Price v. Georgia
Decision Date | 15 June 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 269,269 |
Citation | 398 U.S. 323,90 S.Ct. 1757,26 L.Ed.2d 300 |
Parties | Earl PRICE, Petitioner, v. State of GEORGIA |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Allyn M. Wallace, Savannah, Ga., for petitioner.
Mathew Robins, Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
We granted the writ to consider the power of a State to retry an accused for murder after an earlier guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter had been set aside because of a trial error.
Petitioner was charged with the killing of Johnnie Mae Dupree in an indictment for the offense of murder filed in the Superior Court of Effingham County, Georgia. He entered a plea of not guilty and was tried on October 17, 1962. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser included crime of voluntary manslaughter and fixed the sentence at 10 to 15 years in the state penitentiary. The jury's verdict made no reference to the charge of murder.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the conviction because of an erroneous jury instruction and ordered a new trial. Price v. State, 108 Ga.App. 581, 133 S.E.2d 916 (1963).
On October 20, 1967, petitioner was again placed on trial for murder under the original indictment. Before the commencement of the second trial petitioner entered a plea of autrefois acquit, claiming that to place him again on trial for the offense of murder would expose him to double jeopardy in view of the verdict of voluntary manslaughter at the initial trial. The trial judge rejected the plea and, at the close of the trial, included instructions on the offense of murder in his charge to the jury so that the jury could have rendered a verdict of guilty on that offense. That jury, like the first, found petitioner guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and then fixed the penalty at 10 years' imprisonment.
Petitioner sought direct review of his second conviction in the Supreme Court of Georgia,1 but that court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, declaring that '(o)nly questions as to the application of plain and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution of the United States being involved, * * * the case is one for the consideration of the Court of Appeals * * *.' Price v. State, 224 Ga. 306, 307, 161 S.E.2d 825, 826 (1968).
The Georgia Court of Appeals then heard the appeal and affirmed the second conviction, rejecting petitioner's argument, among others, that his retrial for murder constituted double jeopardy. Price v. State, 118 Ga.App. 207, 163 S.E.2d 243 (1968). The Court of Appeals held that in Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573, 64 S.E. 676 (1909), aff'd, 217 U.S. 284, 30 S.Ct. 514, 54 L.Ed. 768 (1910), the Georgia Supreme Court had decided this question adversely to petitioner. The Court of Appeals then quoted from the Brantley case's syllabus:
'When a person has been indicted for murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter, if he voluntarily seeks and obtains a new trial, he is subject to another trial generally for the offense charged in the indictment, and upon such trial he cannot successfully interpose a plea of former acquittal of the crime of murder or former jeopardy in regard thereto.' 118 Ga.App., at 208, 163 S.E.2d, at 244.
Petitioner sought a rehearing, contending, as he contends here, that Brantley was no longer controlling. He relied on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), and United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (C.A.2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, Mancusi v. Hetenyi, 383 U.S. 913, 86 S.Ct. 896, 15 L.Ed.2d 667 (1966). His contention was rejected. In deciding that Brantley was still a binding precedent as to it, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that the Georgia Supreme Court had transferred the case to it as involving the application of only 'plain and unambiguous' constitutional provisions. The petitioner's motion was then denied. Thereafter the Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari, and petitioner sought review in this Court. We granted the writ, 395 U.S. 975, 89 S.Ct. 2138, 23 L.Ed.2d 764 (1969), and now reverse.
(1)
In United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1194, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896), this Court observed: (Emphasis added.) The 'twice put in jeopardy' language of the Constitution thus relates to a potential, i.e., the risk that an accused for a second time will be convicted of the 'same offense' for which he was initially tried.
The circumstances that give rise to such a forbidden potential have been the subject of much discussion in this Court. In the Ball case, for example, the Court expressly rejected the view that the double jeopardy provision prevented a second trial when a conviction had been set aside. In so doing, it effectively formulated a concept of continuing jeopardy that has application where criminal proceedings against an accused have not run their full course. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189, 78 S.Ct. 221, 224, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).
The continuing jeopardy principle necessarily is applicable to this case. Petitioner sought and obtained the reversal of his initial conviction for voluntary manslaughter by taking an appeal. Accordingly, no aspect of the bar on double jeopardy prevented his retrial for that crime. However, the first verdict, limited as it was to the lesser included offense, required that the retrial be limited to that lesser offense. Such a result flows inescapably from the Constitution's emphasis on a risk of conviction and the Constitution's explication in prior decisions of this Court.
An early case to deal with restrictions on retrials was Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904), where the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy prohibition barred the Government from appealing an acquittal in a criminal prosecution,2 over a dissent by Mr. Justice Holmes that argued that there was only one continuing jeopardy until the proceedings against the accused had been finally resolved. He held to the view that even if an accused was retried after the Government had obtained reversal of an acquittal, the second trial was part of the original proceeding.
Similar double jeopardy issues did not fully claim the Court's attention until the Court heard argument in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).3 There the petitioner had been tried and convicted of first-degree murder after an earlier guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder had been set aside on appeal. A majority of the Court rejected the argument that by appealing the conviction of second-degree murder the petitioner had 'waived' his plea of former jeopardy with regard to the charge of first-degree murder.
The Court in the Green case reversed the first-degree murder conviction obtained at the retrial, holding that the petitioner's jeopardy for first-degree murder came to an end when the jury was discharged at the end of his first trial. This conclusion rested on two premises. First, the Court considered the first jury's verdict of guilty on the second-degree murder charge to be an 'implicit acquittal' on the charge of first-degree murder. Second, and more broadly, the Court reasoned that petitioner's jeopardy on the greater charge had ended when the first jury 'was given a full opportunity to return a verdict' on that charge and instead reached a verdict on the lesser charge. 355 U.S., at 191, 78 S.Ct., at 225. Under either of these premises, the holding in the Kepner case—that there could be no appeal from an acquittal because such a verdict ended an accused's jeopardy—was applicable.
The rationale of the Green holding applies here. The concept of continuing jeopardy implicit in the Ball case4 would allow petitioner's retrial for voluntary manslaughter after his first conviction for that offense had been reversed. But, as the Kepner and Green cases illustrate, this Court has consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an offense continues after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is express or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense when the jury was given a full opportunity5 to return a verdict on the greater charge. There is no relevant factual distinction between this case and Green v. United States. Although the petitioner was not convicted of the greater charge on retrial whereas Green was, the risk of conviction on the greater charge was the same in both cases, and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not punishment.
The Georgia courts nonetheless rejected Green as a persuasive authority in favor of reliance on Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573, 64 S.E. 676 (1909), aff'd, 217 U.S. 284, 30 S.Ct. 514, 54 L.Ed. 768 (1910). The Brantley case presented a situation where a defendant's appeal from a conviction for a lesser included offense ultimately led to retrial and conviction on the greater offense. After the second conviction had been affirmed on appeal, the defendant sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Georgia from this Court, contending 'that the exemption from second jeopardy is one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, which the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to abridge',6 that he had 'been tried and acquitted by a jury of his country of the crime of murder',7 and that '(h)e should never (sic) have been tried a second time only for the offense on which he obtained a new trial * * *.'8 This Court tersely rejected these contentions as:
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