Presidential Vill., LLC v. Perkins

• Citation: 176 Conn.App. 493,170 A.3d 701
• Decision Date: 19 September 2017
• Docket Number: (AC 38459).
• Parties: PRESIDENTIAL VILLAGE, LLC v. Tonya PERKINS
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut

176 Conn.App. 493

170 A.3d 701

PRESIDENTIAL VILLAGE, LLC

v.Tonya PERKINS

(AC 38459).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 14, 2017

Officially released September 19, 2017

Hugh D. Hughes, New Haven, with whom was Barbara M. Schellenberg, Bridgeport, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Amy Eppler–Epstein, for the appellee (defendant).

DiPentima, C.J., and Keller and Prescott, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The plaintiff, Presidential Village, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its summary process action against the defendant, Tonya Perkins, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because the court determined that the federal pretermination notice² was defective, and the defective notice deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Because its decision mistakenly rests primarily on its determination that the federal termination notice was defective under the requirements of General Statutes § 47a–23, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On March 2, 2010, the defendant leased an apartment from the plaintiff. The dwelling unit is located in New Haven and was subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (department). According to the department's model lease agreement entered into by the parties, the defendant's lease term began on March 2, 2010, ended on February 28, 2011, and continued thereafter from month-to-month. At the time the defendant signed the lease, she agreed to pay a rent of $377 on the first day of each month, which was subject to change during the lease term in accordance with the amount the department made available monthly on behalf of the defendant.

On January 14, 2015, the plaintiff sent a federal pretermination notice³ to the defendant based on her nonpayment of rent in January, 2015, at which time the defendant's monthly rent was $1402.⁴ The notice addressed to the defendant stated:

                  "RE: PAST DUE RENT
                  Inv. No       Inv. Date      Due Date       Inv. Amount     Balance
                                08/27/2013     08/27/2013     $1,797.56       $1,797.56
                  10            09/01/2013     09/11/2013     $93.00          $93.00
                  CHFA201321    10/01/2013     10/11/2013     $93.00          $93.00
                  2014-1232     11/01/2014     11/11/2014     $1,402.00       $1,402.00
                  2014-1340     12/01/2014     12/11/2014     $1,402.00       $1,402.00
                  2014-1455     01/01/2015     01/11/2015     $1,402.00       $1,402.00
                  Total Rental Obligation: $6,189.56"
                

Immediately following this table are four paragraphs of text:

"You have violated the terms of your lease in that you failed to pay your rent, in the total rental obligation of $6,189.56 . Your failure to pay such rent constitutes a material noncompliance with the terms of your lease.

"We hereby notify you that your lease agreement may be subject to termination and an immediate eviction ... proceeding initiated by our office. We value our tenants and request that you immediately contact our office, regarding full payment of your rental obligations. Your rental obligations will include the delinquent rent, late fees, utilities, legal fees, and any other eviction proceeding sundry cost[s].

"You have the right within ten days after receipt of this notice or within ten days after the date following the date this notice was mailed whichever is earlier to discuss the proposed termination of your tenancy with your landlord's agent ....

"If you remain in the premises on the date specified for termination, we may seek to enforce the termination by bringing judicial action at which time you have a right to present a defense."

The defendant did not discuss the possible termination of her tenancy with the plaintiff's agent during the ten day period nor did she tender any payment to the plaintiff within that time. Accordingly, on January 29, 2015, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit possession of the premises and, thereafter, in February, 2015, brought a summary process action for nonpayment of rent, seeking immediate possession of the premises.

In response to the plaintiff's summary process complaint, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the pretermination notice was defective, and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The alleged defects included the plaintiff's "failure to specify accurately the amount that must be paid by [the] defendant to cure the default underlying the threatened eviction." Specifically, the defendant alleged that the pretermination notice "inaccurately—and misleadingly—states that she will be evicted unless she promptly pays the landlord $6189.56 in 'total rental obligations,' when, in truth, she would have avoided eviction for nonpayment of rent, under well established Connecticut law, by tendering a cure amount of only $2804 ...." (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.)

In response, the plaintiff argued that the pretermination notice was not defective. To support its argument, the plaintiff asserted that there was "nothing defective about a pretermination notice that lists the total financial obligations owed by [the] defendant to [the] plaintiff." The plaintiff further contended that "a federal pretermination notice fully complies with the law if it includes the specific information supporting the landlord's right to termination; a notice does not become defective simply because it contains more information than strictly necessary."

On September 28, 2015, the trial court, Ecker, J. , issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the summary process action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the pretermination notice was defective. The plaintiff then filed this appeal. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

We begin our analysis by identifying the legal principles governing summary process actions. "Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy.... It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms.... Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.... Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.

"[B]efore a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy of summary process, the landlord must prove compliance with all of the applicable preconditions set by state and federal law for the termination of the lease." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. DeRoche , 112 Conn.App. 355, 361–62, 962 A.2d 904 (2009).

We now turn to the applicable standard of review. "A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [O]ur review of the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [decision to] grant ... the motion to dismiss [is] de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut , 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007). Mindful of these principles and guided by our standard of review, we address the specific claim raised by the plaintiff on appeal.

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed the summary process action because the court determined that the federal pretermination notice was defective. With respect to this claim, the plaintiff argues that its pretermination notice complied with the applicable federal regulations governing the termination of a federally subsidized tenancy based on nonpayment of rent. We note that the adequacy of a federal pretermination notice based on nonpayment of rent is an area of the law that rarely has been addressed by the appellate courts of this state. Nevertheless, applying established principles of summary process law, we conclude that the trial court improperly dismissed the action because the federal plaintiff's pretermination notice sufficiently complies with the federal requirements.

In its memorandum of decision, the court determined that the plaintiff's pretermination notice was defective because it was "misleading in at least two respects. First, $6189.56 is not the amount that [the defendant] would have needed to pay to avoid the termination of [the defendant's] tenancy for nonpayment of rent under Connecticut law.... Second, the plaintiff's notice uses the term 'rental obligations' as a synonym for 'rent,' as in, 'you failed to pay your rent in the total rental obligation of $6,189.56.' This is not true, as a matter of law.... The plaintiff concedes that the $6189.56 figure includes charges for attorney's fees and expenses, as well as late charges. It is no secret among most landlords (nor even, perhaps, sophisticated tenants) that the term 'rent' is a term of art in housing law.... 'Rent' under [§ 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f et seq. (Section 8) ]⁵ means the amount that may be charged for the right to occupy the dwelling unit, period—it cannot include charges for late payments, utilities, attorney's fees, property damage, or any other item.... The plaintiff's pretermination notice lumps together rent and nonrent items in a single category ('total rental obligation'), and then impermissibly defines that obligation as 'rent.' ('[Y]ou failed to pay your rent, in the total rental obligation of $6,189.56.') The misleading phrase ('rental obligation') is repeated throughout the pretermination notice, and its definition continues to expand to include items that federal law says cannot be...