Price Bldg. Service Inc. v. Christensen
Citation | 215 Mont. 372,697 P.2d 1344,42 St.Rep. 440 |
Decision Date | 08 April 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 84-394,84-394 |
Parties | PRICE BUILDING SERVICE INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John CHRISTENSEN, d/b/a J.C. Tile, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
Timothy D. Geiszler, Missoula, for defendant and appellant.
Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Michael J. Milodragovich, Missoula, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant appeals a judgment entered by the Missoula County District Court in favor of Price Building Service in its action for breach of warranty. Following a nonjury trial, Price was awarded $10,872.13 plus interest, fees and costs in a judgment dated June 8, 1984. Christensen appeals raising certain questions concerning the trial court's admission of expert testimony.
This lawsuit was initiated by the general contractor, Price, against its subcontractor, Christensen, for damages resulting from a defective tile floor installed in the construction of the Missoula Arby's restaurant. Several months after the building was complete, the tile flooring came loose in several places.
Price claimed that the problem was caused by defective bonding of the "thin-set" mortar and that the tile subcontractor, Christensen, was responsible. Christensen refused to replace the flooring as it was his position that the concrete slab surface to which the tile was bonded had settled. Christensen argued that this settling caused the tile to buckle and spring loose. After the owner, Arby's threatened legal action against the general contractor, Price demanded Christensen replace the floor. Christensen eventually submitted a bid for the replacement, but Price contracted with another tile company who submitted a lower bid to do the work. This lawsuit was filed against Christensen to recover the costs of the repair work.
Christensen's primary issue on appeal is whether Kevin Price was properly allowed to testify as an expert witness under Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid. Kevin Price was an employee of the plaintiff contracting company and was generally responsible for supervising the various construction projects that were undertaken. Price has a high school education but no technical training in tile-laying. He had worked as a general laborer for the company before assuming his office responsibilities. Experience in tile-laying was gained through supervising subcontractors and preparing for the present litigation.
Christensen takes exception to Kevin Price expressing his opinion of the cause of the tile failure. Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony under Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid. This rule of evidence, adopted verbatim from the modern federal rule, provides as follows:
Christensen's appeal takes several tacks. First, it is argued that Price had no education, training or personal skill or experience with regard to tile installation. Secondly, appellant points out that the only expertise Price had was gained in preparation for this trial. The first contention is not supported by the record. The second contention may be true, but we find no legal support, nor does appellant provide such, for the proposition that one cannot become a Rule 702 expert through knowledge gained in preparation for litigation.
Of greater importance to the issue is the standard of review to be applied to the expert witness determination by the trial court. Appellant acknowledges that a determination of whether an expert witness is properly qualified is within the discretion of the trial judge. Haynes v. County of Missoula (1973), 163 Mont. 270, 290, 517 P.2d 370, 381. Absent a showing of abuse, the trial court's determination that a witness is qualified to testify as an expert will not be disturbed.
The District Court Judge in this case stated:
This pronouncement followed several objections to opinion testimony by appellant's counsel that were sustained before a proper foundation was laid. The following dialogue preceded the witness being qualified as an expert:
On the basis of this foundation, the lower court qualified the witness.
We are somewhat concerned that this witness was allowed to express his opinion on a skill to which he had no practical or personal involvement prior to preparation for trial. But the fact that we would reach a different conclusion on the determination than that of the trial court does not render the trial judgment infirm. The trial court's ruling must be upheld unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Rule 52, M.R.Civ.P. This Court will not overturn the holdings or findings of a trial court simply because the evidence furnishes reasonable grounds for different conclusions. Morgen & Oswood Const. Co. v. Big Sky of Mont. (1976), 171 Mont. 268, 557 P.2d 1017. This adage is particularly justified here, where the trial judge had the benefit of observing the witness's demeanor and credibility while we are reviewing a lifeless record.
Two Colorado appellate decisions illustrate the degree of discretion trial courts have in resolving Rule 702 determinations. In Sundance Develop., Inc. v. Standard Lbr. & Hard. Co. (Colo.App.1974), 520 P.2d 1056, the owner of recently constructed tennis courts sued the contractor who installed fences around the courts after the fences were wind-damaged. The plaintiff attempted to qualify as an expert a vice president of a firm that built tennis courts, such that this individual could testify on the cause of the tennis fence failure. The trial court excluded the testimony after the expert conceded he had little personal experience in the construction of fences because, in his firm, work of that nature was performed by subcontractors. This decision was upheld by the court of appeals which applied a "clearly erroneous" standard similar to Montana's standard set forth above. The Sundance court noted that the witness was generally knowledgeable with respect to tennis court construction but lacked knowledge and expertise in the matter at issue--construction of fences around tennis courts.
A trial court's ruling on expert testimony was ultimately reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court in Freeman v. Gentry Builders, LTD. (1974), 185 Colo. 123, 522 P.2d 739. In this case owners of a home with alleged defects attempted to qualify a foundation contractor as an expert to testify on the cost of repairing defects to the home generally. The trial court excluded the testimony because the contractor had bid many repair jobs but not the particular type of job required by the home's defects (placing voids in the partitions of the home). The court of appeals affirmed, Gentry Builders, LTD. v. Freeman (1973), 33 Colo.App. 144, 517 P.2d 469, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found the trial court ruling clearly erroneous as the foundation contractor had considerable experience in the building trade:
"... if it is shown that the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous and results in the exclusion of competent and relevant evidence from the trial, reversal is required." 522 P.2d at 740.
These two cases indicate the general rule followed across this country that the lower court decision will be upheld unless there has been some clear error. In the case at bar, the trial judge was presented with sufficient evidence of Kevin Price's ...
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