Presidential Vill., LLC v. Perkins
| Citation | 209 A.3d 616,332 Conn. 45 |
| Decision Date | 18 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | SC 20043 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | PRESIDENTIAL VILLAGE, LLC v. Tonya PERKINS, et al. |
Amy Eppler-Epstein, with whom was Shelley White, for the appellant (named defendant).
David E. Schancupp, with whom was Hugh D. Hughes, New Haven, for the appellee (plaintiff).
J.L. Pottenger, Jr., filed a brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization et al. as amici curiae.
Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins and Kahn, Js.
This summary process action concerns the degree of specificity required in the pretermination notice1 that, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), must be provided to a tenant who resides in federally subsidized housing before the landlord may commence an eviction proceeding against that tenant. Specifically, the issue presented is whether a pretermination notice asserting nonpayment of rent as the ground for the proposed termination of the tenancy is jurisdictionally defective if it includes either rent charges that cannot serve as a basis for termination of the tenancy under state summary process law or undesignated charges for obligations other than rent. The trial court concluded that the inclusion of both types of charges renders the notice jurisdictionally defective. The Appellate Court concluded that state law is irrelevant to the legal sufficiency of such a notice, and that the inclusion of charges other than for rent is not a material defect under federal law. Presidential Village, LLC v. Perkins , 176 Conn. App. 493, 500, 506, 170 A.3d 701 (2017).
The defendant tenant, Tonya Perkins,2 appeals, upon our grant of certification, from the Appellate Court's judgment reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing the summary process action initiated by the plaintiff landlord, Presidential Village, LLC. We conclude that the inclusion of undesignated charges for obligations other than rent rendered the notice jurisdictionally defective. Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Court's judgment.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff is a private company that owns and manages Presidential Village, a housing development in New Haven in which the rental units are subsidized by HUD through a project based Section 83 program intended to benefit low income families. Tenants are responsible for a portion of the rent, based on a percentage of their income and other factors; HUD makes monthly payments to the plaintiff to make up the difference between the tenant's portion of the rent and the full market rent. If a tenant fails to provide information relevant to the determination of the tenant's share of the rent, which may be periodically adjusted as circumstances change, the tenant may be required to pay the market rent.4 See generally United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, HUD Handbook 4350.3 Rev-1: Occupancy Requirements of Subsidized Multifamily Housing Programs (November, 2013) (HUD Handbook).
In March, 2010, the defendant signed a HUD model lease for an apartment in Presidential Village for a term beginning March 2, 2010, and ending February 28, 2011, and thereafter "continu [ing ]" for successive terms of one month ...." (Emphasis added.) The lease set the defendant's rent at $ 377 per month; it did not indicate the amount of HUD's subsidy or the market rate for the unit. The lease provides that the defendant's rent may increase (or decrease) for various reasons, including a change in her income.5
In February, 2015, the plaintiff commenced the present summary process action against the defendant, seeking immediate possession of the premises, solely on the ground of nonpayment of rent. The complaint alleged that the defendant's monthly rent was $ 1402, the defendant's portion of that rent was $ 1402,6 and, on January 1, 2015, the defendant failed to pay the rent then due and payable.
The complaint further alleged the procedures under-taken by the plaintiff prior to initiating the action. Specifically, it alleged that, on January 14, 2015, with the January rent still unpaid, the plaintiff sent a pretermination notice to the defendant, in accordance with HUD regulations, regarding her past due rent. It further alleged that, on January 29, 2015, with the rent still unpaid, the plaintiff served a notice to quit on the defendant. Both notices were attached as exhibits to the complaint. Relevant to the present case, the pretermination notice stated as follows:
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's summary process complaint on the ground that the pretermination notice was defective and, therefore, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The alleged defects were (1) a variance in the cure amount requested in the pretermination notice ($ 6189.56) and the alleged nonpayment that is the basis of the complaint ($ 1402), which contravenes federal laws regulating the pretermination notice, as articulated in the HUD Handbook and state case law, and (2) the notice's allegations of violations of leases that are no longer in effect, which violate Connecticut summary process law.
In its opposition to the motion, the plaintiff argued that the pretermination notice was not defective. It asserted that there was nothing defective about a pretermination notice that lists the total financial obligations owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further contended that a federal pretermination notice fully complies with the law if it includes the specific information supporting the landlord's right to termination; a notice does not become defective simply because it contains more information than strictly necessary.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court determined that the notice was defective because it contained legally impermissible and factually inaccurate grounds for termination. The trial court explained that one purpose of the pretermination notice is to provide the tenant with the opportunity to cure. The present notice did not provide this opportunity because it was misleading in at least two ways. First, the notice informed the defendant that she had to pay $ 6189.56 in order to prevent eviction when, under state summary process law, payment of a far lesser amount, $ 2804 (rent for December, 2014, and January, 2015), would have prevented the only eviction that could have been initiated based on that particular notice.8 See General Statutes § 47a-23 (d). Second, the notice included charges as "rental obligations" that did not qualify as "rent." The trial court noted that the plaintiff had conceded that the $ 6189.56 in "rental obligations" included approximately $ 1300 in attorney's fees for which the defendant was not even liable,9 and that it could not account for another portion of one of the charges listed. The trial court concluded that the defective notice deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction and rendered a judgment of dismissal.
The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment, holding that the pretermination notice was not jurisdictionally defective. Presidential Village v. Perkins , supra, 176 Conn. App. at 494, 170 A.3d 701. The Appellate Court determined that the trial court improperly incorporated state summary process law in determining that the notice was defective. Id., at 499–500, 170 A.3d 701. The Appellate Court held that the notice must be assessed solely in relation to the requirements of federal law; id., at 500, 170 A.3d 701 ; under which a pretermination notice for nonpayment of rent required only "the dollar amount of the balance due on the rent account and the date of such computation ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 502, 170 A.3d 701, quoting 24 C.F.R. § 247.4 [e] (2017). The Appellate Court determined that the plaintiff complied with this requirement because all of the charges listed in the pretermination notice were amounts for either past due rent or other financial obligations due under the lease. Id., at 502–503, 170 A.3d 701.
The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's argument that the balance due on the "rent account" was limited to the amount of unpaid rent that supported the nonpayment of rent ground alleged in the complaint. Id., at 503–504, ...
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2017-2018 Developments in Connecticut Landlord-tenant Law
...second case was reversed by the Supreme Court in 2019. Presidential Vill. LLC v. Perkins, 176 Conn. App. 493, 170 A.3d 701 (2017), rev'd 332 Conn. 45 (2019). The Supreme Court decision will be discussed in the 2019 survey. [80] Id. At 122. [81] Id. at 122-23. [82] Id at 123. Specifically, C......