Price v. Confair
| Decision Date | 19 March 1951 |
| Citation | 366 Pa. 538,79 A.2d 224 |
| Parties | PRICE v. CONFAIR et al. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Action by C. I. Price against Zehnder H. Confair and Arlyene S Confair and Zehnder H. Confair, trading as Confair Bottling Company, for breach of a written contract by which defendants agreed to furnish plaintiff al his requirements of a bottled soft drink. From a final decision, order and judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, No 390, December Term, 1946, the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, No. 34, January Term 1951, Bell, J., held that where the contract was silent as to its duration, it did not require the defendants to supply the plaintiff with all his requirements of the bottled soft drink for the balance of his life.
Judgment affirmed.
John C. Youngman and Candor, Youngman & Gibson, Williamsport, for appellant.
W. Dorland Rouse, Williamsport, for appellees.
Before DREW, C. J., and STERN, STEARNE, JONES, BELL, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.
Defendants made a written contract with Cloverdale Spring Co. on January 17, 1941, in which defendants agreed, inter alia, to furnish to seven named distributors, one of whom was the plaintiff, ‘ all of their requirements of bottled Pepsi-Cola’ . The contract was silent as to its duration and the sole question involved in the case is as to the period of the contract.
For many years prior to 1941 Cloverdale Spring Co. had granted the defendant bottling rights on a royalty basis, retaining however, the right to sell Pepsi-Cola to wholesalers and distributors in a certain area. On January 17, 1941, Cloverdale and Confair entered into a written agreement by the terms of which Confair paid Cloverdale $22,500 in lieu of all royalty payments previously contracted for and Cloverdale gave up its distribution rights in Confair's territory, thereby making Confair the exclusive bottler and distributor of Pepsi-Cola in the Williamsport area.
In order to protect Cloverdale's old customers, the contract provided:
The contract contained no provision as to the period of time defendants would provide plaintiff and other distributors ‘ all of their requirements of bottled Pepsi-Cola’ ; and the contract did not require plaintiff to purchase any specific number of cases or bottles of Pepsi-Cola annually or to continue their purchases from the defendants for any period of time whatsoever. Furthermore, the plaintiff paid nothing and gave no consideration for this contract.
Defendants furnished all of plaintiff's requirements during 1941. Plaintiff claimed that by January 1, 1942 and ever since he had built up his requirements to 100 cases of Pepsi-Cola per week. The retail selling price was fixed by defendants at 80¢ a case, which plaintiff claimed gave him a clear profit of 20¢ per case, alleging that his overhead was in no way increased by handling Pepsi-Cola and that he had no expenses in connection therewith. In 1942 defendants began reducing deliveries to the plaintiff and assuming plaintiff's requirements were 100 cases a week, plaintiff would have been entitled to 2540 additional cases up to July 13, 1945.
On July 13, 1945, defendants notified plaintiff they would not furnish him any bottled Pepsi-Cola thereafter. On November 13, 1946, the defendants increased the retail price of Pepsi-Cola from 80¢ to 96¢ per case. This was necessitated by the war and rationing and the scarcity of materials and labor and the increased cost of materials and labor facts which were not only well known to every one, but were proved in this case. The lower court found that the contract was not terminable at will, but remained in full force and effect so long as defendants ‘ were situated as they then were, viz: on January 17, 1941’ . The court thereupon awarded plaintiff damages at 20¢ a case for all the cases defendants had failed to deliver to plaintiff, based on plaintiff's requirements of 100 cases a week from January 1, 1942 to November 13, 1946, or $3,848.50, with interest and costs.
The lower court concluded that the situation of the defendants had changed on November 13, 1946, at which time they raised the retail selling price from 80¢ a case to 96¢ a case. Plaintiff thereupon took an appeal, contending that the contract which is silent as to its duration, is a contract for his life; that he is 69 years of age, with an expectancy of 12.11 years, so that until he is 80 years of age he is entitled to recover additional damages of 20¢ a case (with no deduction for overhead or expenses) for 100 cases a week for an...
To continue reading
Request your trial