Price v. Price

• Decision Date: 08 October 1894
• Citation: 91 Iowa 693,60 N.W. 202
• Parties: PRICE v. PRICE ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

91 Iowa 693

60 N.W. 202

PRICE

v.PRICE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 8, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Polk county; W. F. Conrad, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages alleged to have been caused by the wrongful acts of defendants, in injuring the reputation and good name of plaintiff, and in depriving her of her husband and of a home, in causing her husband to ill use her, and for the loss of social position, and for mental and physical suffering. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $4,000. A motion for a new trial was overruled on condition that one-half the amount should be remitted. That was done, and from the judgment rendered against them for the remainder the defendants appeal. Affirmed.C. C. & C. L. Nourse, for appellants.

Bishop & Wilcoxen and Hume & Dawson, for appellee.

ROBINSON, J.

On the 14th day of April, 1888, the plaintiff married George L. Price, who is a son of the defendants. She alleges that soon after the marriage the defendants, by means of conversations and letters, communicated to her husband false, defamatory, and slanderous matter concerning her character and reputation, and made threats and promises to him for the express purpose and with the malicious intent to destroy the affection existing between them, and to excite ill-will and hatred on his part for her, for the purpose of causing him to abandon her; that the defendants offered him valuable property and large sums of money if he would abandon her, and threatened to disinherit him if he did not do so; that in consequence of the course pursued by the defendants her husband became angry with and jealous of her, and cursed, choked, wounded, and otherwise illtreated her, and abandoned her, in destitute circumstances, when alone among strangers and without help, and deprived her of her home, of the social intercourse and confidence of her friends and of her husband, and his care, love, confidence, protection, help, and support, and caused her mental and physical pain and suffering.

1. The judgment in this case was rendered in June, 1891, and the appeal was taken in the next September. At the October term, 1892, of this court, the appellee filed a motion to affirm the judgment of the district court on the ground that the appeal had been abandoned. That motion was supported and resisted by affidavits and a partial transcript of the record, and was submitted with the cause for our determination. It is claimed that when the motion was filed the appellants had neither filed nor served any abstract or argument; but, to excuse their failure to comply with the rules in that respect, they show that negotiations for a settlement had been pending for some time, and that a stipulation of settlement had been signed by the parties to the action. A complete abstract has since been filed, with an argument for each party, and the cause is now ready for determination on the merits. The stipulation of settlement was not signed by all the parties interested in the judgment, and never became effectual to end the case. There is now no reason for disposing of it otherwise than on the merits, and the motion to affirm is overruled.

2. The court charged the jury, in effect, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover “for the loss, if any, she has sustained, of the love, affection, companionship, support, and society of her husband,” wrongfully caused by the defendants. The appellants insist that no action for such loss can be maintained under the laws of this state, that no right of action on such grounds existed at common law, and that none is given by the statutes of this state. The authorities are not in accord in regard to the rights of the wife at common law. It was said in Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N. W. 522, that the common law gave to the wife no cause or right of action for the loss of the society and support of her husband in a case of this kind. That conclusion was based largely upon the fact that under the common law the title to the personal property of the wife was vested in the husband; that he was entitled to her labor, or the proceeds of it; and that an injury to her was, in contemplation of the law, an injury to him alone. In Doe v. Roe (Me.) 20 Atl. 83, the right of the wife to maintain an action for the alienation of her husband's affections, and for depriving her of his comfort, society, and support, was denied. But in Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, it was said that at common law the right of action for a wrong committed on a married woman belonged to her, and, although it was necessary for her husband to join in an action to recover damages caused by it, yet it was in effect her action. An elaborate discussion of authorities bearing on this question will be found in Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621. The tendency of legislation in this country is towards making husband and wife equal in law, giving to each the rights possessed by the other, and the legislation of this state is designed to accomplish that end, in most respects. Section 2211 of the Code provides that “a wife may receive the wages of her personal labor and maintain an action therefor in her own name, and hold the same in her own right, and she may prosecute and defend all actions at law or in equity for the preservation and protection of her rights and property as if unmarried.” Section 2562 is as follows: “A married woman may in all cases sue and be sued without joining her husband with her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried, and an attachment or judgment in such actions shall be enforced by or against her as if she were a single woman.” Other provisions of the statute give to a married woman the right to acquire and dispose of both real and personal property to the same extent and in the same manner that the husband can property held by him in his own right, and provide that either the husband or wife owning property in the possession or under the control of the other may maintain an action therefor in the same manner and to the same extent as though unmarried. The wife is liable for civil injuries which she commits, and her husband is not responsible therefor, except in cases where he would be jointly liable if the marriage relation did not exist. The property of each is exempt from the debts of the other, excepting in a few cases, and the wife may contract and incur liabilities which may be enforced by and against her as though she were unmarried. Code, §§ 2202, 2204, 2205, 2212, 2213. It is said in Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027, that from time immemorial the law has regarded the right of the husband “to the conjugal affection and society of his wife as a valuable property, and has compelled the man who has injured it to make compensation,” and that husband and wife have equal rights, in this: that each owes to the other the fullest possible measure of conjugal affection and society. In this state the husband is entitled to the earnings of the wife, when she is not engaged in business on her own account, and is required to provide for the wife a reasonable support, according to their rank and station in society. Thill v. Pohlman, 76 Iowa, 639, 41 N. W. 385; Van Doran v. Marden, 48 Iowa, 188. But the marriage state is not one entered into for the purpose of labor and support alone. Considerations of the highest character, as the comfort and happiness of the parties to the marriage contract, and the welfare of their children, give to each the right to the affection, companionship, and society of the other, and whoever wrongfully deprives either of that right may be held responsible. As it is a valuable property right when due to the husband, it must be so regarded when due to the wife. That being true, the recovery by her of damages caused by its loss, as...