Price v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 21 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:94-CT-764-BR.,5:94-CT-764-BR. |
| Citation | 961 F.Supp. 894 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Joe L. PRICE, Plaintiff, v. Gary DIXON, R.E. Signal, C. Hinnant, E. Thomas, G. Theissen, E. Tant, S. Brown, and J. Daughtry, Defendants. |
J. Phillip Griffin, Jr., Raleigh, NC, for plaintiff.
Jane R. Garvey, N.C. Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for defendants.
This matter comes before the court on objections by both parties to the Memorandum and Recommendation ("M & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Alexander B. Denson.
Plaintiff Joe L. Price was, and to the best of the court's knowledge remains, an inmate at Central Prison, a maximum custody facility located in Raleigh, North Carolina. The following facts are undisputed.
In January 1994, because of a pattern of misbehavior, Price was detained in singlecell segregation. Despite being confined in segregation, Price continued to act in an aggressive and disruptive fashion. By his own admissions, he threw urine on correctional officers and engaged in other disorderly conduct. After warning Price that he would be restrained if his aggressive behavior did not subside, on 12 January 1994, correctional officers sprayed him with mace and placed him in four-point metal restraints when he again threw urine on the officers. Price was restrained in this position, in which his hands and feet were handcuffed to his bunk, for a period of twenty-eight hours. During this confinement, correctional officials checked his condition every fifteen minutes and released him regularly for bathroom and meal breaks.
In his complaint, Price maintains that the course of action pursued by the correctional officers violated his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Moreover, Price alleges claims under North Carolina state law and the provisions of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.
On 5 August 1996, Magistrate Judge Denson issued an M & R recommending the following:
1) The allegations should be construed as excessive force claims rather than claims for inadequate medical care.
2) Qualified immunity is not appropriate because Price has alleged a violation of a clearly established right.
3) Defendants' summary judgment motion as to the excessive force claims should be denied because genuine issues of material fact exist.
4) Defendants' summary judgment motion as to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment claim and the state law claims should be granted.
Both parties have objected to the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. First, defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge erred in his findings regarding the qualified immunity issue and the denial of summary judgment on the excessive force claims. Price objects to the portions of the M & R characterizing the complaint as exclusively an excessive force claim, dismissing the state law claims, and neglecting to discuss the due process claims.
The court will address each objection in turn.
When reviewing a magistrate judge's M & R in these circumstances, the court is obligated to undertake a de novo review of any portion of the M & R to which an objection has been properly lodged. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Therefore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c). The Fourth Circuit has articulated the summary judgment standard as follows:
A genuine issue exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. The plaintiff is entitled to have the credibility of all his evidence presumed. Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S.Ct. 1018, 112 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1991). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party must demonstrate that a triable issue of fact exists; he may not rest on mere allegations or denials. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the case is insufficient. Id.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 39 F.3d 515, 518 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24, 513 U.S. 814, 115 S.Ct. 68, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994)).
The court's initial inquiry must focus on whether defendants are protected under the qualified immunity doctrine. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 794-95 (4th Cir. 1995). Qualified immunity operates to release government officials from suit if it cannot be shown that their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person in their position would have known. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir.1992) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). The legal reasonableness of a defendant's actions is to be construed in light of the clearly established law at the time of the alleged violation. DiMeglio 45 F.3d at 799.
When examining whether the alleged violation infringed a clearly established right, "the proper focus is not upon the right at its most general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged." Id. at 803 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court advised that
if the test of "clearly established law" were to be applied at [a] level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness" that is the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.... The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
Operating within the above framework, the court will now look at each specific claim. After evaluating the claims with respect to the qualified immunity defense, the court will address any remaining issues.
Price makes several claims arising under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment offers protections from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has instructed that "in order to establish the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must prove two elements — that the deprivation of [a] basic human need was objectively sufficiently serious and that subjectively the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir.1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Notably, the subjective culpability varies depending on whether the alleged violation arises from the use of excessive force or deprivation of adequate medical care.
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation under the inadequate medical care prong, Price must demonstrate a deliberate indifference on the part of defendants. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). A higher standard is imposed to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment's excessive force prohibition. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir.1996). When employed to quell a prison disturbance, the exertion of force by a correctional officer only rises to the level of a constitutional violation when it is imposed "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). When making this determination, factors to be considered include the need for application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force exerted, and the extent of the resulting injury. Id. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085.
Initially, defendants argue that this case is about excessive force and the use of mace and a four-point restraint. Therefore, defendants insist, and the Magistrate Judge agreed, that claims about inadequate medical care are not properly at issue. However, the complaint cannot be so narrowly confined. In the following portions of the complaint, Price indicates his contention that he was deprived sufficient mental health care:
5. Plaintiff suffers from mental illness and his actions are sometimes bizarre, destructive, self-injurious, and violent. He has been treated repeatedly at the Mental Health Unit of Central Prison for this illness but in January 1994, he was housed in a maximum security area instead. Beginning around January 6, 1994, Plaintiff began a course of bizarre behavior which should have notified Defendants that he required mental health treatment and intervention.
6. Instead of providing mental health intervention and treatment of plaintiff, Defendants responded with mace...
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