Price v. People of State
| Decision Date | 23 January 1884 |
| Citation | 109 Ill. 109,1884 WL 9778 |
| Parties | FREEMAN PRICEv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. JOHN J. GLENN, Judge, presiding.
Mr. C. C. WILSON, for the plaintiff in error:
An officer indicted as an accessory to a burglary may, for the purpose of explaining his frequent intercourse with those indicted as principals, give in evidence the conversation between himself and another officer in relation to the best means of bringing them to justice. 1 Wharton on Crim. Law, (5th ed.) sec. 700; Commonwealth v. Robinson et al. 1 Gray, 555.
The whole evidence considered, it is evident that Price acted with the other parties as a detective, for the purpose of bringing them to justice, and a new trial should have been granted to him.
Mr. JAMES MCCARTNEY, Attorney General, for the People:
There was no error in refusing to allow the plaintiff in error to testify as to his conversations with others. The court allowed those other persons to testify as to the conversations.
The jury were the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be attached to the testimony of each. Valandschoot v. Adams, 61 Ill. 368; Peeples v. McKee, 92 Id. 397; Rogers v. People, 98 Id. 581.
Mr. T. E. MILCHRIST, State's Attorney, also for the People:
The verdict of the jury will not be disturbed because of the insufficiency of the evidence, unless there is a clear and well founded doubt of the guilt of the accused. Gainey et al. v. People, 97 Ill. 270; Needham v. People, 98 Id. 275.
On the 28th of June, 1883, Freeman Price, impleaded with James Moran and Abel Lindohl, was tried and convicted in the Henry county circuit court for the crime of burglary, the jury fixing the term of his confinement in the penitentiary at three years. A motion for a new trial having been made and overruled, the defendant was sentenced by the court to the penitentiary for the period fixed by the verdict. The accused having brought the case here for review, asks a reversal of the conviction, mainly on the ground it is not supported by the evidence.
The transaction upon which the indictment is based occurred about half-past six o'clock in the evening of the 9th of March, 1883, at the dwelling house of John Milroy, on his farm near the county line between Knox and Henry counties. Milroy testifies that at about the time indicated some one rapped at his door and inquired the road to Woodhull, a village some two or three miles distant; that about half an hour afterwards there was another rap at the door, and his wife, Mrs. Milroy, asked who was there, to which the party rapping replied, “It is me;” that she then inquired if it was Pete, meaning one of the neighbors, and receiving an affirmative answer, she thereupon opened the door, when three men, with cloths tied over the lower part of their faces, walked in, and one or all of them presented pistols, and said, “Your money or your life;” that witness stepped into the kitchen to get a spade to defend himself with, where he was followed by the largest one, who subsequently proved to be Moran; that upon witness drawing a spade on Moran, the latter presented a pistol, but did not shoot, nor did witness strike with the spade; that Mrs. Milroy remained in the first room with the other two; that upon their ordering her to get a light she did so, and handed it to one of them, and then passed through the pantry down into the cellar, and from thence out of doors, when she screamed for help; that the parties thereupon left, without having got any money or other valuables. The three persons who thus entered the house were the accused and his co-defendants, and it is conceded that the latter entered the house of Milroy, as stated, for the purpose of robbing him; but the plaintiff in error insists, and we think the evidence tends strongly to show the fact, that his object in accompanying them was to expose the contemplated crime, and bring the real perpetrators of it to justice, and whether this is so or not is really the only question in the case.
The gist of the offence charged is the intent with which the plaintiff in error entered Milroy's house. The indictment charges it was with the intent to steal, and it is conceded the facts, as testified to by Milroy and his wife, are amply sufficient to make out a case against the accused, if there was no evidence explanatory of the criminating facts occurring at the house, and testified to by them, and it is therefore unnecessary to detail more particularly what transpired there. Judging the case by what occurred at Milroy's house alone, the plaintiff in error does not stand in any better position than his co-defendants, who are confessedly guilty, and have not therefore joined in the writ of error. The defence set up by the former is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. If he was really, as he claims, acting the part of a mere detective in accompanying the other two on their criminal mission, it is a matter of no significance that no difference could be seen in his conduct and the other two at Milroy's house, for to have acted his part well that would reasonably be expected. To have merely stood by as though he were a silent spectator, would doubtless have excited the suspicions of his comrades, imperiled his own safety, and possibly have defeated the very object he claims to have had in becoming one of the party. The turning point in the case then is, is the evidence tending to show plaintiff in error was acting in the affair merely as a detective, sufficiently strong to raise a clearly well founded doubt of his guilt? If so, he ought not to be convicted.
The accused testifies the first intimation he had of an intention to rob Milroy he obtained from Moran, who came to him and asked him to help rob an old man near Woodhull; that witness said to him first, “that is not my business,” but afterwards said, “I will see about it;” that Moran came to him again, about four months ago, and asked him to go, when he said, as before, “I will see about it.” The witness was then asked whether or not he advised with Mr. Byers in reference to going with Moran. This and other questions of similar import were propounded to the witness, all of which, on objection by the People, were held improper, and the witness was not permitted to answer them. The evidence shows that Byers, the individual referred to, was an attorney, and also a justice of the peace, and it was clearly erroneous to not permit the witness to answer the questions. It is clear enough the object of the inquiry was to show that he gave notice to an officer of the law of the intended breach of the Criminal Code, which would have strongly negatived any criminal intent on his part in going. It is also well settled one may prove his own declarations, when made just before or at the time of starting to a particular place, for the purpose of showing his motives or object in going.
But the error in excluding this evidence was, perhaps, cured by the subsequent testimony of the witness. Further on in his testimony, in answer to the question, “Did you take any steps, after you were informed of the intended robbery, to prevent it?” the witness states that he did, by informing VanRiper, the constable, and Mr. Byers; that on the day of the robbery he called VanRiper out of Frederick's store, into the back room, and told him two young men were going to rob an old man, and also told him what Byers had said. The witness then proceeds in these words: In answer to the further question, “Did you call on any one else that day, and inform them of the intended robbery?” the witness replied,
While Byers denies that Price told him of the intended robbery before it occurred, yet he admits he called at his office next morning and told him all about what had happened, and through the information thus given the parties were arrested that day....
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