Price v. Mercury Supply Co., Inc.

• Citation: 682 S.W.2d 924
• Decision Date: 30 August 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-39-III,83-39-III
• Parties: Richard P. PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERCURY SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., Leonard Weil, and Ruth Weil, Defendants- Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee

Page 924

682 S.W.2d 924

Richard P. PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERCURY SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., Leonard Weil, and Ruth Weil,

Defendants- Appellees.

No. 83-39-III

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Middle Section.

Aug. 30, 1984.

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme

Court Dec. 31, 1984.

Richard Manson, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellant.

William H. Lassiter, Jr., Nashville, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

KOCH, Judge.

Mr. Richard P. Price was discharged from his position as vice president in charge of sales for Mercury Supply Company, Inc. He filed this action against his former employers alleging breach of an oral employment contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and age discrimination. After a lengthy and at times acrimonious discovery process, the Chancery Court for Davidson County, Part III, granted the defendants' motion for a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and dismissed Mr. Price's amended complaint. This appeal follows. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the defendants were entitled to a summary judgment based upon the undisputed facts presented in this record.

Mr. Price commenced this action on August 10, 1981. Subsequently, on October 21, 1981, he filed an amended complaint setting out three causes of action. In substance, the complaint alleged that the defendants had breached an oral contract for lifetime employment by terminating Mr. Price without good cause. The complaint also alleged that by this termination, the defendants had discriminated against Mr. Price because of his age and were guilty of acts of fraud and misrepresentation.

The defendants filed an amended answer on May 14, 1982. Therein, they denied the material allegations in the amended complaint and raised the following three affirmative defenses: first, the alleged oral employment contract relied upon by Mr. Price was barred by the statute of frauds; second, that, in fact, no oral contract was ever made; and third, that the employment contract between the parties was terminable at the will of either party.

On July 20, 1982, the defendants filed an "Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and/or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss" relying upon the affidavits of the defendants and certain discovery depositions of the parties and other witnesses. In their brief accompanying this motion, the defendants stated that there was no dispute concerning the material facts and argued that no oral employment contract ever came into existence and that they could not be found to be guilty of age discrimination because Mr. Price was not in the class of persons protected by Federal and state age discrimination statutes. ¹

On August 23, 1982, Mr. Price responded to this motion by filing a pleading styled as a "Motion Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" ² stating that material factual disputes existed thereby rendering a summary judgment inappropriate. In the brief accompanying this pleading, Mr. Price stated that there are two disputed issues: first, the "issue of fraud" and second, "whether there is a contract." ³ Attached to this pleading was Mr. Price's affidavit dated August 23, 1982 and a copy of the written employment contract entered into by the parties on July 6, 1970. Later, on September 8, 1982, the affidavits of Mr. Price and his wife, signed on September 7, 1982, were filed in support of his opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The trial court heard the defendants' motion on October 9, 1982. On December 29, 1982, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion granting the defendants a summary judgment. An order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment was entered on January 7, 1983. Mr. Price tried unsuccessfully to appeal this decision thinking it was a final order.

On July 14, 1983, D. Price Supply Company, Inc. moved for a summary judgment challenging the defendants' third-party complaint. The trial court denied this motion on October 7, 1983. Subsequently, on October 11, 1983, pursuant to the defendants' motion in accordance with Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court dismissed the defendants' counterclaim and third-party claim. This order finally resolved all the issues between the parties. Mr. Price has now perfected this appeal on the basis that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should not have been granted because there are disputes of material facts between the parties. ⁴

This is an appeal from the trial court's decision to grant the defendants' motion for a summary judgment. Thus, our normal review pursuant to Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure does not apply. Instead, our role is to determine whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure were met. Hill v. City of Chattanooga, 533 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tenn.App.1975). In making this determination, this Court views the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and competent affidavits in a light most favorable to the opponent of the motion. Likewise, all legitimate conclusions from the record should be drawn in favor of the opponent of the motion. Jones v. Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 651 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tenn.1983) and Bennett v. Mid-South Terminals Corp., 660 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tenn.App.1983).

Our courts have repeatedly described the purpose of summary judgments and the circumstances when they are proper. These principles bear restating. A motion for summary judgment can provide a quick, less expensive means to conclude a case that can be disposed of on the legal issues alone because there are no disputed material facts. Brookins v. The Round Table, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547, 500 (Tenn.1981) and Ferguson v. Tomerlin, 656 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn.App.1983). However, such motions cannot be used as substitutes for a trial of disputed factual issues. Jones v. Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 651 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tenn.1983). Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that any dispute over material facts or even an uncertainty as to whether there are disputed material facts will render granting a summary judgment improper. Executone of Memphis, Inc. v. Garner, 650 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tenn.1983) and Evco Corp. v. Ross, 528 S.W.2d 20, 25 (Tenn.1975). Even if the basic facts are not in dispute, this Court has held that granting a summary judgment is not proper when the parties disagree about the inferences to be drawn from the facts. Prescott v. Adams, 627 S.W.2d 134, 138-39 (Tenn.App.1981).

The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure contain explicit directions for opponents to a motion for summary judgment to follow. In part, Tenn.R.Civ.P. 56.05 provides:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.

The term "genuine issue for trial" referred to in Tenn.R.Civ.P. 56.05 connotes genuine factual issues. It does not include issues involving legal conclusions to be drawn from the facts. Thus, our courts have held that opponents to a motion for summary judgment should not take their predicament lightly and will be required to come forward with some "specific factual information," other than mere pleadings, ⁵ in support of their position if they wish to avoid a quick, unfavorable decision. Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn.1978) and Ferguson v. Tomerlin, 656 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn.App.1983).

It follows, therefore, that if the opponent to a motion for summary judgment introduces no competent and material evidence demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court may grant the summary judgment by finding that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Brookins v. The Round Table, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tenn.1981) and Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, 658 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tenn.App.1983). A defendant is entitled to a summary judgment if the court determines that the complaint and undisputed facts in the record fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

We have reviewed the pleadings and evidence in this record in the manner required by Tenn.R.Civ.App. 56 and have determined, for reasons different than those relied upon by the trial court, that the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The Material Facts

As Tenn.R.Civ.P. 56 requires, we have examined the pleadings in this case to determine which facts are material and then have considered the competent proof to determine whether there exist any genuine and material factual disputes. While Mr. Price's testimony in his depositions and affidavits is at times vague and contradictory, we have viewed his testimony as a whole in a light most favorable to him. ⁶ Based upon this review, we find that the following facts are uncontradicted or undisputed.

For many years prior to 1970, Mr. Leonard Weil operated a business known as Mercury Supply Company. This business sold cleaning materials and janitorial supplies in the Nashville and Middle Tennessee area. Mr. Weil had complete charge of the business, although his wife was a nominal partner.

In July, 1970, Mr. Price applied for and obtained a job as a salesman with Mercury Supply Company. On July 6, 1970, Mr. Price and Mr. Weil signed a written employment contract of indefinite duration which could be cancelled by either party for any reason upon fifteen days notice. Under this contract, Mr. Price was employed as a salesman, and his compensation consisted of a straight weekly salary as well as a commission based on the sales he actually made. This contract specifically provided that Mr. Price's compensation could be altered from time to time without affecting the validity of the rest of the contract.

The company prospered...