Price v. United Mine Workers of America, 15046.

• Decision Date: 03 October 1964
• Docket Number: No. 15046.,15046.
• Parties: R. P. PRICE, C. H. Kelly and Follace Fields, Partners, d.b.a. Elkhorn Coal Company, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

336 F.2d 771 (1964)

R. P. PRICE, C. H. Kelly and Follace Fields, Partners, d.b.a. Elkhorn Coal Company, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15046.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

October 3, 1964.

M. E. Boiarsky, Charleston, W. Va., and Harrison Combs, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

James S. Greene, Jr., Harlan, Ky., and Logan E. Patterson, Pineville, Ky., Patterson & Berger, Pineville, Ky., on brief, for appellees.

Before WEICK, Chief Judge, O'SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, and PRETTYMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

WEICK, Chief Judge.

This appeal presents questions concerning the liability of United Mine Workers of America under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947,¹ and the common law of Kentucky, for damages to Elkhorn Coal Company's business and property sustained by reason of the alleged commission by the Union of unlawful acts of secondary boycott, violence and depredation during an organizational strike in the coal fields of the Hazard-Letcher County, Kentucky area in 1959.

The case was tried before a jury in the District Court resulting in a plaintiffs' verdict, based on answers to interrogatories, in which the jury fixed compensatory damages at $150,000 and punitive damages at $100,000.

Two cases arising out of the same strike in Kentucky have been before this Court. Flame Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 303 F.2d 39 (CA 6, 1962) cert. denied 371 U.S. 891, 83 S.Ct. 186, 9 L.Ed.2d 125; Sunfire Coal Co., et al. v. United Mine Workers of America, 313 F.2d 108 (CA 6, 1963) cert. denied 375 U.S. 924, 84 S.Ct. 268, 11 L.Ed.2d 166. In these cases the activities of UMW were revealed and need be repeated only briefly here.

The strike extended into the coal fields of Tennessee where similar acts of depredation were committed. These acts were detailed in our opinions in Allen v. United Mine Workers of America, 319 F.2d 594 (CA 6, 1963); White Oak Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 318 F.2d 591 (CA 6, 1963) cert. denied 375 U.S. 966, 84 S.Ct. 484, 11 L.Ed.2d 415; Gilchrist v. United Mine Workers of America, 290 F.2d 36 (CA 6, 1961) cert. denied 368 U.S. 875, 82 S.Ct. 120, 7 L.Ed.2d 76 and United Mine Workers of America v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (CA 6, 1960) cert. denied 364 U.S. 881, 81 S.Ct. 169, 5 L.Ed.2d 103.

Many of the questions raised in the present appeal have been repeatedly urged before us and decided adversely to UMW in the cases cited in the preceding paragraphs. They need not be redetermined.

After the oral arguments in this appeal were made and while the case was being considered by the Court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Morton v. Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, 200 F.Supp. 653, aff'd 320 F.2d 505 (CA 6, 1963) cert. granted 375 U.S. 939, 84 S.Ct. 348, 11 L.Ed.2d 270. Thinking that Morton might control some of the issues here, we postponed further consideration to await the decision of the Supreme Court. Morton has now been decided² and leave was granted to counsel to file supplemental briefs in this appeal.

UMW contends that Morton controls the issues here. It argues that we have misapplied the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in this case and in the cases which we have previously decided. It contends that Congress preempted the entire field in the enactment of Section 303 and, therefore, the state courts no longer have jurisdiction of a common law tort action for damages against a labor union for conspiracy or malicious destruction of a business or property; that it is wholly immaterial whether primary or secondary activities are attended by instigated riots, shootings or other methods of mob force and violence; that the sole remedy of an injured victim is a federal action under Section 303 in which jurisdiction is limited and state remedies may not be applied; that since jurisdiction has been preempted there is no pendent jurisdiction.

We do not understand that Morton sanctions any such propositions. Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court, was careful to point out many times that Morton was a case of peaceful picketing and did not involve violence. He stated that a different rule applied to union violence, as follows:

"And in cases involving union violence, state law has been permitted to prevail by reason of controlling considerations which are entirely absent in the present case. `We have allowed the States to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order. International Union, United Automobile, etc., Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 1030; United Construction Workers, etc., v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025. * * * State jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction. * * *\'", Id. at 257, 84 S.Ct. at 1257.

Morton affirmed the award of compensatory damages for a Section 303 violation but denied recovery for items of damage not covered by the Act, even though permitted by state law, because in the absence of force and violence the field was preempted by federal law. If Morton had been brought in the state court instead of the federal court, only federal law could have been applied. The Court indicated that since the state court would have been without authority to award damages under state law, the District Court under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction had no greater power to do so.

Section 303 provides a remedy only for damages to business or property caused by unlawful secondary activities. It affords no remedy for injuries to person. It does not apply to unlawful primary activities. If UMW's contention is correct that Congress has preempted the entire field and there is no state or pendent jurisdiction, then the hapless victim of personal injuries, or damages inflicted to his property by unlawful primary activities is left without remedy in either state or federal courts. He could not sue for damages for an assault and battery committed on his person or for malicious destruction of his property or business.

We are taught, however, in Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1957) and United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025 that Congress, in enacting Section 303, did not deprive the victim of tortious conduct of his common law rights for all damages suffered. In Laburnum, the Supreme Court said:

"To recover damages under that section (303) is consistent with the existence of jurisdiction in state courts to enforce criminal penalties and common-law liabilities generally. On the other hand, it is not consistent to say that Congress, in that section, authorizes court action for the recovery of damages caused by tortious conduct related to secondary boycotts and yet without express mention of it, Congress abolishes all common-law rights to recover damages caused more directly and flagrantly through such conduct as is before us." Id. at 666, 74 S.Ct. at 838-839.

UMW attempts to distinguish these cases on the ground that jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and not on Section 303 and that Section 303 provided a remedy which was not available in Russell and Laburnum. This is a distinction without a difference for their principles are applicable. The contention is refuted by the above quoted language in Laburnum where state jurisdiction was recognized in Section 303 cases.

Section 303 does not immunize unlawful acts of force and violence or malicious destruction of property committed by anyone in the course of a strike whether characterized as primary or secondary. It is not a haven for such conduct.

Pendent jurisdiction became firmly embedded in federal law by the decision of the Supreme Court in Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77 L.Ed. 1148 (1932) which has been cited and relied on many times by the federal courts. See also: Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629, 66 S.Ct. 445, 90 L.Ed. 358 (1945); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 325, 59 S.Ct. 191, 83 L.Ed. 195 (1938); Rumbaugh v. Winifrede Railroad Co., 331 F.2d 530, 539 (CA 4, 1964). Under Hurn, piecemeal adjudication of a claim by different courts was eliminated. When a substantial federal claim is asserted the federal court has jurisdiction to fully determine it including its local aspects. The federal and state claims are regarded merely as different grounds to support a single cause of action. United Mine Workers of America v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (CA 6, 1959) cert. denied 359 U.S. 1013, 79 S.Ct. 1149, 3 L.Ed.2d 1038. This permits an award of punitive damages where authorized by state law. Automobile Workers v. Russell, supra, 356 U.S. at 646, 78 S.Ct. 932.

The fact that a voluntary unincorporated labor organization may not be amenable to process in its common name in Kentucky does not affect the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court, for Section 303 permits suits against such an organization. We are concerned here with substantive rights not mere state procedural problems.

The complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a substantial claim justiciable not only under federal law but by the common law of Kentucky. Paragraph 5 alleges a secondary boycott to induce Elkhorn's employees to engage in a concerted refusal, in the course of their employment, to handle or work on coal produced by other employers with the object of forcing plaintiffs to cease doing business with other employers and force them to recognize or bargain with UMW as the representative of the employees of such other...