Pressel v. Bice

Citation142 Pa. 263,21 A. 813
Decision Date04 May 1891
Docket Number220
PartiesJAMES PRESSEL v. ALEXANDER BICE
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Argued April 20, 1891

APPEAL BY DEFENDANT FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BLAIR COUNTY.

No. 220 January Term 1891, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 107 June Term 1889, C.P.

On June 10, 1889, an appeal was entered by the defendant from the judgment of an alderman in favor of James Pressel against Alexander Bice. On August 29, 1889, the plaintiff filed a statement of claim in trespass for the wrongful sale by the defendant, a constable, of a portable saw-mill engine belonging to the plaintiff, on execution process issued against one James Dodson. Issue.

At the trial, on January 29, 1890, it was shown that some time in 1887, James Dodson had bought a portable saw-mill and appurtenances, including a steam-engine, with money borrowed upon obligations on which James Pressel was a surety. In December, 1888, Dodson was operating the saw-mill on timber on the land of Pressel, and, becoming insolvent and unable to pay a large part of said indebtedness remaining unpaid, he executed a written assignment of the saw-mill and appurtenances to Pressel. This assignment, admitted to have been dated December 17, 1888, was lost after the trial, but as reproduced in the appellant's paper-book, was as follows:

"In consideration of the money for which James Pressel is bail for me, I hereby sell to him my saw-mill, engine, and all belonging to it, he to leave it in my possession for one year.

"JAMES DODSON."

As reproduced by the appellee, however, it was as follows:

"I hereby sell my saw mill, engine and all tools belonging to it, to James Pressel, in consideration of what he is bail for me to Joseph Fichtner and others, hereby leasing it to W. H Dodson for one year, for which he is to pay twenty-five dollars as rent.

"JAMES DODSON."

The saw-mill remained at work on Pressel's land during the winter following the transfer, operated by W. H. Dodson, a son of James Dodson, until Pressel leased the mill to W. H Dodson and his brother, at the rental of $25 per annum.

On March 30, 1889, Aloysius Dodson obtained, before a justice of the peace, a judgment against James Dodson for $42.92, for the wages of manual labor about said saw-mill, earned within six months prior to the transfer to Pressel. On an execution issued on said judgment, on April 22, 1890, after the lease of the mill by Pressel to W. H. Dodson and his brother, as claimed by the plaintiff, the defendant, Alexander Bice, as constable, sold the saw-mill at constable's sale to W. H Dodson, for $56.

At the close of the testimony, the court, DEAN, P.J., charged the jury in part as follows:

It has been urged upon us that here is no actual, existing debt on the part of Dodson to Pressel. But we say to you that under the circumstances it was an actual, existing indebtedness, a sufficient consideration for the transfer. If I am bail for A and he is not good and I am, and he has become unfortunate in business, I am, to all practical purposes, the debtor, and A's creditor. I am the man who would have to pay, and there is nothing wrong in A transferring to me property for the payment of the debt. Now, this is the case so far as the bona fides of the transaction is concerned, on the part of the plaintiff. He alleges a sale, a subsisting, valid indebtedness on the part of Dodson to Pressel and an attempt on the part of Dodson to pay what was, in morals and in fact, a debt on his part to Pressel.

The transfer was made. At the time of the transfer the steam engine and saw-mill were on the property of Pressel. Pressel, it seems, had made a sale or given a lease of some timber which he had; and Dodson was sawing it for him. He had already sawed three thousand or four thousand feet, intending to saw more. The transfer was made by a written agreement, a copy of which has been exhibited to you and conceded by both sides to be the agreement made between Dodson and Pressel when this transfer was made. In the same agreement Pressel agrees to lease this property to Dodson for a period of one year for the consideration of $25. It is alleged on the part of the defendant that this was a conditional sale, the title still remaining in Dodson; and therefore, that the property was still subject to levy and execution on the part of Dodson's creditors. We instruct you that if this was a conditional sale, the title was still in Dodson, and the property would not be exempt from the claims of Dodson's creditors. But the plaintiff denies that it was a conditional sale, and swears that it was an absolute sale; and the agreement so far as the terms go, does not make it a conditional sale. Pressel said on the stand, at the close of his testimony: "When I made this agreement, he being my brother-in-law, if I sold it for over $500, it was my intention to give him back what was over." But this did not make it a conditional sale. A man, because he chooses to have a generous intention with regard to the property that has been sold to him, does not thereby affect the absolute character of the sale, if it was, in other respects, an unconditional sale. I may buy a horse from a man for $100 in payment of a debt, intending in my own mind, or even expressing the intention, that if I sell the horse for $200, I will give him back $100. This is mere generosity and does not affect the bona fides of the transaction. So, if this was the understanding of these two brothers-in-law, that if he sold the property for more than the amount for which he was bail, he would give Dodson back the surplus, that did not affect the title to the property. It would depend altogether on Pressel's generosity, whether he would give him anything back, and Dodson could not recover it if he refused.

If there was no actual sale, if this sale was conditional or if it was a pretended sale or a colorable sale, to put the property out of Dodson and in the name of Pressel, for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding the creditors of Dodson, it would not stand. The law will not tolerate any such transaction with personal property. If you should, from the weight of the evidence, find that this was only a colorable transfer, a fraudulent transaction for the mere purpose of keeping the property from the creditors of Dodson, it would be void as to creditors. The whole transaction must be declared void in court, and the property would still remain liable to seizure and sale by the creditors of Dodson.

But it is for the party alleging fraud to prove it. It is not merely to be presumed. It may be presumed from certain circumstances, but the transaction is not to be found fraudulent because it is suspicious. The circumstances must warrant the presumption. If the weight of the evidence satisfies you that it was actually fraudulent, it would not be valid; and your verdict should be for the defendant. If, on the other hand, the weight of the evidence satisfies you that there was an honest intention on the part of Pressel, when he bought, to secure payment of a liability which he had incurred by reason of his suretyship, and the property was transferred to him to indemnify him against loss which he might or would incur by reason of signing these notes, then your verdict will have to be for the plaintiff, so far as that particular question is concerned. But then another question will come up, and that question is whether or not the transaction is constructively fraudulent.

There are two kinds of fraud, actual fraud, which is fraud with a dishonest, corrupt, immoral intention; and constructive fraud, a transaction which may be declared legally fraudulent; not because the party intended to defraud anybody, but because he did not do that which the law requires him, under the circumstances, to do in order to make a valid transaction. Under the statute of Elizabeth, many cases have been decided by our Supreme Court, in which it is held that a transaction is constructively fraudulent without respect at all to the intention of the parties to it. They may be entirely honest and yet may not have given the transaction those elements which are necessary to make it legal. When a man owns property and desires to sell it, he being at the time heavily in debt or insolvent, and he does sell it, actually intending at some future time to deliver it, and the purchaser pays the full price, yet the seller of the property retains possession of it as he did before, such a transaction is held to be a legal or constructive fraud, because such change of possession as the property was capable of under the circumstances was not made at the time of the purchase and sale. The transaction is good as between the parties, but fraudulent as to creditors, because the law will not permit him who owns personal property to sell it and yet retain possession of it. To do so, is to give notice to all the debtor's creditors, or to persons who want to sell to him or trust him, that he is the owner of the property, thus giving him an opportunity to defraud by creating the impression that he is the owner of the property. One in this financial condition must transfer the property which he sells, into the possession of the party who buys it.

At one time, as has been well stated by the counsel for the defendant, the rule was much more rigidly held in this state than it is to-day. Within the last twenty years there has been considerable modification of the rule. A judge who twenty years ago,...

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6 cases
  • In re Standard Wood Products Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • April 8, 1941
    ...Therefore, it necessarily must follow that the claim here would not be entitled to priority by virtue of the state law". Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263, 21 A. 813; Wilkinson v. Patton, 162 Pa. 12, 29 A. 293; Brown v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 174 Pa. 443, 34 A. By the above statement......
  • Joseph Taney v. Penn National Bank of Reading
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 26, 1914
    ...Pa. 352, 3 Am. Rep. 588; Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576; Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219, 21 Am. St. Rep. 286, 20 Atl. 542; Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263, 21 Atl. 813; Garretson v. Hackenberg, 144 Pa. 107, 22 Atl. 875; Barlow v. Fox, 203 Pa. 114, 52 Atl. 57; White v. Gunn, 205 Pa. 229, 54 At......
  • Davies v. Oxenreider
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • July 20, 1910
    ...assigned amongst others were above instructions, quoting them. Cyrus G. Derr, with him Edward S. Kremp, for appellant, cited: Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263; McCullough Willey, 200 Pa. 168; Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576; Goodard v. Weil & Co., 165 Pa. 419; Bell v. McCloskey, 155 Pa. 319. Sila......
  • McCullough v. Willey
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • July 17, 1901
    ...the parties is required. Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576; Ziegler v. Handrick, 106 Pa. 87; McClure v. Forney, 107 Pa. 414." Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263, 21 Atl. 813. "The results of these cases were summarized in Crawford v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576, where it was said that the character of the prop......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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