Prete v. Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law
| Decision Date | 12 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 12-cv-474-JL |
| Parties | Michael Eric Prete v. Roger Williams University School of Law and Christopher Neronha |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
This age discrimination case arises out of Roger Williams University School of Law's (the "law school") decision to deny early admission to plaintiff Michael Eric Prete. Prete has brought suit against the law school and Christopher Neronha, the Associate General Counsel for Roger Williams University, alleging that the law school denied him admission as an undergraduate junior on the basis of his age, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4, and the Age Discrimination in Federally Assisted Programs Act ("Age Discrimination Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that Prete has failed to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
This court has jurisdiction over the equal protection challenge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question). The parties disagree as to whether the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over Prete's Age Discrimination Act claim. After hearing oral argument on both the defendant's motion to dismiss and Prete's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court concludes that it cannot entertain Prete's Age Discrimination Act claim because Prete neither provided notice to defendants nor exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit.1 Prete's equal protection claim also fails because the law school is not a state actor bound by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff's complaint must make factual allegations sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts set forth in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Martino v. Forward Air, Inc., 609 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2010). The court "may consider not only the complaint but also facts extractable from documentation annexed to or incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters susceptible to judicial notice." Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). With the facts so construed, "questions of law [are] ripe for resolution at the pleadings stage." Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009).
The standard of decision for a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is identical to that applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, Sam M. ex. rel. Elliot v. Chafee, 800 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370 (D.R.I. 2011), however, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction"involves a court's power to hear a case." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Consequently, a court without jurisdiction over a claim must dismiss it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). "The burden of proving federal court jurisdiction is on the party invoking the jurisdiction." Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 200 (1st Cir. 2000).
Prete, age 20 as of July 16, 20122 , is an undergraduate student at Roger Williams University in Bristol, Rhode Island. Roger Williams University School of Law is an ABA-accredited law school also located in Bristol. The law school is a private institution that receives financial assistance from the federal government.
In 2010, Roger Williams University accepted Prete into its "Three-Plus-Three program." The program allows Roger Williams University undergraduate students to begin their first year of law school during their fourth year of undergraduate study--provided they are able to gain early admission to the law school. Early acceptance into the law school is guaranteed to students who (1) satisfy Roger Williams University's undergraduate requirements, (2) achieve a Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT") score that is at or above the law school's median accepted score for the prior year, and (3) present no serious character or fitness issues.
Prete sat for the LSAT during the first semester of his junior year. He scored 149, two points below the law school's median accepted LSAT score in the year prior to his application. After receiving his results, Prete contacted the law school and was informed that his score was not at or above the median accepted score of 151 and that he would not be guaranteed early admission. The law school, however, invited Prete to apply for admission the following year, his senior year of undergraduate study. Undeterred, Prete applied for early admission anyway. His application was denied.
The parties agree that Prete's LSAT score did not qualify him for guaranteed entry. According to Prete, the combination of his GPA and LSAT scores would have resulted in his admission into the law school had he been a college senior rather than an undergraduate junior. In short, Prete (completely ignoring the difference between a junior and senior under the law school's admissions policies) alleges there was "no academic reason for denial of acceptance into law school" and that he was denied admission because of his age. Prete filed this suit in the Providence Superior Court and defendants removed the case to this court.
Prete's age discrimination claim rests on the allegation that, because the law school denied him early admission as a junior when it would have admitted a similarly-situated senior, his age was the motivating factor in the law school's decision. Rather than exploiting the manifest absurdity of Prete's substantive argument (there is no serious dispute that the law school denied Prete's admission because he was neither a college graduate nor an undergraduate junior who met the law school'searly admissions requirements, and not because of his age)3 , the defendants instead argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Prete's Age Discrimination Act claim because Prete did not exhaust administrative remedies or give notice as required under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 6104. Alternatively, the defendants argue that Prete has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted for the same reason. Prete answers that the notice and exhaustion requirements do not apply to his suit because he originally filed his case in Rhode Island state court. He is incorrect.
The Age Discrimination Act "prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of age in programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 6101. To achieve this purpose, Congress has directed each agency distributing federal financial assistance to promulgate regulations creating an administrative process to remedy violations. Id. §§ 6103, 6104(a).
Id. § 6104(e)(1) (emphasis added). Section 6104(e)(2), the exhaustion provision, directs that no action referred to in 6104(e)(1) may be filed unless administrative remedies are exhausted. Id. § 6104(e)(2).
Prete concedes he has satisfied neither the Act's notice nor its exhaustion provisions. The law school argues that this fact is fatal to his suit. Prete counters that Section 6104(e) does not apply to civil actions originally filed in state courts, such as his, because the statute, by its terms, relates only to actions filed in U.S. District Court. But Prete's argument is based on the underlying assumption that the Age Discrimination Act gives him a cause of action in state court. Prete has not provided any authority or reasoned argument to support his premise, and the court rejects it.
Section 6104(e) of the Act creates a limited private right of action to seek injunctive relief in federal district court. See, e.g., Long v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 807 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-20 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The court has not found, and the parties have not cited, any authority supporting an implied right to sue in state court.4 In fact, regulations promulgated under the Act state the opposite, requiring the Department of Education to inform complainants, upon administrative exhaustion, that "a civil action can be brought only in a United States district court for the district in which the recipient is found or transacts business." 34 C.F.R. § 110.39(b)(3)(I)(emphasis added); see also 45 C.F.R. § 90.50(b)(3)(I); Becker v. Washington State Univ., 266 P.3d 893, 902 (Wash. App. 2011) (). Nevertheless, Prete insists that the Act creates a cause of action in state court.
For Prete to succeed, the court must find that the Act implies the right and remedy underlying his premise. See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors,...
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