Press v. Pasadena Independent School District

• Decision Date: 04 March 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 71-H-187.
• Citation: 326 F. Supp. 550
• Parties: Sabrina Dale PRESS, by next friend, Jesse D. Press, Plaintiff, v. PASADENA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, the Board of Trustees of Pasadena Independent School District, the Superintendent of Pasadena Independent School District, and Bryant McDonald, Principal of Jackson Intermediate School, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

326 F. Supp. 550

Sabrina Dale PRESS, by next friend, Jesse D. Press, Plaintiff, v. PASADENA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, the Board of Trustees of Pasadena Independent School District, the Superintendent of Pasadena Independent School District, and Bryant McDonald, Principal of Jackson Intermediate School, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 71-H-187.

United States District Court, S. D. Texas, Houston Division.

March 4, 1971.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Frederick S. Grossberg and John C. Connolly, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.

Stanley D. Baskin, Baskin, Fakes & Stanton, Pasadena, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NOEL, District Judge.

I. Preface

This controversy concerns secondary school discipline. Plaintiff, an eighth grade student, by her father as next friend, sues a school district, its board of trustees, and various school officials. Plaintiff was suspended from the Jackson Intermediate School for the remainder of the spring term as disciplinary action for her disobedience to certain school rules, to wit: the wearing of a pantsuit in violation of the dress code and participation in a demonstration in violation of the disruption policy. It is asserted that this suspension was constitutionally defective. Framing the claim as a class action, plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of herself and of students similarly situated. Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.; 28 U.S.C. § 2201. In view of the Court's decision, it will be unnecessary to discuss or decide whether the class action is properly maintainable. The Court has jurisdiction over the named parties, and the procedural due process aspects of the subject matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I.

The threshold issue presented by this suit is whether such jurisdiction as exists should be exercised. As a general proposition a federal court may not decline to entertain an action when its jurisdiction is properly invoked and a claim is stated. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Company, 212 U.S. 19, 40, 29 S.Ct. 192, 53 L.Ed. 382 (1909); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). The exigencies of federalism, however, have caused federal courts to depart from this rule in certain "narrowly limited `special circumstances'". Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967).¹

The first of these occasions for abstention arises when a federal court is invited to hear a case involving a constitutional question which might be avoided, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), or materially altered, Harrison v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 360 U.S. 167, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152 (1959), by prior disposition of questions of state law in state courts. The second is in diversity suits, where abstention has been countenanced when unclear or unusually difficult questions of state law are presented. United Services Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964) (en banc), certiorari denied Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank in Dallas, 377 U.S. 935, 84 S.Ct. 1335, 12 L.Ed.2d 298 (1964). In the third situation, abstention is required if a federal court is invited to intrude upon an area of paramount state interest in which a developed structure of state administration is operative. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943); Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway, 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762, 95 L.Ed. 1002 (1951). The presence of all of the foregoing is not necessary in order for it to be appropriate or requisite for a federal court to abstain. Each stands alone as a criterion for abstention. It is the third category which precisely embraces the instant case, as the essentially local nature of disciplinary problems in secondary public education counsels restraint on the part of a lower federal court which is urged to intervene for the purpose of rewriting secondary school rules of discipline.

Burford involved an attack upon the validity of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission granting a drilling permit for wells in the East Texas field. The order had been issued pursuant to the Commission's policy of regulating petroleum production by spacing wells and prorating production among individual fields and wells. The State had created a system for orderly judicial review of the Commission's rulings by appeal to a state district court in Travis County and subsequent review by a Court of Civil Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court. In view of the State's high interest in the regulation of its resources and the provision of a complex scheme to effect that regulation by judicially reviewable administrative action, the Supreme Court held that federal courts must decline the invitation to interfere:

The State provides a unified method for the formation of policy and determination of cases by the Commission and by the state courts. The judicial review of the Commission's decisions in the state courts is expeditious and adequate. Conflicts in the interpretation of state law, dangerous to the success of state policies, are almost certain to result from the intervention of the lower federal courts. On the other hand, if the state procedure is followed from the Commission to the State Supreme Court, ultimate review of the federal question is fully preserved * * *. Under such circumstances, a sound respect for the independence of state action requires the federal equity court to stay its hand.

319 U.S. at 332-334, 63 S.Ct. at 1107.

The principle of the Burford case was applied again in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway, supra. There, a state regulatory agency had denied the plaintiff railroad leave to discontinue local passenger service which was being operated at a loss. In holding that the District Court erred by enjoining enforcement of this order, the Supreme Court noted that intrastate passenger service was an "essentially local problem" for which the State had created a regulatory commission whose orders were reviewable in the state courts:

As adequate state court review of an administrative order based upon predominantly local factors is available to appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary for the protection of federal rights * * *. Considering that "(f)ew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies", Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971, the usual rule of comity must govern the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the District Court in this case. Whatever rights appellee may have are to be pursued through the state courts. (emphasis added)

341 U.S. at 349-350, 71 S.Ct. at 768.

The heart of this matter lies in "comity," and the Supreme Court of the United States, within the last fortnight, has reaffirmed its admonition that District Courts must exercise their equity powers with high regard to the principles which that word embraces. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). In holding that a three-judge federal District Court erred by enjoining a state criminal prosecution, Mr. Justice Black in writing for the Court defined "comity" in traditional terms which deserve emphasis here:

* * * the notion of "comity", that is a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.

401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750.

Grounded as it is in considerations of comity, Burford-Alabama abstention is appropriate in cases which share one or more of three characteristic factors, all of which are present in the case at bar:

1. A legitimate state interest, in addition to private rights, must be at stake in the controversy. It cannot be gainsaid that public instruction is an area of legitimate and even paramount state interest. It is "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). As this Court noted in Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School District, 309 F.Supp. 1034, 1045 (1970):

* * * (T)he education of Texas children is not an incidental activity of the State of Texas. It is an activity to which the State has devoted the income from millions of acres of public lands, as well as large sums from its general revenues. More than financial, the State's concern has extended to an eager acceptance of its obligation and responsibility to exercise administrative supervision over the local officials directly responsible for

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