Price v. State

• Docket Number: A25-0871
• Decision Date: 09 February 2026
• Citation: Price v. State, A25-0871 (Minn. App. Feb 09, 2026)
• Parties: Rashawn Dyrone Price, Jr., petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

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Rashawn Dyrone Price, Jr., petitioner, Appellant,
v.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A25-0871

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

February 9, 2026

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-23-8449

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Hannah B. Laub, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mitchell S. Sell, Robbinsdale City Attorney, Eckberg Lammers, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Jesson, Judge. ^[*]

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EDE, JUDGE

After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating a motor vehicle. Appellant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence but later petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking a new trial and asserting that his right to equal protection under the United States Constitution was violated when the district court denied his challenge to respondent's exercise of a peremptory strike of a potential juror during selection. In this appeal from the district court's order summarily denying his postconviction petition, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion because (1) the court applied deferential review to its decision to deny appellant's challenge to respondent's peremptory strike and (2) respondent's peremptory strike was motivated by racial discrimination and respondent's proffered explanation for removing the potential juror was pretextual. Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Rashawn Dyrone Price Jr. with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(1) (2022), and having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating a motor vehicle, in violation of Minnesota

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Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(5) (2022).^[1] The matter proceeded to a jury trial over three days in November 2023, after which Price was convicted of having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of operating a motor vehicle and acquitted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The district court stayed execution of a 30-day jail sentence and placed Price on probation for two years, subject to certain terms and conditions. Although he did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, Price later petitioned for postconviction relief, which the state opposed and the district court summarily denied.^[2] The following summary of the undisputed facts relevant to this appeal stems from the district court's postconviction order, which is consistent with the trial record.

During jury selection, the state exercised peremptory strikes of two potential jurors—Juror 6 and Juror 1—each of whom identified as a racial minority. Price objected, contending that the state's use of two of its three peremptory strikes to remove potential jurors from racial minority groups was improper under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).^[3]

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As to Juror 6, the state responded to Price's Batson challenge by explaining that it had exercised a peremptory strike "because Juror 6 'was on her phone for much of the duration of voir dire and [the state believed] . . . that she [might] not pay attention during trial.'" The district court determined that "this was an adequate, race-neutral reason to exercise the challenge," and Price ultimately withdrew his Batson objection regarding Juror 6.

In response to Price's Batson challenge concerning Juror 1—"who had reported during voir dire that they were 'excited to be part of the process' of jury duty, had always wanted to go through the experience, and 'I like - watch [sic] TV crime shows'"—the state asserted that it had exercised a peremptory strike "because the [potential] juror was excited to be on the jury" and "people who are eager to be on the jury tend to read into things too much." Referring to convictions for driving while impaired (DWI), the state also

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maintained that it sought to remove Juror 1 because she "stated that her husband ha[d] two DWIs." Price countered that "leaving white persons on the jury panel who may have friends or relatives with [DWI] history rendered the state's reason a non-race-neutral one." The state replied by pointing to "a 'notable difference' in the lack of statements [by Juror 1] taking accountability or agreement with the [DWIs]," by "specifically compar[ing] the voir dire of Juror 1 with that of at least two other jurors who had expressed remorse for their own alcohol-related offenses," and by "reiterat[ing] its concerns about a potential juror being 'eager' to be on a jury."

The district court denied Price's Batson challenge as to Juror 1, finding that the state's "primary reason" for exercising the peremptory strike was that Juror 1 had expressed an "excitedness to be here, which was in contrast to many if not most of . . . the [potential] jurors [who] were here." And the district court cited the state's explanation that Juror 1's excitedness "was something different" that the state was "entitled to consider[,] . . . as long as it's not an inappropriate reason." The district court therefore determined that Price "had not proven purposeful discrimination and [had] not established that the race-neutral reasons given by the state were pretextual or that the real reason for the strike was based on Juror 1's race."

In his postconviction petition, Price requested that the district court grant him a new trial based on his claim that "his constitutional right to equal protection was violated when the . . . court wrongly denied his Batson challenge at trial."

As mentioned above, the district court summarily denied Price's petition. In its postconviction order, the district court quoted the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in

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State v. Harvey for the proposition that "[a]ppellate courts afford great deference to a district court's Batson ruling because the record may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the court may consider." 932 N.W.2d 792, 811 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

The district court determined that its "discussion on the record of its ruling did not elaborate on the first Batson factor," but noted that "[a]nalyzing a Batson challenge focuses on factors two and three when the district court proceeded to address them."

As to step two of the Batson analysis, the district court ruled that "the record does not indicate the court erred at trial" because the state had "proffered a race-neutral explanation": Juror 1's "degree of expressed eagerness to participate in jury duty." The district court observed that, "[w]hether the State's reason is persuasive is irrelevant, as they fulfilled their burden of production to provide a race-neutral explanation."

And on step three, the district court determined that Price "did not demonstrate the state's reason was a pretext for racial discrimination" because "[t]here are no facts on record compelling an inference of racial discrimination, and the State's justification for its decision sufficiently supports the Court's initial ruling on . . . [Price's] Batson defense." The district court noted that "demeanor can be [a] valid, race-neutral explanation[] for a peremptory strike" and that it had "considered what the [potential] juror stated and the way they expressed themselves about it." And the district court decided that the state's election to strike Juror 1, who had "exhibited and expressed a noteworthily distinct demeanor and attitude about being on a jury," along with "the nature of the description of the [potential] juror's family member's DWI history," did not result in "an explanation so implausible or

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fantastical that it suggest[ed] a pretext." In addition, the district court quoted Harvey, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (quotation omitted), in stating that,

[e]ven if . . . [it] could have reached a different impression by finding the state's reason to be a pretext for racial discrimination, . . . [Price] ha[d] not demonstrated from the record that the court committed clear error overcoming the "great deference" it is granted when reviewing a Batson challenge by reaching a different result than that advocated by [Price].

Price appeals.

DECISION

Price contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his petition for postconviction relief because (1) the court applied deferential review to its decision to deny his Batson challenge and (2) the state's peremptory strike was motivated by racial discrimination and its proffered explanation for removing the potential juror was pretextual.

Our review of a postconviction proceeding is limited to determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the findings of the postconviction court. Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1992). A "postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack on a judgment which carries a presumption of regularity and which, therefore, cannot be lightly set aside." State ex rel. Gray v. Tahash, 156 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Minn. 1968) (footnote omitted). Appellate courts "review a [district] court's summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion." Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). "A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of

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the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted)....