Price v. Quill.

• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: HOOD, Associate Judge.
• Citation: Price v. Quill., 46 A.2d 311 (D.C. 1946)
• Decision Date: 20 March 1946
• Docket Number: No. 355.,355.
• Parties: PRICE v. QUILL.

46 A.2d 311

PRICE

v.QUILL.

No. 355.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

March 20, 1946.

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division, Small Claims and Conciliation Branch.

Action by Francis K. Price against Thomas A. Quill, brought in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Municipal Court, to recover for dental services rendered to the children of defendant. After obtaining judgment, plaintiff moved to orally examine defendant as to his financial ability to pay the judgment. From an order denying the motion, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Milton Dunn and A. M. Goldstein, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD, Associate Judge.

HOOD, Associate Judge.

Plaintiff brought an action in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the trial court to recover for dental services he had rendered the children of defendant. After obtaining a judgment plaintiff moved for leave to orally examine the defendant as to his financial status and ability to pay the judgment. The motion was denied, and we granted an appeal because of a reported diversity of opinion in the trial court on the question involved.

The motion was made under Rule 19 of the Small Claims Branch. That rule is taken verbatim from the Act of Congress ¹ creating that branch of the court and establishing its jurisdiction and procedure. ² The rule, entitled ‘Supplementary Proceedings in Wage Claims,’ reads as follows:

‘In all cases where the judgment is founded in whole or in part on a claim for wages or personal services the judge shall, upon written or oral motion of the party obtaining judgment, order the appearance of the party against whom such judgment has been entered, but not more often than once each 4 weeks, for oral examination under oath as to his financial status and his ability to pay such judgment, and the judge shall make such supplementary orders as may seem just and proper to effectuate the payment of the judgment upon reasonable terms.’

The trial court, in a written memorandum denying the motion, ruled that the expression ‘personal services,’ though generally quite comprehensive in meaning, should not as used in the Act be given a wider meaning than the word ‘wages' with which it is associated, and does not include professional services rendered by a dentist, a physician or an attorney-at-law.

We think the ruling of the trial court expressed the intention of Congress and was correct. The Act does not define the words ‘personal services.’ While upon casual examination their meaning would seem clear, the connotation to be given them is dependent upon the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. Few words are unchangeable in their meanings. Generally they differ according to the time and circumstances under which used. ‘They have a color and a content that may vary with the setting.’ First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Beach, 301 U.S. 435, 440, 441, 57 S.Ct. 801, 804, 81 L.Ed. 1206. In determining the meaning of the words of the statute, we are not confined to an examination of the words alone.

‘In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress. There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that intention. * * * When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination.” United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542, 543, 544, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L.Ed. 1345.

As originally introduced in the Senate, the bill included a provision for supplementary examination by all judgment creditors. ³ During the hearings before the Senate District Committee, however, objection was made to this provision on the grounds that it would harass the laborers in whose interests the passage of the Act was being sought and that the periodic examinations provided were too frequent. As a result of these contentions, a proponent of the bill suggested that it be amended to take care of the greater part of the objections, but stated: ‘When it comes to wage cases, however, you have a most difficult question, and the right of examination but once in 4 weeks would appear to be entirely reasonable and feasible.' ⁴ He therefore suggested the present wording of the section, which language was adopted by the Committee and subsequently became law.

It is apparent that the provision was looked upon in the House of Representatives as a feature to protect only the wage earner. The Committee report accompanying the legislation in its passage by that body stated that the bill provided ‘Supplementary examination of defendants in wage-claim cases.’ ⁵

We are therefore of the opinion that Congress intended supplementary proceedings to be made available for judgments arising from wage claims or claims based on personal services of a similar nature to those for which wages are...