Price v. Carri Scharf Trucking, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 19-1162 |
| Parties | WILLIAM BROKAW PRICE, SHARON PRICE, and WINDFALL PROPERTIES, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. CARRI SCHARF TRUCKING, INC., an Illinois Corporation, and JOSEPH A. SCHARF, and CARRI SCHARF MATERIALS COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Pending before the Court are Defendants Carri Scharf Trucking, Inc. (“CST”), Carri Scarf Materials Company (“CSM”), and Joseph A. Scharf's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 264) and Plaintiffs William Brokaw Price (“Brokaw”), Sharon Price, and Windfall Properties, LLC, and Third-Party Defendant Theodosia Price's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 263. For the reasons stated below, these Motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
There is complete diversity of citizenship with all Plaintiffs being citizens of Washington and all Defendants citizens of Illinois. ECF No. 254 at 3. Specifically, Sharon and Brokaw Price are both citizens of Washington and they are the sole members of Windfall Properties, LLC. Id. Accordingly, Windfall Properties is a citizen of Washington for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). See generally Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 72, 731 (7th Cir. 1998) ().
Defendants CST and CSM are Illinois Corporations in good standing with the Illinois Secretary of State. ECF Nos. 254 at 3; 262 at 2-3. Their principal offices are in Bloomington Illinois and they conduct substantially all of their business in the State of Illinois. Id. Defendant Scharf is a citizen of Illinois and the current president of both CST and CSM. Id. Plaintiffs also point to evidence that their damages will exceed $75,000. Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1332(a)(1).
Venue is appropriate in the Central District of Illinois since Defendants reside within the jurisdiction and because the events that are the basis of the claim transpired within the jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.A. §1391(b)(1) and (2). The claims specifically involve trespass to real property, conversion from resources taken from that property and breach of contractual covenants with respect to the reclamation of real property, with the property being located in McLean County, Illinois. ECF No. 254.
The dispute stems from a contract between Plaintiff Brokaw's parents, William and Barbara Price, and CST entered into on or about January 7, 1997 (“the Contract”). The Contract granted CST the exclusive right to mining operations (a “gravel pit”) on a sixty-acre portion of the Price's property (“Mining Tract”). The Contract gave CST permission to extract sand, gravel, and topsoil from the Mining Tract in order to sell. In exchange, the Prices would receive a royalty on the sales of the extracted materials. ECF No. 83-1 at 2.
Under the Contract, CST was required to obtain a Special Use Permit from McLean County allowing mining operations on agriculturally zoned property (the “Permit”). The Permit set forth McLean County's requirements for CST's mining operation on the Price's land, including a reclamation requirement. The reclamation process required a reclamation bond, ongoing reclamation, and final reclamation. The Contract required Scharf assume the responsibility of complying with all local, State, and Federal regulations or orders regarding the use of the premises. ECF No. 255 at 10. Scharf's failure to comply with said laws or regulation would constitute a default under the Contract. Id. The Contract also required CST to remove all equipment and improvements, leave the lake with a certain shoreline, and distribute the remaining sand gravel or overburden over the premises upon termination of the Contract. ECF Nos. 83-1 at 13. CST was also required to comply with Price's reasonable plans and directions regarding the distribution of the left-over material. Id.
Ultimately, the Contract was renewed for the last time on November 7, 2009. ECF Nos. 264 at 13; 269 at 4. Under the terms of the renewed Contract, the mining provisions expired on June 1, 2010, and the article controlling royalties was in effect until December 31, 2010.
Since the Contract was signed, the ownership of the land has shifted, and Defendants blame the conflict largely on the change in owners. Initially, William and Barbara owned the land when they entered the Contract in 1997. In 2003, William and Barbara conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the Farm Tract and Mining Tract to each of their respective trusts. William was the trustee of the William Brokaw Price trust and Barbara was the trustee of the Barbara Scott Price Trust. ECF No. 268 at 3. Everything went to the Barbara Scott Price Trust when William died in 2010. ECF No. 233-7 at 26. Theodosia Price succeeded her mother as trustee of the Barbara Scott Price Trust following Barbara's resignation on March 21, 2016. ECF Nos. 264 at 14; 269 at 4. Barbara passed away on September 18, 2017. ECF No. 269-5 at 3. Theodosia, in her capacity as trustee, conveyed the Farm Tract to Brokaw on May 31, 2018. ECF Nos. 264 at 20 and 30; 269 at 9. On September 27, 2019, Theodosia, in her capacity as trustee, conveyed the Mining Tract to Brokaw. ECF No. 233-7 at 54. Plaintiffs Brokaw and Shannon Price, and their company, Windfall, LLC, now have the relevant ownership interest in the Mining Tract and Farm Tract. Theodosia, in her capacity as trustee also assigned to Brokaw all claims involving the property. ECF No. 264 at 26; 269 at 12.
Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of cutting corners on the reclamation work after the gravel pit operation closed. They also accuse Defendants of trespassing on the neighboring “Farm Tract,” a seventy-acre parcel abutting the Mining Tract, to dig a large trench and steal topsoil. Plaintiffs express concern about the thirty-six-inch sewer pipe placed in the trench that runs for approximately two-hundred feet on the Farm Tract. Plaintiffs assert that this trench and piping connect the lake on the Mining Tract to Kickapoo Creek, in violation of the Special Use Permit. ECF No. 233 at 8-9. Plaintiffs also suggest that part of the purpose of digging this trench was to steal topsoil to use in the reclamation process on the Mining Tract. Plaintiffs also provide evidence that the Mining Tract does not have proper topsoil, that the lake was not properly reclaimed, and that the poor reclamation work has caused needless flooding on the land. Plaintiffs' expert estimates that properly reclaiming the land could now cost over a million dollars.
Defendants argue that problems arose when Theodosia and Brokaw became involved. They assert that Theodosia and Brokaw repeatedly ordered them from the land during the reclamation process, which they assert resulted in Defendants paying employment and equipment costs for time they were not working. ECF No. 100.[1] Defendants claim that Plaintiffs unreasonably withheld access to the adjoining Farm Tract and prevented them from completing the reclamation work. While the Contract and Permit limit Defendants to certain acreage for the purpose of the gravel pit, Defendants argue that William Price allowed them on the Farm Tract to support the mining work. Defendants suggest they should have been allowed to continue with the work and that the problems largely arise from Theodosia and Brokaw's lack of understanding and unreasonable expectations.
The parties are currently operating under the Third Amended Complaint alleging Trespass (Count I) and Conversion (Count II) against CST, CSM, and Joseph Scharf, and Breach of Contract against CST and CSM (Count III). ECF No. 80.[2] Defendants filed a counterclaim against Brokaw and a Third-Party Complaint against Theodosia Price alleging Breach of Contract (Count I) and Anticipatory Breach of Contract (Count II). Defendants have also raised numerous affirmative defenses alleging the claims are time barred and that they otherwise had a right to work on the Farm Tract.
Presently before the Court are the following: Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III of the Third Amended Complaint as to liability, on Defendants' affirmative defenses, the Counterclaims brought against Brokaw Price, and Third-Party Defendant Theodosia Price's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II of the Third-Party Complaint. (ECF No. 233, 235, and 263). Also, before this Court is Defendants CST, CSM, and Joseph Scharf's and Counter/Third-Party Plaintiff CST's Motion for Summary Judgment on all pending claims. ECF Nos. 236, 264. The matters are fully briefed, and this Order follows.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows, through “materials in the record, including depositions documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ... admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. In resolving a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When presented with a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe “the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid[] the...
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