Pressley v. State
| Decision Date | 16 November 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 24,24 |
| Parties | Benson Lee PRESSLEY v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Bryan B. Haddaway, Baltimore, for appellant.
Clayton A. Dietrich, Asst. Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., Saul A. Harris, State's Atty. for Baltimore City, Baltimore, Frank J. Marcellino, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.
Pressley, the appellant, and one Vass were indicted jointly for larceny and receiving stolen goods. At arraignment both pleaded not guilty. Each told the judge, when advised of his right to counsel, that he did not intend to retain a lawyer. The judge appointed counsel for Vass but told Pressley that he was old enough to represent himself or to seek his own lawyer.
When the case came on for trial some eleven days later, the trial judge appointed Vass' lawyer to represent Pressley. Between the time of arraignment and trial, Vass decided to plead guilty to larceny, and after a conference with the lawyer Pressley decided to offer to plead guilty to receiving stolen goods, and the State accepted that plea. Vass was sentenced to two years for larceny, and Pressley, because of his extensive prior criminal record of larcenies and burglaries, to three years for receiving.
Pressley, without the aid of counsel, filed a timely appeal as an indigent person and in his handwritten petition asserted as grounds of error that the value of the stolen goods found in his possession (a sweater and two shirts) 'did not warrant a term of three years for receiving same;' that he had no knowledge the clothing had been stolen; that he was not given counsel until the trial and 'did not have enough time to fill my counsel in on my case and also the other defendant and I had the same counsel,' and further: 'It seems to me that I have been convicted of receiving the whole lot of the goods * * * I feel I should have been convicted of the goods that were found in my possession.'
The record discloses that the automobile of one Joseph Luger, parked on Henrietta Street near Sharp Street in Baltimore, was entered and a suit, jackets, sweaters, slacks and shirts of the total value of some $280 stolen from it.
Vass was picked up near the scene a few days later wearing one of the stolen jackets. Pressley was arrested soon after and in his possession were a shirt and one of the sweaters, which bore the initials of Mr. Luger. Neither Vass nor Pressley took the stand, but Vass gave a statement to the police in which he said Pressley had suggested the larceny and that both had participated in it. A policeman testified, after the guilty pleas, that Pressley, upon arrest, would not make a statement but did say that he had helped Vass carry the clothing from Sharp and Henrietta Streets to 525 S. Sharp Street, that the clothing had come out of a car, and that the policeman's recollection was that Pressley had said he had thought it was stolen.
For the purposes of the decision we may assume, without deciding, that Pressley was entitled to the appointment of counsel under Maryland Rule 723b, as one charged in a serious case, despite his age, his experience in criminal courts, and the relative simplicity of the facts and law involved, and their interrelation. These considerations and the familiarity of Pressley's counsel with the case, because of his representation of Vass, lead us to conclude that the relatively short period of time the lawyer had to confer with Pressley was adequate under the facts of the case, so that the representation was not illusory or nugatory. People v. Quevreaux, 407 Ill. 176, 95 N.E.2d 62, 66, certiorari denied 340 U.S. 938, 71 S.Ct. 485, 95 L.Ed. 677; Tolbert v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 55 A.2d 91, 93; Slaughter v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 89 A.2d 646, 647. It is to be noted that neither appellant nor his lawyer seemed to find the time given them before trial to confer about the case inadequate. No request for postponement or complaint or objection was made by either prior to or at the trial.
That the same lawyer represented the two defendants is not of itself error. To show prejudice there must be revealed an actual or imminently potential conflict of interest which prevented the lawyer from impartially and adequately representing his clients. Whether there was, or not, such a conflict is a question of fact to be determined in each case.
In the case at bar, the evidence the State was prepared to offer against Vass left him little choice but to plead guilty to larceny. There is no evidence whatsoever that the plea was induced by the State as a promise of leniency or other reward, and at the time his lawyer was appointed to defend Pressley, it would appear that Vass had made his choice. The lawyer's immediate concern then became the proper course for Pressley to take. As indicated by his suggestion to the court that Vass' confession was not evidence against Pressley, the lawyer could not have failed to realize that the State would have difficulty in proving Pressley guilty of larceny, since the testimony of Vass against his accomplice would not of itself have been enough to convict, and there was real doubt of sufficient corboration. Undoubtedly he knew, too, that Pressley's possession of the recently stolen shirts and the sweater bearing the initials of the owner, and his admission to the police made it very likely that the verdict would be guilty of receiving stolen goods even without testimony from Vass. The decision to plead guilty to receiving stolen goods was logical under the circumstances. Pressley does not suggest that the lawyer pressured or induced him, or that there was any improper influence whatever upon him, to make the guilty plea.
A lawyer appointed to represent two defendant accused of joint criminal activity must determine whether there is, or is likely to be, a conflict of interest. If he finds that there is, he should advise the court and ask to be relieved. If he finds there is not, he properly can continue the joint representation if his clients agree. In the case before us the lawyer evidently found, when Pressley decided to plead guilty, that there was no conflict, and apparently neither Vass nor Pressley saw any. Pressley did not make any objection to the trial judge to Vass' lawyer representing him or claim that Vass' interests and his were antagonistic. There was no inconsistency or conflict between the interests of Vass and Pressley...
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