993, the circuit court held a hearing on Dr. Prescott's motion to set aside the default judgment. Dr. Prescott testified that a "certified registered nurse anesthetist" had performed the intubation, that he was not in the room with Mrs. Baker when the intubation was performed, that there were no anesthesiologists in the area of Thomasville, Alabama, where the surgery had been performed, and that in what he called the Thomasville medical community, it was accepted and standard practice to allow "certified registered nurse anesthetists" to administer anesthesia without the supervision of a physician.
A trial court has broad discretionary power to grant or deny a Rule 55(c) motion to set aside a default judgment, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So.2d 600, 603 (Ala.1988). In determining whether to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment, however, the trial court should exercise its discretion with liberality and should balance the equities of the case with a strong inclination toward allowing the defendant to have his day in court. To guide trial courts in the exercise of their discretion, this Court has specified three factors the trial courts should consider: (1) Whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; (2) Whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside; and (3) Whether the default judgment was a result of the defendant's own culpable conduct. Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 605-08.
Dr. Prescott argues that he presented sufficient evidence to establish a meritorious defense to the claims alleged against him by the Bakers and that, although he was negligent in conducting his case, his actions did not constitute a knowing or intentional disregard or flouting of judicial authority. Citing Fries Correctional Equip., Inc. v. Con-Tech, Inc., 559 So.2d 557 (Ala.1990), Dr. Prescott contends that because the judgment is so large and because, he says, the Bakers would not suffer substantial prejudice by the setting aside of the default judgment, the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default judgment.
The plaintiffs admit that "Dr. Prescott submitted evidence during the March 19, 1993, hearing which, if believed, might create a question of fact as to breach of the standard of care." Thus, they do not question in this appeal whether Dr. Prescott has presented a meritorious defense; they argue only the issues of substantial prejudice and culpability.
Prejudice must be substantial to justify the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment; minimal prejudice, which may be remedied effectively by imposing costs on the defaulting party, is insufficient. Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 607. Dr. Prescott argues that the plaintiffs suffered no prejudice that could not be remedied by an order imposing on him costs occasioned by the delay and expense of conducting a trial of their claims.
The plaintiffs make several arguments in support of their contention that they will suffer substantial prejudice if the default judgment is set aside and they have to try their claims on the merits. First, they note that when Dr. Prescott moved to set aside the default judgment, he filed untimely responses to the Bakers' interrogatories and requests for production, and that in those responses Dr. Prescott listed four expert witnesses whose testimony he intended to present at trial if the default judgment were set aside by the circuit court. The plaintiffs argue that the additional expense and delay involved in deposing these witnesses, who would not have testified if Dr. Prescott had appeared for the January 13, 1993, trial date, constitute substantial prejudice. Any such prejudice is not substantial and could be remedied by imposing these additional costs on Dr. Prescott.
The plaintiffs also argue that during 1992 Dr. Prescott disposed of $1.6 million in assets in what they allege were fraudulent transfers, and they...
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