Price v. Chain Elec. Co.

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: HANS J. LILJEBERG, JUDGE
• Citation: Price v. Chain Elec. Co., 216 So.3d 388 (La. App. 2017)
• Decision Date: 12 April 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 16–CA–597,16–CA–597
• Parties: Clyde PRICE and his Wife, Mary Price v. CHAIN ELECTRIC COMPANY and Entergy Corporation and/or its Affiliate

216 So.3d 388

Clyde PRICE and his Wife, Mary Price

v.CHAIN ELECTRIC COMPANY and Entergy Corporation and/or its Affiliate

NO. 16–CA–597

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

April 12, 2017

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, CLYDE PRICE AND HIS WIFE MARY PRICE, Victor J. Woods, Jr.

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, ENTERGY CORPORATION Ernest P. Gieger, Jr., Emily E. Eagan

Panel composed of Robert M. Murphy, Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg

HANS J. LILJEBERG, JUDGE

Plaintiffs, Clyde and Mary Price, appeal a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant, Entergy Louisiana, L.L.C. ("ELL"), finding that ELL was Mr. Price's statutory employer and dismissing plaintiffs' tort claims against ELL. For the following reasons, we reverse the summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 9, 2005, Chain Electric Company ("Chain") and Entergy Services, Inc. ("ESI") entered into a written agreement, entitled "Entergy Systemwide Multipurpose Maintenance, Modification and Construction General Services Agreement" ("the Agreement"), bearing contract number 10092965. Pursuant to the Agreement, ESI and Chain agreed that any "affiliate" of ESI could issue Contract Orders to Chain requesting Chain's services. The parties further agreed that any and all Contract Orders issued by an affiliate were deemed to incorporate the provisions of the Agreement. The Agreement provides that an affiliate that issues a Contract Order to Chain is recognized as the statutory employer of Chain's employees.

On June 1, 2011, Chain and ELL entered into a Contract Order, bearing contract number 10318822 and providing that Chain would perform services for ELL, commencing on June 1, 2011 and ending on May 31, 2013. This Contract Order indicates that it was issued pursuant to the Agreement, number 10092965, between ESI and Chain.

On November 28, 2012, while working as an employee of Chain, Clyde Price was assisting with excavation and trenching work for the purpose of adding additional line capacity for ELL. Mr. Price sustained injuries when an incident or "cave-in" occurred in the trench where he was working. On December 2, 2013, Mr. Price and his wife, Mary Price, filed this lawsuit against Chain, Entergy Corporation, and/or its affiliate, alleging that defendants were negligent by failing to ensure that proper safety procedures were followed.¹ Plaintiffs subsequently amended their petition to name ELL as a defendant, in lieu of Entergy Corporation.

On September 21, 2015, ELL filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against it, arguing that ELL was Mr. Price's statutory employer and, thus, ELL is immune from tort claims, with worker's compensation being plaintiffs' exclusive remedy. ELL asserted that the clear language of the Agreement, the Contract Order, and La. R.S. 23:1061 establish that ELL was Mr. Price's statutory employer.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, ELL submitted several exhibits, including the affidavits of Diane Ehlers and Randy Gegenheimer, as well as a copy of the Agreement and the Contract Order at issue. In Ms. Ehlers' affidavit, she stated that she is employed as a Procurement Specialist, Sr. for ESI, that she has regular access to and is personally familiar with the business records of ESI, and that ELL is a subsidiary and affiliate of ESI and Entergy Corporation. In Mr. Gegenheimer's affidavit, he stated that he is a Construction Supervisor for ELL and that ELL is a subsidiary and affiliate of ESI and Entergy Corporation. He stated that the work Chain was to perform pursuant to its agreement with ELL was an integral part of ELL's business and essential to ELL's ability to supply electrical power to residences and businesses throughout Louisiana.

On November 20, 2015, plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to ELL's motion for summary judgment, in which they argued that ELL did not present sufficient proof to establish that it is an affiliate of ESI under the terms of the Agreement. They asserted that the affidavits of Ms. Ehlers and Mr. Gegenheimer contain conclusory statements that ELL is a subsidiary and affiliate of ESI, but they do not address the requirements of the definition of "affiliate" set forth in the Agreement. Plaintiffs further argued that ELL could not have been an affiliate of ESI under the Agreement, because ELL was not in existence when the Agreement was executed. They asserted that because ELL has not shown that it is an affiliate of ESI, it was not the statutory employer of Mr. Price.²

In response to plaintiff's opposition memorandum, ELL filed a reply memorandum, arguing that the language of the Agreement clearly shows that it was intended to apply to future entities, such as ELL. ELL submitted an affidavit of Mark Otts, the Assistant General Counsel for Corporate and Securities with ESI. Mr. Otts indicated that he has regular access to and is personally familiar with the business records of Entergy Corporation, and he stated that ELL is a subsidiary and affiliate of Entergy Corporation and an affiliate of ESI. In his affidavit, Mr. Otts noted that "affiliate" is defined in clause (b) of the Agreement as:

any corporation, company, partnership or other entity in the United States in which Entergy Corporation now or hereafter owns or controls, directly or indirectly, more than fifty percent (50%) of the ownership interest having the right to vote or appoint its directors or their functional equivalents.

Mr. Otts attached an Organizational Chart for Entergy Corporation to his affidavit. In his affidavit, Mr. Otts explained the organizational structure of the corporation and stated that Entergy Corporation owns all of the stock of ESI. He stated that Entergy Corporation also owns all the membership interests in Entergy Louisiana Holdings, L.L.C., and that Entergy Louisiana Holdings, L.L.C. owns all of the membership interests in ELL.

ELL's motion for summary judgment came for hearing before the trial court on February 23, 2016. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that ELL established that it is an affiliate of ESI under the Agreement and thus, ELL was the statutory employer of Mr. Price. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of ELL and dismissed plaintiffs' claims against it with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by granting ELL's motion for summary judgment, finding that ELL was the statutory employer of Mr. Price at the time of the accident. They assert that ELL did not prove that it was an affiliate of ESI pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. We agree.

An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo , using the same criteria that govern the district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc. , 93-2512 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 750 ; Bourgeois v. Boomtown, LLC of Delaware , 10-553 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/15/11), 62 So.3d 166, 169. A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine factual dispute. Mbarika v. Bd. of Supervisors , 07-1136 (...