Price v. City of New Madrid
| Decision Date | 16 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:21 CV 93 ACL |
| Parties | NEAL EVAN PRICE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW MADRID, MISSOURI, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Plaintiff proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Defendants City of New Madrid, Missouri Trent Beeson, Andrew Lawson, New Madrid County Prosecutor's Office, and New Madrid County, Missouri alleging violations of his constitutional rights arising out of a traffic stop in New Madrid, Missouri.
Presently pending before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Andrew Lawson and New Madrid County Prosecutor's Office (Doc. 12), Defendant New Madrid County (Doc. 14), and Defendant Trent Beeson (Doc. 25). The motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition.
Taken as true for purposes of the pending motions, the facts alleged in the Complaint are as follows. On May 17, 2019, Plaintiff and an unnamed female passenger were driving on Interstate 55 in New Madrid, Missouri, when they were pulled over by Defendant Trent Beeson of the Missouri Highway Patrol. Plaintiff has attached the Probable Cause Statement of Beeson to his Complaint. (Doc. 1-5.) In his Probable Cause Statement, Beeson states that he pulled Plaintiff over because he observed him “cross the white fog line on the right side of the roadway, without signaling a lane change.” Id. at 1. After approaching Plaintiff's vehicle, Beeson stated that he detected an odor of marijuana. Beeson searched the vehicle. During the search, Beeson asked Price's passenger about the marijuana. The passenger told Beeson the marijuana was in her bag. Beeson found marijuana in the passenger's bag, and issued a citation to Plaintiff. Beeson did not issue a citation to the passenger, nor did he mention the passenger's presence in his Probable Cause Statement. Plaintiff had to make trips from his residence in Atlanta, Georgia, to New Madrid County multiple times for hearings, until the case was ultimately dismissed.
In his single-count Complaint, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Andrew Lawson and the New Madrid County Prosecutor's Office maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff, as Missouri case law states that fog line violations are not reasons to initiate traffic stops. He claims that Lawson and the New Madrid County Prosecutor's Office disregarded the inconsistencies between the dash camera-which showed the passenger taking the marijuana out of her bag-and the Probable Cause Statement. Plaintiff contends that Defendants knew that most people traveling on Interstate 55 are not local residents and will therefore pay fines and plead guilty instead of making inconvenient trips back to the courthouse to defend themselves. Plaintiff further argues that he was the victim of unnecessary harassment. As a result of these violations, Plaintiff contends that he suffered economic losses by taking time away from his business and traveling back and forth between Atlanta and New Madrid. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants.
On July 14, 2021, Defendants Andrew Lawson and New Madrid County Prosecutor's Office filed a Motion to Dismiss, in which they argue Lawson, as the prosecuting attorney, is absolutely immune from liability, and the New Madrid County Prosecutor's Office is not a legal entity capable of being sued. On the same date, Defendant New Madrid County filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On August 3, 2021, Defendant Trent Beeson filed a Motion to Dismiss, in which he argues the Eighth Circuit has not recognized a constitutional claim for malicious prosecution. In the alternative, he contends that Plaintiff's claim fails because Defendant Beeson had probable cause both to conduct a traffic stop and to cite Plaintiff for marijuana possession.
“To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must show the plaintiff ‘is entitled to relief,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), by alleging ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts all factual allegations as true and construes all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Usenko v. MEMC LLC, 926 F.3d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 2019). The Court need not accept as true a plaintiff's conclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 734 (8th Cir. 2019). The complaint “must allege more than ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements'” and instead must “allege sufficient facts that, taken as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 544, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A facially plausible claim is one “that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Wilson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). This “standard asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully, or more than a mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.
“Though matters outside the pleading may not be considered in deciding a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, documents necessarily embraced by the complaint are not matters outside the pleading.” Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). The Court will treat the Probable Cause Statement attached to the Complaint as part of the pleadings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (); Pratt v. Corrections Corp. of America, 124 Fed.Appx. 465, 466 (8th Cir. 2005) ( that “the district court was required to consider the allegations not only in [plaintiff's] pro se complaint, but also in his motion to amend, his response to defendants' motion to dismiss, and the attachments to those pleadings”).
Although pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, “they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). “[P]ro se litigants must set [a claim] forth in a manner which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Lawson is entitled to absolute immunity and the New Madrid County Prosecuting Attorney's Office is not an entity capable of being sued.
Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity in their review of and decisions to charge a violation of the law. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-27, 431 (1976). Absolute immunity protects prosecutors against claims arising from their initiation of a prosecution and presenting a criminal case “insofar as that conduct is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). Because the immunity depends upon the functional nature of the prosecutor's activities, allegations of improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial functions will not defeat its protection. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds, Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); see Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., 447 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir. 2006); Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff argues that absolute immunity does not apply here because Lawson “ignored Missouri State Law during the investigatory part of this matter to initiate a false prosecution.” (Doc. 21 at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Missouri law is clear that fog line violations do not create probable cause for traffic stops.
Plaintiff misapprehends the nature of absolute immunity. Plaintiff's only claim against Lawson relates to Lawson's decision to pursue criminal charges against Plaintiff. Even if every allegation from the Complaint about the impropriety of the traffic stop and citation were true, there are no allegations that would overcome Lawson's immunity from suit for claims arising from the pursuit of criminal charges. See Sample, 836 F.3d at 916 (prosecutorial immunity “applies even if the prosecutor's steps to initiate a prosecution are patently improper” or in the face of “[allegations of unethical conduct and improper motives in the performance of prosecutorial functions[.]”); Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 580 ()
Further, Plaintiff's statement that crossing a fog line does not create probable cause for a stop is a misstatement of Missouri law. See State v. Smith, 595 S.W.3d 143, 146 (Mo. 2020), reh'g denied (Mar. 17, 2020) (“Crossing the fog line and driving on the shoulder, therefore, is a traffic violation and creates a lawful justification for a traffic stop”).
Thus, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted as to Defendant Andrew Lawson.
Defendants argue that the New Madrid...
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