Price v. State

Decision Date26 November 1980
Docket NumberNo. 1279S356,1279S356
Citation274 Ind. 479,412 N.E.2d 783
PartiesRalph PRICE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

James A. Neel, Neel & Wyndham, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of murder in violation of I.C. § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1977). He was sentenced to forty years in prison.

At about 12:30 a. m., after a day of beer drinking, appellant went to the victim's home to talk to her about their amorous relationship. Later the victim gave appellant a ride home in her automobile. On the way, they stopped at the home of a friend of appellant, ostensibly to pick up some beer. While the victim waited in her car, appellant obtained a twenty-two caliber rifle and returned to the car. When they arrived at appellant's house, appellant shot the victim in the side with the rifle. As her body slumped, he reloaded the gun and fired a second shot. Appellant then went into his house and told his son what had transpired. His son didn't believe him, so appellant, with the body of the victim still in the car, drove to another son's home. From there, he was driven by one of his sons to his ex-wife's house where he was arrested by the police.

Appellant first claims the specific intent element of murder was not supported by sufficient evidence. Although there was evidence that appellant was intoxicated at the time he committed the offense, there was also evidence to the contrary. The arresting officer testified that approximately three hours after the incident, it was his opinion appellant had not been drinking. The decedent's daughter, who saw appellant shortly before the murder occurred, testified that appellant had been drinking, but that she didn't know whether he was drunk. This Court has stated that voluntary intoxication is no defense in a criminal proceeding, unless the defendant is so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming intent. Stevens v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 541, 542, 372 N.E.2d 165, 165-66.

The State produced other evidence which supported the conclusion that defendant acted intentionally. Defendant had directed the victim to drive him to a house where his rifle was located, where he obtained a gun, loaded it, and later fired it twice into the side of the victim. Where there is conflicting evidence concerning the question of voluntary intoxication, the presence of mental incapacity is a question of fact for the jury. Shackelford v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 698, 705, 349 N.E.2d 150, 155. In the case at bar, there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the jury's conclusion that appellant intentionally killed the decedent.

Appellant next raises the question concerning his defense of insanity. In the past, once the defendant raised the issue of insanity, the burden shifted to the State to prove a defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Greider v. State, (1979) Ind., 385 N.E.2d 424; Coonan v. State, (1978) Ind., 382 N.E.2d 157. In 1978, the Legislature changed the law and placed the burden of establishing the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence on a defendant. I.C. § 35-41-4-1 (Burns Supp.1978 as amended by Acts 1978, P.L. 145 § 9). This law became effective on April 1, 1978. Since appellant committed the crime on May 27, 1978, the new state is applicable to him. Appellant contends the statute flies in the face of justice and fair reasoning and that the State should not be relieved of the burden of proving a defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, as it must prove every element of a crime charged to obtain a conviction.

While placing the burden on a defendant to prove insanity is a recent development in Indiana, it has long been the law in a number of jurisdictions. See Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 30 at p. 52 (13th ed. 1972); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968). In Grace v. Hopper, 566 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 844, 99 S.Ct. 139, 58 L.Ed.2d 144 (1978), the Court stated, "(t)he states treat the insanity defense in different fashions; slightly more than half place the burden of disproving insanity on the prosecution, while the others place the burden of proving insanity on the defendant." Cases in jurisdictions which place the burden on the defendant view insanity as an affirmative defense, while those which place the burden on the state see sanity as an element of the offense. United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145 (D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 190 (1974); Chase v. State, (1962) Alaska, 369 P.2d 997; State v. Murphy (1936) 338 Mo. 291, 90 S.W.2d 103.

In United States v. Greene, supra, at 1155, the Circuit Court stated:

"The essential elements of the charge of felony murder do not include proof of sanity. If that were the case, the Government would be required to produce evidence establishing sanity beyond a reasonable doubt as part of its direct case, before the defendant introduced an iota of testimony, and that is not and never has been the law."

Although early Indiana cases hold that sanity is an element of a crime which requires a specific intent, the foundation of these cases is not based upon constitutional considerations. See Noelke v. State (1938) 214 Ind. 427, 15 N.E.2d 950; Fritz v. State (1912) 178 Ind. 463, 99 N.E. 727; Stevens v. State (1869) 31 Ind. 485. The Legislature has examined this state of the law and has seen fit to change the law. We must follow the legislative policy unless that policy is found to be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Benjamin v. Criminal Ct. of Marion Cty., (1976) 264 Ind. 191, 341 N.E.2d 495.

We hold the new statute placing the burden on a defendant is, in fact, constitutional. In a landmark case, Leland v. Oregon, (1952) 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302, the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon statute which required a defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In Rivera v. Delaware, (1976) 351 A.2d 561, the Delaware Supreme Court followed Leland v. Oregon and held that the Delaware statute requiring a defendant to prove mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence was constitutional. The United States Supreme Court refused to review Rivera for the reason that it lacked a substantial federal question. Rivera v. Delaware, (1976) 429 U.S. 877, 97 S.Ct. 226, 50 L.Ed.2d 160. One year after Rivera, the United States Supreme Court, in Patterson v. New York, (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 207, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2325, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 290, stated unequivocally that it was unwilling to reconsider Leland and Rivera. We hold that the statute placing the burden of proof of insanity on a defendant is permissible under the United States Constitution and under the Indiana Constitution.

Appellant further argues that under the Indiana Constitution, even though he may have the burden to produce a preponderance of the evidence establishing his insanity, once he has presented such evidence, the state must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. We do not accept defendant's construction of the statute. The statute clearly states, "the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence." I.C. § 35-41-4-1 (Burns Supp.1978, as amended by Acts 1978, P.L. 145 § 9.)

This Court will interpret a statute "so as to give efficient operation to the expressed intent of the legislature." State v. Bigbee, (1973) 260 Ind. 90, 93, 292 N.E.2d 609, 611. We hold the language of the statute is clear. We hold that it is the intent of the Legislature that the burden is now on the defendant. The State no longer needs to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the past, where the State had the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant could challenge the verdict of the jury by an assignment raising the sufficiency of the evidence. The standard of review is different under the new law. Where the party with the burden of proof suffers a negative judgment, a question on the evidence on which he had the burden of proof cannot be raised by an assignment of insufficiency of evidence. Graves v. City of Muncie, (1970) 255 Ind. 360, 264 N.E.2d 607. Such a question must be raised on an assignment that the verdict is contrary to law. Graves, supra, at 361, 264 N.E.2d 607, 608; Garbe v. Excel Mold, Inc., (1979) Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 296.

In the case at bar, the jury heard conflicting evidence on the issue of appellant's mental capacity. One psychologist testified that he had talked with appellant and administered various psychological tests which indicated appellant suffered from a mental defect. Two psychiatrists for the State had interviewed appellant and concluded that he was sane at the time of the offense. This Court will not weigh such conflicting testimony. To do so, would be an invasion of the province of the jury.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs over defendant's objection. State's exhibits 3, 5 and 6 are pre-autopsy pictures of the decedent. State's exhibit number 14 is a post-autopsy photograph of the victim's upper body and head. Trial courts are allowed wide discretion in determining the admissibility of photographic evidence. In Brandon v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 150, 155, 374 N.E.2d 504, 507, Justice Prentice articulated the test for admissibility of such evidence:

The test to be applied is whether or not the photographs are relevant to any material issue in the case, with the issue of relevancy determined by whether or not the photographs evidence anything that a witness would be permitted to testify to if identified and verified by the witness. Patterson v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482; Birkla v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 37, 323 N.E.2d 645.

In the instant case, exhibit number 3 depicts decedent as she appeared when the police first arrived....

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