Prescott, Wright, Snider Co. v. City of Cherryvale

Decision Date07 November 1931
Docket Number29966.
Citation134 Kan. 53,4 P.2d 457
PartiesPRESCOTT, WRIGHT, SNIDER CO. v. CITY OF CHERRYVALE. [*]
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

Notice to corporation given to principal officer in charge of matters involved is deemed notice to corporation.

Proof that in due course of business of corporation doing large business letter was mailed by those in charge of transmission constitutes rebuttable evidence that letter was received.

Corporation cannot escape responsibility because officer to whom notice was given may have forgotten previous receipt thereof.

Evidence held to sustain finding that notice that certain bonds had been stolen had been received by corporation through its cashier before it purchased bonds.

A notice to a corporation given to a principal officer in charge of the matters pertaining to a transaction is deemed to be notice to the corporation itself.

In proving a correspondence of the corporation doing a large business, it is not necessary to trace every detail of the transmittal and reception of a letter, and, where it is shown that in the due course of business the letter was mailed to the addressee, by those in charge of the transmission, it will constitute rebuttable evidence that the letter was received.

The corporation cannot escape responsibility by the fact that the officer to whom the notice was given may have forgotten the previous receipt of the notice.

The evidence examined, and held to be sufficient to sustain the finding that the notice had been received by the plaintiff through the cashier.

Objections to the charge of the jury and to the admission of evidence are held to be without merit.

Appeal from District Court, Montgomery County; J. W. Holdren, Judge.

Action by the Prescott, Wright, Snider Company against the City of Cherryvale. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

C. J Bryant, of Independence, for appellant.

Sullivan Lomax, of Cherryvale, and Thos. E. Wagstaff, Jay W. Scovel John Bertenshaw, and Kirke C. Veeder, all of Independence for appellee.

JOHNSTON C. J.

The Prescott, Wright, Snider Company brought this action against the city of Cherryvale to recover on several obligations of a series of municipal bonds issued by the city for street improvements, all amounting to $19,077.40. In its petition the plaintiff alleged that the bonds were duly issued on July 1, 1923, and that on the 25th of February, 1928, prior to the maturity of the bond and coupons in suit, it purchased them for value and in due course and without notice, and is now the owner of them, but the city declined to pay them. The answer of the city was that the obligations were duly issued by the city, and that on May 26, 1926, the bond and coupons in suit, then the property of one J. B. Coyner, were with other stocks, bonds, and money in the custody of the Montgomery County National Bank, were stolen and carried away with force and violence by robbers and bandits.

It is alleged:

That after the robbery, the bank made an itemized list and statement of the bonds and other valuables stolen which was transmitted to the Federal Reserve Bank of which it was a member, and that the list was promptly broadcast and sent to all member banks and to the principal stock and bond houses of the federal reserve district, and that the Federal Reserve Bank prepared exact photostatic copies of the statements and mailed them out on June 2, 1926, and one of them was mailed to the plaintiff herein.

That as the robbery was one of the greatest in the amount stolen within the reserve district, all the newspapers for a period of about five weeks printed, and commented, illustrated stories regarding the robbery, and that plaintiff's officers, agents, or employees either read or willfully refused to read the accounts of said robbery which was discussed and known by all the banks and bond houses in Kansas City, Mo., where plaintiff carried on its business. It is said that plaintiff willfully disregarded the notices it had in its purchase of the bond and coupons, and that it acted in bad faith in the purchase, and is not the owner and holder of said bond or any coupon.

The case went to trial with a jury in May, 1930, and it was admitted that the bond and coupons involved in the action had been issued by the defendant, had been presented to the Kansas fiscal agency for payment, and payment had been refused. The main question tried was the sufficiency of the notice to the plaintiff of the fact that the bonds and coupons were stolen. The jury found in favor of the defendant, and with the general verdict returned the following answers to special questions:

"1. Do you find that the plaintiff became the holder of the bond sued on herein, (a) before maturity? A. Yes. (b) For value? A. Yes.
"2. Do you find that Laurence G. Piersol acted as agent for the plaintiff in the purchase of the bond involved in this action? A. Yes.
"3. Do you find that Laurence G. Piersol had any notice that this bond had been stolen from the Montgomery County National Bank? A. No.
"4. On what date did plaintiff receive any notice of theft of any securities from the Montgomery County National Bank? A. About June 3, 1926.
"5. If you find that plaintiff received such notice, then state what agent of the plaintiff received such notice? A. Cashier.
"6. Did such agent remember or have any present recollection or memory of receipt of such notice or that bond had been stolen from Montgomery County National Bank at the time of the purchase of these bonds? A. No.
"7. Do you find that C. P. Bryant when issuing check for purchase of bond involved herein had any notice or present recollection of notice of theft of said bond? A. Received notice, but no present recollection.
"8. Do you find that plaintiff acquired the bond in good faith? A. Yes."

On this appeal by plaintiff, it contends that the finding that it had notice of the theft of the securities stolen and the finding that it had purchased the bonds with notice of the theft is not supported by competent or sufficient evidence. Plaintiff is an investment bank of Kansas City, Mo., dealing in corporation bonds and stock of various issues, mortgages, and municipal tax bills, and does a business aggregating from fifteen to twenty million dollars a year. L. G. Piersol has been the agent of the plaintiff for many years in charge of the buying of municipal securities. The bond and coupons in question were purchased by him for the plaintiff on February 25, 1928, and paid for by the check of the plaintiff, and stated that he had no notice that the securities had been stolen. He stated that a stranger came to him who claimed to be the agent of the owner, and asked him to buy the bonds. The stranger went away, but came back a few days later and informed him that Dr. Sellers was the owner, one whom Piersol had not known,...

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7 cases
  • Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • December 27, 1937
    ...803, 805; Citizens' Bank & Trust Co. of Middlesboro, Ky. v. Allen, 4 Cir., 43 F.2d 549, 552; Prescott, Wright, Snider Co. v. City of Cherryvale, 134 Kan. 53, 4 P.2d 457, 459. ...
  • Leasing Associates, Inc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • October 21, 1971
    ...describe his office custom and his complying acts up to handing the letter to the mailclerk, Prescott, Wright, Snider Co. v. City of Cherryvale, 134 Kan. 53, 4 P.2d 457 (1931); Prudential Trust Co. v. Hayes, 247 Mass. 311, 142 N.E. 73 (1924), or placing the letter in the outgoing mail, Citi......
  • American Surety Company of New York v. Blake
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 18, 1933
    ...at the same time are not 'copies,' but duplicate originals, and could be introduced in evidence without notice to produce." In the case of Prescott, Wright, Snider Co. v. City Cherryvale, 134 Kan. 53, 4 P.2d 457, the court uses this language: "The carbon impression of the letter written on ......
  • Crissey v. State Highway Commission
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • April 1, 1966
    ...is an office practice or custom of mailing letters and that this practice or custom was followed. Prescott, Wright, Snider Co. v. City of Cherryvale, 134 Kan. 53, 4 P.2d 457; See Annotation 86 A.L.R. 541, 546, and cases cited therein. Here, there was a practice of putting all letters in an ......
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