Price v. Delaware Dept. of Correction

Citation40 F.Supp.2d 544
Decision Date09 March 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 95-297-LON.,Civ.A. 95-297-LON.
PartiesCalvin M. PRICE, Plaintiff, v. DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; Catherine Taylor; and George Hawthorne, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware

Laurence V. Cronin, Smith, Katzenstein & Furlow, Wilmington, DE, for plaintiff.

Michael F. Foster, State of Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for defendants.

OPINION

LONGOBARDI, Senior District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Calvin M. Price was employed by the Delaware Department of Correction ("Department") as a probation officer assigned to the Work Programs Unit from November 1986 until July 1992. Plaintiff filed his complaint against the Department and two of his former supervisors, George Hawthorne and Catherine Taylor, on March 12, 1995. (Docket Item "D.I." 1). After the Court's Summary Judgment Order, (D.I.73-74), and an Order dismissing several counts of the complaint, (D.I. 112, amended D.I. 124), two claims remained: a Title VII1 retaliation claim against the Department, and a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants.2

The jury made the following findings of fact in its verdict: (1) the Department took some adverse employment action against Plaintiff after he made a complaint of discrimination; (2) Plaintiff's complaint of discrimination was a determinative factor for the Department's adverse action against Plaintiff; (3) Plaintiff sustained injury, damage, loss or harm as a result of the Department's retaliation against him; (4) the changed conditions under which Plaintiff was required to work after making a complaint of discrimination were so intolerable that a reasonable person under all the circumstances would have been forced to resign; (5) George Hawthorne intentionally retaliated against Plaintiff for complaints of discrimination; (6) Catherine Taylor intentionally retaliated against Plaintiff for complaints of discrimination; (7) George Hawthorne and Catherine Taylor intentionally engaged in retaliatory or other wrongful practice with malice or reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff; and (8) Plaintiff would have been able to continue working for four years after his constructive discharge, in spite of his health problems. The jury then awarded Plaintiff $200,000 against the Department on the Title VII claim, and $100,000 in back pay against all Defendants jointly. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Amendment of the Jury Award.

II. Facts

Briefly summarized, the relevant facts, in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,3 are as follows: From November, 1986 through July, 1992, Calvin Price worked as a probation officer in the Work Programs Unit for the Delaware Department of Correction. In August, 1991, he and eleven other African-American employees who worked for the Division of Community Services, a division within the Department, filed a complaint of racial discrimination with Gregory Chambers, Delaware's Affirmative Action / Equal Employment Coordinator. Ms. Taylor and Mr. Hawthorne both knew that Plaintiff was one of the twelve employees who filed the complaint. This complaint resulted in a lengthy investigation, culminating in the conclusion that historical discrimination existed within the Department. Mr. Chambers communicated this to Mr. Hawthorne on December 18, 1991. The findings caused disruption within the Department, culminating with Senate Hearings in October, 1992. In the interim, little was accomplished to remedy the situation due to the Department's disagreement with Mr. Chamber's conclusions.

Ms. Taylor began supervising Plaintiff in May, 1991. Mr. Hawthorne was her supervisor. At the end of 1991, Ms. Taylor gave Plaintiff an exemplary performance review, his second consecutive glowing review. On February 6, 1992, Mr. Hawthorne submitted a written response to Mr. Chambers, disputing the findings of his investigation. On that same day, Ms. Taylor began to keep a log of her contacts with Plaintiff, and requested a monthly statistical report, which Plaintiff had been sending to the Wilmington office. While there were other sources from where Ms. Taylor could obtain this report, Plaintiff does not dispute that she was entitled to the report from Plaintiff. This, however, was the first time she requested this report in her seven months as Plaintiff's supervisor.

Additionally, in April, 1992, Ms. Taylor made several unauthorized requests for Plaintiff's medical report from his cardiologist. Plaintiff had suffered two heart attacks in 1990, and a note in his file from the doctor stated that he could only work four-hour days. Plaintiff thought he could increase his work load as he felt better, and began to work full days. In 1991, Ms. Taylor asked Plaintiff on several occasions for a "how goes it" report from his doctor regarding his permitted workload, but Plaintiff never followed up on these requests. Five months passed from Ms. Taylor's last casual request to her unauthorized phone calls to the doctor. After being denied the information, Ms. Taylor and Mr. Hawthorne demanded Plaintiff submit a return to work form to update the note in the file, at which point, Plaintiff demanded to know the authority for the request before he would comply.

Throughout 1992, Ms. Taylor heavily criticized Plaintiff's work, criticism that a co-employee, Barbara Fisher, found to be factually inaccurate. Furthermore, Ms. Fisher testified that Ms. Taylor asked her to convince Plaintiff to retire on State disability pension. Additionally, Ms. Taylor diverted all of Plaintiff's calls to other people in the office, and barred him from discussing cases with his co-workers. These discussions with clients were a major part of his job, as he was primarily responsible for finding new work sites to provide positions for probationers. In June, 1992, while Plaintiff was out sick for a day, Ms. Taylor conducted an unannounced audit of Plaintiff's office. Subsequently, on June 22, 1992, Plaintiff took an extended sick-leave. On June 25, 1992, Ms. Taylor had two other officers deliver to Plaintiff's home a copy of a merit rule dealing with requests for sick leave over five days. After this, Plaintiff applied for a State disability pension, ending his employment with the Department.

III. Relevant Standards
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Defendants first move for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 To succeed, Defendants must meet a high burden:

A post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) should be granted only where there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to have found for the nonmoving party. In considering a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), a reviewing court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Keith v. Truck Stops Corp. of America, 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Kelly v. Matlack, Inc., 903 F.2d 978, 981 (3d Cir.1990) (same). The reviewing court must give the nonmoving party, "as [the] verdict winner, the benefit of all logical inferences that could be drawn from the evidence presented, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in his favor, and in general, view the record in the light most favorable to him." Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348 (3d Cir.1991), reh'g, en banc, denied, 1991 WL 228122, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS 16758 (3d Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed w.o. opinion, 947 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.1991). If "`the record contains the minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief,'" Keith, 909 F.2d at 745 (quoting Smollett v. Skayting Dev. Corp., 793 F.2d 547, 548 (3d Cir.1986)), then the reviewing court must deny the motion. Thus, "[w]here there is sufficient conflicting evidence, or insufficient evidence to conclusively establish the movant's case, judgment as a matter of law after the verdict should not be awarded." 5A James Wm Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 50.07[2] at p. 50-78 (1993). The reviewing court should not grant judgment as a matter of law merely because its view of the evidence differs with that manifest in the jury's verdict. Such action on the part of the reviewing court would constitute a usurpation of the jury's province as factfinder. Newman v. Exxon Corp., 722 F.Supp. 1146, 1147 (D.Del.1989), affirmed w.o. opinion, 904 F.2d 695 (3d Cir.1990) ("Although a court in viewing the evidence of record may have reached a different conclusion from that reached by the jury, that alone is not reason to enter judgment [as a matter of law].").

Garrison v. Mollers North America, Inc., 820 F.Supp. 814, 818-19 (D.Del.1993). See also Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir.1993); Gonzalez v. Avon Products, Inc., 648 F.Supp. 1404, 1407 (D.Del.1986); Tyler v. Board of Educ. of New Castle County, 519 F.Supp. 834 (D.Del.1981).

B. New Trial

Defendants alternatively ask the Court to order a new trial, alleging that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Defendants also must meet a high standard for this motion.

Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supplies that standard. Rule 59(a) states that, "A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues ... in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted at law in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). Among the firmly established grounds for granting a new trial at common law are that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence and that the jury's damages award is excessive. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940); see also Schreffler v. Board...

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