Preston v. Bd. of Trs. of Chi. State Univ.
| Decision Date | 26 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14 C 3423 |
| Parties | WILLIE PRESTON and BRITTANY BAILEY, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CHICAGO STATE UNIVERSITY, WAYNE WATSON, ANGELA HENDERSON, PATRICK CAGE, MATOYA MARSH, and RONNIE WATSON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Willie Preston and Brittany Bailey sued Chicago State University ("CSU") raising numerous federal constitutional and state law claims against CSU's Board of Trustees and officials based on the defendants' response to their on-campus activism. The defendants seek to dismiss the complaint based on allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations in the plaintiffs' affidavits supporting their requests to proceed without paying the filing fee. Alternatively, the defendants seek to dismiss most of the complaint based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Younger abstention doctrine, and for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss based on fraud is denied and the remainder of the motion is granted in part and denied in part as detailed below.
The following facts are drawn from the plaintiffs' complaint and are accepted as true for the purpose of the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs Willie Preston and Brittany Bailey attending CSU in 2010. At all relevant times, they were either dating or married. Preston was expelled at the end of 2013. Bailey appears to be a current student.
Defendant Wayne Watson served as President of CSU while the plaintiffs were students at CSU. Defendant Angela Henderson began to serve as CSU's Interim Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs in 2013. Defendant Patrick Cage is CSU's Vice President for Labor and Legal Affairs and General Counsel for CSU. He oversees the Student Judicial Affairs Office. In 2012, defendant Matoya Marsh began working as CSU's Director of Student Activities & Leadership. Defendant Ronnie Watson is the Chief of CSU's Police Department.
While they were students at CSU, the plaintiffs engaged in on-campus activism to criticize various policies in place at CSU and actions taken by Watson and other CSU officials. In addition, the plaintiffs were elected to roles in CSU's student government system. The plaintiffs' twenty-nine pages of factual allegations detail their belief that CSU officials retaliated against them based on their exercise of their First Amendment rights, "including instituting disciplinary actions against them, invalidating the results of elections they won, arranging their arrest and criminal prosecution, and expelling . . . Preston from the University." (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2.) The plaintiffs assert claims against Watson, Cage, Henderson, and Marsh in their individual capacities for deprivation of First Amendment rights and retaliation (Count I). They assert the same theories against all individual defendants in their official capacities (Count II). They also assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim against the individual defendants in their individual andofficial capacities (Count III). Next, they assert that CSU's Board of Trustees, Watson, Cage, Henderson, and Marsh violated the Illinois State Officials and Employees Ethics Act (Count IV), CSU's Board of Trustees, Watson, Henderson, and Marsh violated the Illinois Campus Press Act (Count V), and all of the defendants violated the "Illinois State University Law" and the "Chicago State University Law" (Count VI). Finally, they contend that CSU (presumably CSU's Board of Trustees, as that entity is a party to this action) breached a contract by violating policies in the CSU student handbook that govern the expression of ideas (Count VII).
The plaintiffs (through counsel) paid the $400 filing fee when they filed their complaint in May 2014. In July 2014, they filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") and for reimbursement of the filing fee to their counsel. The plaintiffs asserted that their counsel paid the fee with the intention of seeking reimbursement and submitted financial affidavits in support of their motion. The court found that payment of the fee would constitute a "significant hardship" on the plaintiffs since they are unemployed and receive under $7,000 per year in welfare benefits. (Dkt. 12.) It thus granted the plaintiffs' IFP motion and refunded the filing fee.
The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A) based on IFP fraud. This motion was based on the defendants' discovery, via an online search, that the plaintiffs had received almost $2,000 in donations for their "legal fund" made through the crowdfunding site "www.gofundme.com." (Dkt. 15 at 2.) The plaintiffs website asks for donations "so [their] attorneys can continue to subpoena, file motions, retain their private investigators, etc." (Dkt. 15-1, Ex, A & B.) The plaintiffs had not disclosed these assets in their IFP affidavits, despite questions asking if they had received "gifts" or assets from"any source." In their response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs state that when they signed their IFP affidavits, they had just started to receive donations and that those donations were "not even close to being sufficient to cover legal fees." (Dkt. 18.) They also assert that they were never (whether at the time they filed suit or now) able to pay the filing fee and that their counsel paid the fee and received the refund. According to the plaintiffs, their counsel believed that the IFP affidavit required disclosure of assets and income, not donations for legal fees that the plaintiffs were not entitled to retain for personal use.
Presumably due to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs filed amended IFP affidavits that disclose that on the date of filing (September 26, 2014), they had collected $1,841.98 in donations for attorney's fees, which they paid to their counsel. In response, the defendants filed a supplement to their motion to dismiss arguing that the amendments were too little, too late to rectify the plaintiffs' alleged IFP fraud. Specifically, the defendants assert that nothing requires the plaintiffs to use the donations for attorneys' fees and stress that the plaintiffs' crowdfunding site asked for donations to cover attorney's fees as well as costs, such as the retention of private investigators. According to the defendants, the filing fee is a cost that the plaintiffs could have paid using donated funds. Finally, the defendants vigorously argue that the donations should have been disclosed in the section of the IFP form requiring disclosure of gifts.
The defendants seek to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint based on alleged IFP fraud. They also raise multiple alternative arguments. First, they contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiffs' state law claims against the Board of Trustees and the official capacity claims against the individual defendants. Second, they argue that the plaintiffs' requestfor this court to reverse or dismiss state court criminal proceedings against Preston should be rejected pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Third, they argue that Counts III (Fourteenth Amendment due process), Count IV (Illinois State Officials and Employees Ethics Act), Count VI (the "Illinois State University Law" and the "Chicago State University Law") and Count VII (breach of contract) must be dismissed as these counts fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. As discussed below, the court declines to dismiss the complaint based on purported IFP fraud. The remainder of the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part as specified below.
"The opportunity to proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege provided for the benefit of indigent persons and the court system depends upon the honesty and forthrightness of applicants to ensure that the privilege is not abused." Chung v. Dushane, No. 03 C 5955, 2003 WL 22902561, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992)). Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the [plaintiff's] allegation of poverty is untrue." This provision mandates dismissal when a plaintiff's IFP application contains material and false information supporting a finding of poverty but the plaintiff is not indigent. See Palmer v. Dollar Tree, No. 10 C 7340, 2012 WL 4795720, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2012); see also Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 2002) (); cf. Chriswell v. Big Score Entm't., LLC, No.11 C 861, 2013 WL 3669074, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2013) ().
Courts may dismiss cases under § 1915(e)(2)(A) with or without prejudice. Thomas, 288 F.3d at 306-07. If the court determines, in the exercise of its discretion, that a lie is sufficiently egregious, it may impose the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. See id. (). Thus, when evaluating whether to dismiss with prejudice based on a false allegation of poverty, courts consider the magnitude of the falsehoods and whether the falsehoods were intentional or inadvertent. See id. at 308; see also Mullins v. Hallmark Data Sys., LLC, 511 F. Supp. 2d 928, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (...
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