Price v. SERVICE TECHNOLOGY CORP., CA 3-74-750-C.
| Citation | 461 F. Supp. 1184 |
| Decision Date | 15 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. CA 3-74-750-C.,CA 3-74-750-C. |
| Parties | Mae L. PRICE and Marva Shaw v. SERVICE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, LTV Aerospace, Inc., and Kentron of Hawaii, Ltd. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Linda N. Coffee, Palmer, Palmer & Coffee, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiffs.
William L. Neary, Dallas, Tex., for defendants.
Plaintiffs Mae L. Price and Marva Shaw were employed by Defendant Service Technology Corporation during the summer of 1968 and were laid off in May of 1972 due to a lack of work.
Subsequently, they filed this civil action alleging that they and a similarly situated class were discriminated against by Defendants because of their race, Black, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
Plaintiffs essentially abandoned their class action allegations in their Pre-Trial Memorandum brief filed September 19, 1977. They did so because they could not meet the numerosity requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. From the evidence presented this would appear to be so, and the Court so finds and concludes that a class could not be properly constituted.
Plaintiffs did file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging there the same acts of discrimination that they have alleged here. Both of these charges were filed before they were laid off by Defendant Service Technology Corporation.1 Subsequent to their layoffs, they filed additional charges with the E.E. O.C. alleging retaliation on the part of STC because of their filing of the previous charges. The retaliation charges have since been dropped by Plaintiffs.
There is no controversy as to Plaintiff Price's timely filing of the civil action within the 90-day period after she received her notice of right to sue from the District Director of the E.E.O.C.2 Based on the evidence presented to the Court, the Court finds that Mrs. Price did file within the 90-day period as to her claims alleged in this civil action and concludes that it does have jurisdiction.
The parties have stipulated that one right to sue notice was issued to Mrs. Shaw. This notice was issued on April 29, 1974, and was only pertinent to her charge of retaliation. Therefore, she has not received a notice of right to sue as to allegations that she has made in the complaint in this civil action. The Court cannot therefore find that she has received a notice to sue as to these charges or that she filed this civil action within 90 days of the receipt of a pertinent notice of right to sue and must conclude that it does not have jurisdiction over Mrs. Shaw. But her claims will be discussed along with Mrs. Price's for the sake of this opinion and any possible appellate review.
At the outset, it would be best to set out in short form the business of Defendant as related to the Plaintiffs' employment. Defendant would secure contracts with the Federal Government, such as the one that Plaintiffs worked on. That contract was with the Army Electronics Command.
What Defendant's employees would do is to take the plans, specifications and other documents relating to a piece of equipment that the Army, Navy or Air Force was going to deploy in the field and list the parts. Then they would compare them to a general listing of parts maintained by the Government to ensure conformity with federal specifications. They then would determine the frequency of repair for the various components and elements of components, which parts should be replaced in the field, which should be repaired or replaced at a parts depot and which should only be replaced. They would also determine which replacement parts should be carried along with the equipment, which should be held at some depot or another and which should only be ordered from a supplier as needed. They also determined what tools would be needed at what location to effectuate repairs. They also developed the maintenance manuals for the equipment which covered both preventive maintenance and repair.
Of course, the sophistication of the equipment could and would vary tremendously. The more sophisticated the equipment, the more knowledgeable and trained the personnel of Defendant had to be to do the actual contract work and to coordinate the contract work.
I. When the Plaintiffs were hired in the summer of 1968, they were hired as Parts Listers "B," Labor Grade 3, at a salary of $366.00.
Besides their job description, there were seven other job descriptions in their department, all higher in level. They were, in ascending order, Parts Lister "A," Labor Grade 5; Senior Parts Listers, Labor Grade 6; Data Documentation Analysts, Labor Grade 22; Senior Data Documentation Analysts, Labor Grade 24; a Logistics Requirement Specialist, and a Technical Publications Editor.
Mr. Manuel Yglesias and Mr. Harry Fry, the Plaintiffs' superior, and his superior, set out in their testimony for Defendant the job descriptions for each of these positions in great detail. The sum of both Plaintiffs' testimony was that each person in the department was doing the "same" work. It is without dispute that the whole department was working on one or another similar contract with the Federal Government while the Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant and that the Plaintiffs only worked on one particular contract. It is dubious at best that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of discrimination by testifying that everyone in the department was doing the "same" work. Particularly so as the Plaintiffs could not at trial explain to much of any degree what they themselves did while employed by Defendant.
It is clear from the testimony of Mr. Yglesias and Mr. Fry that there were substantial differences in the positions occupied by various members of the department.3
Besides the Plaintiffs, four other persons were hired as Parts Listers "B," Labor Grade 3, in the Supply Support Section of Defendant. All four were Caucasians. Two were hired at the same salary as Plaintiffs and two at a slightly higher salary. The two with higher salaries ($375.00 and $390.00 as opposed to...
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