Price v. Tunica Cnty. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 03 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4:20-CV-16-DMB-RP,4:20-CV-16-DMB-RP |
| Parties | GERUKA PRICE PLAINTIFF v. TUNICA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, SUPERINTENDENT MARGIE PULLEY, SHERWONDA DUNN, and TROSIKI PETTES DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Before the Court are Sherwonda Dunn and Trosiki Pettes' motion to dismiss Geruka Price's original complaint, Doc. #14; Tunica County School District and Margie Pulley's motion to dismiss Price's original complaint, Doc. #17; and the School District and Pulley's motion to dismiss Price's amended complaint, Doc. #28.
On January 29, 2020, Geruka Price filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Tunica County School District, Superintendent Margie Pulley, Sherwonda Dunn, and Trosiki Pettes,1 alleging state and federal claims based on the non-renewal of her employment contract. Doc. #1. After United States Magistrate Judge Roy Percy ordered Price to show cause why her case should not be dismissed for failing to timely serve the defendants, Doc. #6, Price requested an extension to perfect service, Doc. #7. Judge Percy granted the motion and extended the "deadline for serving process ... to May 18, 2020."2 Doc. #8 atPageID 41. Dunn and Pettes were personally served on April 28, 2020. Doc. #9. The School District and Pulley were purportedly served through Stanley Ellis, the assistant superintendent of the School District,3 on May 4, 2020. Docs. #12, #13.
On May 19, 2020, Dunn and Pettes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. #14; see Doc. #15. One week later, the School District and Pulley moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for insufficient service of process. Doc. #17.
The next day, on May 27, 2020, Price filed a seven-count amended complaint against the same defendants. Doc. #19. Price purportedly served the School District and Pulley (through their attorney, Paul Watkins) that day. Docs. #24, #25. Six of the amended complaint's seven counts are asserted against the School District: "Count I: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy," "Count III: Retaliation in Violation of Title IX," "Count IV: Sex Discrimination in Violation of Title VII," "Count V: Retaliation in Violation of Title VII," "Count VI: Interference with Right to Reinstatement in Violation of the FMLA," and "Count VII: Retaliation in Violation of the FMLA." Id. at 8-13. Pulley, Pettes, and Dunn, in their individual capacities, are named only in "Count II: Intentional and Malicious Interference with Employment Contract."4
Price filed a response opposing Dunn and Pettes' motion to dismiss her original complaint on June 1, 2020. Doc. #20. On June 5, 2020, Price filed a response opposing the School District and Pulley's motion to dismiss her original complaint. Doc. #26.
On June 10, 2020, the School District and Pulley filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.5 Doc. #28. Price responded in opposition to the motion. Doc. #30. The School Districtand Pulley replied. Doc. #36.
Dunn and Pettes argue that because "[n]one of Plaintiff's causes of action allow for individual liability ... her claims against [them] must be dismissed." Doc. #15 at 1. Price responds that the filing of her amended complaint "adding a separate claim for malicious interference with employment" against the individual defendants moots Dunn and Pettes' motion to dismiss the original complaint. Doc. #20.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), a party may amend a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required within "21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), ... whichever is earlier." Generally, "[a]n amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect." King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the filing of an amended complaint will ordinarily moot a pending motion to dismiss unless the amended complaint "on its face" fails to address the alleged defects identified in the motion to dismiss. See McIntyre v. City of Rochester, 228 F. Supp. 3d 241, 241-42 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) ().
Price filed her amended complaint eight days after Dunn and Pettes filed their motion to dismiss. See Docs. #14, #19. The amended complaint specifically addresses Dunn and Pettes' argument that they are not individually liable by adding a claim for "intentional and malicious interference with employment contract" against Dunn and Pettes (and Pulley). Doc. #19 at 9-10. A school principal and superintendent "might conceivably be held liable for tortious interference with contract in performing their official duties if their conduct was sufficiently malicious."Samsel v. Desoto Cnty. Sch. Dist., 242 F. Supp. 3d 496, 531 (N.D. Miss. 2017); see Papagolos v. Lafayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 972 F. Supp. 2d 912, 933 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (). Because this is the only claim asserted against Dunn and Pettes in the amended complaint, Dunn and Pettes' motion to dismiss Price's original complaint is moot and will be denied as such.
The School District and Pulley's motion to dismiss the original complaint raises a similar argument that "Price's claims do not allow for individual liability against Defendant Pulley." Doc. #17. As explained above, the filing of the amended complaint, which includes a malicious interference claim against Pulley, renders this argument moot.
The School District and Pulley also argue that the claims against them should be dismissed for improper service. Doc. #18 at 2-4. After Price filed the amended complaint, the School District and Pulley filed a subsequent motion to dismiss which presents the same arguments regarding Price's first attempt at service and adds additional arguments related to Price's second attempt at service. Docs. #28, #29. Because the amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and because the School District and Pulley's subsequent motion supersedes their first motion to the extent it includes the same arguments as their first motion, their first motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.
The School District and Pulley's motion to dismiss the amended complaint argues that the claims against Pulley should be dismissed because Price failed to properly serve Pulley and thatthe claims against the School District should be dismissed because service on the School District was untimely. Doc. #29 at 1, 3.
Pulley argues service was ineffective because she "was not personally served, she did not receive a copy of the summons and Complaint at her place of abode, and neither Dr. Ellis nor [Pulley's] counsel was designated as her agent for service of process." Doc. #29 at 3. Price's response does not address the attempt to serve Pulley through Ellis but argues that Watkins agreed to accept service and "had actual and/or apparent authority to accept service on [Pulley's] behalf." Doc. #30 at 2. Pulley replies that service through Watkins was untimely and that Watkins never agreed to accept service. Doc. #36 at 2.
"'When service of process is challenged, the serving party bears the burden of proving its validity or good cause' for failing properly to effect service." Shabazz v. City of Houston, 515 F. App'x 263, 264 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sys. Signs Supplies v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1990)). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an individual may be served by (1) "delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;" (2) "leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there;" (3) "delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process;" or (4) in accordance with state law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). The Mississippi Rules provide for similar methods of service on an individual.6 See Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
There is no contention that Pulley was served personally or that the summons andcomplaint were left at her home with someone who lives there. The relevant question then is whether under federal law either Ellis or Watkins was "an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process" on Pulley's behalf, so as to satisfy Rule 4(e)(2)(C),7 or whether Ellis or Watkins was so authorized under state law, so as to satisfy Rule 4(e)(1).
Price does not argue that Ellis or Watkins were authorized by law to receive service of process. Neither does Price contend that Ellis was authorized to accept service for Pulley. Rather, Price focuses on an alleged appointment of Watkins to accept service. In Watkins' declaration, he states that he was never authorized to accept service for Pulley and that he told Price's counsel, Ashley Satterfield, that he was not authorized to accept service. Doc. #28-3. However, Satterfield's declaration states that Watkins said "he could and would accept service on behalf of both" the School District and Pulley. Doc. #37 at PageID #171.
For service under Rule 4(e)(2)(C ), "the agency relationship, if one exists, must be for the specific purpose of receiving service of process." Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Hampton, 117 F.R.D. 588, 591 (S.D. Miss. 1987). Under federal law, "[t]he existence of an attorney-client relationship does not, in itself, convey authority to accept...
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